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## МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ РЕФОРМЫ И ПРАКТИКИ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ СЛУЖБЫ

ЖУРНАЛ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОГО ХАБА  
В СФЕРЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ СЛУЖБЫ В АСТАНЕ



Regional Hub of Civil Service in Astana was established under the initiative of the Government of Kazakhstan and UNDP on 15 March, 2013 in Astana during the Founding conference with participation of 25 countries' and 5 international organizations' representatives, including the USA, the European Union, Turkey, China, India, Japan, CIS countries, Georgia, Afghanistan, and also UNDP, OECD, World Bank, OSCE and USAID.

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*Paper guidelines:*  
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Приглашаем практиков и ученых стран – участниц Регионального хаба и других стран направлять статьи, кейс-стади и обзоры книг для пятого номера журнала.

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PRACTICE NO. 4 DECEMBER 2014

Contents

**CIVIL SERVANTS' PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL**

---

- Performance Appraisal and Performance-Related Pay in Government:  
The Case of South Korea* . . . . . 11  
Pan Suk Kim, President of the Asian Association for Public  
Administration (AAPA), prof. Yonsei University South Korea
- Performance appraisal as an instrument of quality improvement of  
providing the public services* . . . . . 32  
Daniyar Bakchiev, Head of Information and analytical work  
and development department of the State Personnel Service  
of the Kyrgyz Republic
- Recommendations and proposals of Global conference participants:  
"Civil service personnel management: current issues and prospects",  
Astana, May, 22 2014.* . . . . . 55

**PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY**

---

- Improvement of work with the managerial personnel as a factor of public  
services quality improvement* . . . . . 61  
[Anatoly Morozevich] Rector of the Academy of  
administration under the President of the Republic of  
Belarus, Doctor of Engineering, Professor
- Register of public services as a component of system of electronic  
government in the Russian Federation.* . . . . . 79  
Evgeny Styryn, Leading researcher of the Institute  
of public and municipal administration of the National  
Research University "Higher School of Economics",  
Russian Federation

## EFFECTIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

---

*Comparative Analysis of Public Administration Reforms in Former Socialist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe . . . . . 93*

Juraj Nemec , Profesor, Masaryk University Brno Czech Republic  
Matej Bel, University Banska Bystrica, Slovakia

*Comparative Analysis of Institutional Reforms and Human Resource Capacities of Public Administrations in Post-Soviet countries . . . . . 114*

Yernar Zharkeshov, Head of the Research Center of the Regional Hub of Civil Service in Astana

*Federal Executive Institute of the United States of America: Amid Epochal Changes & On-going Public Administration Challenges . . . . . 154*

Chester Newland, Ex-director of Federal Executive Institute (FEI) of the Office of Personnel Management of the USA, Emeritus Distinguished professor of public administration, University of Southern California

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ РЕФОРМЫ И ПРАКТИКИ  
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ СЛУЖБЫ, №4, ДЕКАБРЬ 2014

Содержание

**ОЦЕНКА ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ  
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ СЛУЖАЩИХ**

---

*Оценка эффективности деятельности и зарплата, основанная на результатах работы, в правительстве: опыт Южной Кореи* 11

Пан Сук Ким, Президент Азиатской ассоциации  
государственного управления (ААРА),  
профессор университета Йонсеи, Южная Корея

*Оценка деятельности как инструмент повышения качества предоставления государственных услуг. . . . .*32

Бакчиев Данияр, Заведующий отделом  
информационно-аналитической работы  
и развития Государственной кадровой службы  
Кыргызской Республики

*Рекомендации и предложения участников Глобальной конференции: «Управление персоналом государственной службы: состояние и перспективы», Астана, 22 мая 2014 г. . . . .*55

**ОКАЗАНИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ УСЛУГ**

---

*Совершенствование работы с руководящими кадрами как фактор повышения качества государственных услуг . . . . .*61

Морозевич А. Н., ректор Академии управления  
при Президенте Республики Беларусь,  
доктор технических наук, профессор

*Реестр государственных услуг как компонент системы электронного правительства в Российской Федерации . . . . .*79

Стырин Е. М. ведущий научный сотрудник Института  
государственного и муниципального управления НИУ  
Высшая школа экономики, Российская Федерация

## ЭФФЕКТИВНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ

---

*Сравнительный анализ реформ государственного управления в бывших социалистических странах Центральной и Восточной Европы. . . . .* 93

Юрай Немец, профессор, Университет Масарик  
Брно Матей Бел, Чешская Республика; Университет  
Банска Быстрица, Словакия

*Сравнительный анализ институциональных реформ и человеческого потенциала государственного управления в постсоветских странах . . . . .* 114

Ернар Жаркешов, Руководитель Исследовательского  
центра Регионального хаба в сфере государственной  
службы в Астане

*Федеральный институт повышения квалификации управленцев Соединенных Штатов Америки: среди эпохальных изменений и продолжающихся проблем государственного управления . . . . .* 154

Честер А. Ньюланд, экс-директор Федерального  
института повышения квалификации управленцев (FEI)  
при Офисе управления персоналом государственной  
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## NOTES FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

Dear Reader,

The fourth issue of the journal of the Regional Hub of Civil Service in Astana – International Journal of Civil Service Reform & Practice highlights articles of scholars and practitioners for your potential interest.

This issue begins with the article of a widely known and distinguished scholar Pan Suk Kim, who analyzes the performance-based pay system in the OECD countries as opposed to seniority-based pay for civil servants, and considers a case-study of Korea. In the example of Kyrgyzstan D. Bakchiyev investigates one of the instruments of raising the quality of public service delivery which is introduction of performance appraisal of civil servants. The article of A. Morozevich investigates various aspects and issues of personnel policy in public administration and contains recommendations for handling the managerial level. Y. Styryn in his article sheds light onto the features and ways for improving the register of public services of Russia as part of e-government.

In the section on effective public administration, J. Nemec provides in his article an analysis of administrative reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and draws reader's attention to how widespread the principles of New Public Management still are as well as to decreasing in

many countries of trust in public institutions and politicians. Y. Zharkeshov provides analogues analysis of PA reforms in Central Asia and Caucasus and concludes that a key factor of national development is quality of public institutions and governance. The analysis demonstrates that post soviet countries appear to be interesting and under researched cases of transformation efforts to market which were heavily influenced by such global trends of the 1980s and 1990s as notorious Washington consensus. In his article a distinguished practitioner and life-long international career civil servant Chet Newland analyses the development of the US Federal Executive Institute in light of the shift of the American society from elitism towards inclusive growth, emphasizing the remaining challenges ahead and potential solutions to them.

This issue also features recommendations of the participants of the Global conference on civil service held within the framework of VII Astana Economic Forum in 2014.

We hope the fourth issue will be of interest to you and that it will spark policy debates on the issues addressed by the above scholars. We would once again like to thank those who have provided their invaluable advice and guidance in developing this journal.

*Yours Sincerely,  
Editorial Board*

Уважаемый читатель,

Представляем Вашему вниманию четвертый номер журнала Регионального хаба в сфере государственной службы в Астане – Международный журнал реформы и практики государственной службы, содержащий статьи ученых и практиков в сфере государственной службы.

Данный номер начинается со статьи известного ученого и практика Пан Сук Ким, который анализирует развитие системы оплаты труда государственных служащих от оплаты за выслугу лет к оплате за эффективность работы в странах ОЭСР, разбирает интересный кейс по опыту Кореи. На примере Кыргызстана Д. Бакчиев рассматривает один из инструментов повышения качества государственных услуг – внедрение системы оценки деятельности госслужащих. Статья А. Морозевича раскрывает различные аспекты и проблемные вопросы кадровой политики в системе государственного управления, а также содержит рекомендации по организации и совершенствованию работы с руководящими кадрами. Е. Стырин в своей статье освещает особенности и пути совершенствования реестра государственных услуг в Российской Федерации как элемента системы электронного правительства.

В разделе по эффективному государственному управлению Ю. Немец в своей статье проводит анализ административных реформ в странах Центральной и Восточной Европы и акцентирует внимание читателя на таких аспектах, как широкое распро-

странение в мире принципов Нового государственного менеджмента и уменьшение во многих странах доверия к государственным институтам и политикам. Е. Жаркешов проводит аналогичный анализ реформ в странах Центральной Азии и Кавказа и делает вывод, что ключевым фактором развития страны является качество ее государственных институтов и управления. В анализе показано, что постсоветские страны представляют собой интересные, малоизученные примеры трансформации к рынку, на которых значительно повлияли глобальные тренды 1980-х и 1990-х годов, такие как печально известный Вашингтонский консенсус. В своей статье известный глобальный практик госуправления Честер Ньюланд анализирует развитие Федерального института повышения квалификации управленцев США в свете перехода Американского общества от элитизма к инклюзивному обществу, акцентируя имеющиеся вызовы и потенциальные решения.

Также в номере опубликованы рекомендации и предложения участников Глобальной конференции по госслужбе, состоявшейся в рамках VII Астанинского экономического форума в 2014 г.

Надеемся, что четвертый номер будет представлять интерес и вызовет дебаты по вопросам, затронутым учеными. Мы хотели бы еще раз поблагодарить тех, кто дал бесценные советы и рекомендации в развитии данного журнала.

*С уважением,  
редколлегия*

**CIVIL SERVANTS'  
PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL**

**ОЦЕНКА ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ  
ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ  
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ СЛУЖАЩИХ**





# PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL AND PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY IN GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA

*Pan Suk Kim<sup>1</sup>*

## **Abstract**

*Many OECD countries began to move from the single pay scale toward more flexible pay arrangements that have pay for performance, and not pay for seniority. The purpose of this study is to review the case of South Korea on pay flexibility in the Korean civil service. Since a performance evaluation is a key element in performance management system, performance appraisal systems in the Korean Central Government are first elaborated, followed by discussion of two performance-related pay systems (performance-related pay for higher-level officials and performance-related pay for middle- and lower-level officials) used in the Korean central government. After that, the impact of pay flexibility in government, policy implications, and concluding remarks are presented.*

**Key Words:** *performance appraisal, performance-related pay, pay flexibility, Korea, performance management*

## **I. Introduction**

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries have moved towards a flexible pay arrangement in the public sector which is, in essence, a combination of key features of performance-related pay (PRP) and differentiation (Manning, 2001; OECD, 2005; Hasnain, Manning, and Pierskalla, 2012). A recent World Bank report (2014) asserts that pay flexibility can improve performance directly through financial incentives and indirectly through improved management with greater efforts by managers, although there is general scepticism in the public administration literature on this topic. It has been argued that

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traditional pay arrangements are unable to ensure that performance objectives are met within fiscal constraints. Consequently, many OECD countries began to move from the single pay scale toward more flexible pay arrangements that have pay for performance, and not pay for seniority (OECD, 2005; World Bank, 2014).

The purpose of this study is to review the case of South Korea (hereafter, Korea) on pay flexibility in the Korean civil service in looking at performance appraisal systems and performance-related pay systems. The Korean government has several different pay tables that include: general service, public security service, research service, support service, technical service, constitution researchers, police and fire fighters, teachers, professors, military service, and labour. Pay tables are slightly different from each other due to the nature of each public service provided. There are pay differences within and across government ministries, departments, and agencies depending on the nature of their service. For example, the average pay level of the public security service is slightly higher than the general service, although the pay difference is not highly significant.

Generally speaking, the Korean civil servant's salary is composed of base pay, allowances and welfare expenses. The base pay is the regular pay that is paid "by grade and pay step" according to the degree of responsibility and difficulty of the position, and length of service. The allowances constitute additional remuneration that is paid separately according to the position and living condition of individuals; and they include family support allowances, allowances for working in special areas, allowances for special work, allowances for extra work, and bonus or performance-related pay. The welfare expenses that are paid for civil servants' welfare include items such as meal payments, job grade assistance payments, traditional holiday payments, and unused vacation payments (Kim, 2003).

Historically, the pay structure for Korean civil servants was based on the rule of seniority. The rate of pay was determined according to the length of service with automatic salary increases every year. The concept that the payoff of a civil servant was a reward for length of service rather than job performance has remained almost unchanged. In the past, the pay did not function as an incentive for better job performance. In the middle of the 1990s, the Korean

government introduced the special bonus system for the first time, but failed to implement it effectively. In 1999, right after the IMF Bailout, the Korean government introduced the performance-related pay system with more serious methodical preparation and a stronger willingness to implement. Socioeconomic difficulties have led to the need for different types of incentives other than promotion to enhance performance management. It aimed at strengthening the competitiveness and performance of the public service. The main goals of the introduction of the performance-related pay system were: (1) to create a hard-working atmosphere in the public office; (2) to attract competent and professional talent from the private sector into the public sector; and (3) to spread a competitive attitude in the government so that every civil servant can carry out his or her tasks with liveliness and creativity. Most categories of staff are covered by PRP schemes, with two different systems applying to top-level staff and mid-managers and below (Kim and Kim, 1997; Kim, 2003, 2012; Kim and Hong, 2013).

The performance-related pay system is operated in connection with the performance management systems. There are two types of programs in the performance-related pay system: the annual merit incremental program for higher-level officials and the performance bonus program for middle- and lower-level officials. The annual merit incremental program for higher-level officials is divided into two portions: the fixed pay portion and the variable (performance-related) pay portion. The variable pay portion is paid separately according to the performance appraisal grade; and the appraisal grade is determined on the basis of the appraisal result of each official. The performance appraisal system for middle- and lower-level officials is the performance bonus system. The general guidelines for the performance appraisal system and PRP arrangements are defined by the central personnel authority. PRP arrangements are defined in the following two decrees: the Decree of Compensation for Civil Servants and the Decree of Allowances for Civil Servants.

## *II. Performance Appraisal System in the Korean Central Government*

The performance appraisal system has been relatively well institutionalized in the Korean government (Kim, 2010, 2011). The legal foundations of this performance appraisal system include: (1)

the National Civil Service Act (articles 40 and 51); and (2) the Decree on the Civil Servant Performance Appraisals and Related Matters. Article 51 of the National Civil Service Act requires that the head of each government agency should evaluate the performance of his or her employees regularly in an objective and fair way and reflect such results in public personnel management records. Article 40 also indicates that promotion should be based on performance appraisal and other forms of evaluation. The National Civil Service Act was originally promulgated in 1949 and it has been revised several times since then. Detailed issues on performance appraisal are written in the performance appraisal decree. The performance appraisal decree was originally passed in 1961 and it has been renamed several times. The current Decree on Civil Servant Performance Appraisals and Related Matters was expanded in 2005. Currently, the central personnel authority is responsible for making or revising public personnel policies including performance appraisal systems.

In Korea, Grade 9 is the lowest level, while Grade 1 is the highest career level in the civil service. Above Grade 1, there are two more levels such as minister and deputy minister levels and both of these levels are political appointments. There are two different types of individual-level performance appraisal management systems in the Korean government: performance agreement for higher-level officials and general performance appraisal for middle- and lower-level officials (See Table 1).

*Table 1: Performance Appraisal Systems in the Korean Central Government*

Targeting Grade Levels*	Appraisal Systems
Grade 4 and above including members of the Senior Civil Service (SCS)	Performance Agreement System
Grade 5 and below (Middle- and lower-level officials)	General Performance Appraisal System

\* Note: The target groups of the performance agreement are government officials who are director-level (Grade 4), director-general-level (Grade 3), and above. The target groups of the general performance appraisal system are government officials who are deputy-director-level (Grade 5) and below.



First, the performance agreement system applies to civil servants above grade 4 (managers) and equivalent grade levels including members of the Senior Civil Service (SCS). This performance agreement system is an evaluation system based on a performance agreement in relation to performance goals and indices, made between the head of the agency and heads of departments and bureaus. Evaluation items could include: individual-level performance, organizational-level performance based on his/her position as a manager (i.e., in terms of citizen satisfaction on service delivery, citizen satisfaction on major public policies, telephone response, knowledge management, deregulation, etc), and/or job-related abilities (competency, ethical integrity, etc). This system evaluates a manager's performance relevant to the 'performance agreement', and then the results can be applied to personnel management including the provision of performance-related pay and/or promotion (Kim, 2003; OECD, 2005). The nature of the performance agreement varies depending upon the type and task of the ministry. This is based on an individually-specific performance agreement along with strategic organizational goals in a given organization. For example, the policy-oriented departments have more qualitative targets, while the service delivery-related departments have more quantitative targets.

Second, a general performance appraisal system is applied for civil servants below grade 5 and equivalent grade levels. This evaluation is conducted by superiors to their subordinates to evaluate his or her individual performance (MOPAS, 2009). The typical performance appraisal system is based on a check list or rating scale that could be based on two major areas: (1) job performance in major performance goals or major tasks in terms of job difficulties, completeness, and timeliness; and (2) job-fulfilling abilities (core competencies such as planning, communication, cooperative team work, execution, innovation, customer-orientation, etc (these items can be differentiated by the job nature of each agency)). In addition, job-performing attitude can also be selected as an evaluation criterion, but most government agencies do not include it due to the possibility of making potential evaluation errors.

The result of each individual's performance appraisal could be used for various public personnel management purposes including

promotion, compensation, capacity building (training and education), and placement. Each person should be informed of his or her individual appraisal result and there is an appeals process if someone is dissatisfied with the outcome. Each agency has a certain degree of autonomy in terms of selecting appraisal items and the individual performance appraisal is designed to allow each ministry to decide the elements and scores by considering the details of each case depending upon the nature of the job of each agency.

In addition, there is an “organizational-level” performance management system in the Korean government and public bodies in the form of the organizational performance evaluation or the management assessment for public organizations. The term ‘organizational performance evaluation,’ specifically targeting central and local governments, has officially been in use since the Basic Act on Government Performance Evaluation in 2001, when the Cabinet Office conducted a general evaluation on government organizations. The organizational performance evaluation is a general performance evaluation system of organizational-level performance, which includes the evaluation of central government, local governments, government-invested enterprises, government-supported research institutes, and executive agencies. Such an evaluation is usually conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office and the result of this organization-level performance evaluation usually affects the tenure of the head of the agency. Overall government evaluation is handled by the Government Performance Evaluation Committee (GPEC) in the Office of the Prime Minister. The Government Performance Evaluation Committee, co-chaired by the Prime Minister and an external expert, is composed of not more than 15 people including three ministers (from the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and the Prime Minister’s Office) related to evaluation supervision and several private experts. Policies implemented by central ministries and local governments are evaluated in order to ensure the responsibility, efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. Agencies subject to evaluation are central ministries, local governments, and public bodies.

Government performance evaluation has two major evaluation components: (1) self-evaluation (central ministries or local

governments evaluate their own policies based on three areas such as major policies, financial projects, and organizational capability, and then the Government Performance Evaluation Committee verifies and corrects the supporting materials for self-evaluation); and (2) specific evaluation (the Government Performance Evaluation Committee evaluates central ministries in terms of three major areas such as regulatory reform, customer satisfaction, and specific government policies). All of the evaluation results are put together and forwarded to the Cabinet Council. A Government Performance Evaluation Report Meeting is held the following year. Meanwhile, non-departmental public bodies have been evaluated through the public body management evaluation system. Organizational-level PM targeting Korea's public bodies were introduced in 1984. Along with the revision of related laws, the organizational-level PM for public bodies now covers more than 200 quasi-governmental organizations including 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The Korean government can grant the citation of outstanding performance and/or the financial incentives to an agency that received an evaluation of 'excellent', based on the result of the organizational-level performance evaluation, and the head of an agency that received an evaluation of excellent from the Government Performance Evaluation Committee could be provided with an award, bonus, and/or promotion to government officials who made substantial contributions to the increase of organizational-level performance (in accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of the Basic Act on Government Performance Evaluation).

### *III. Performance-Related Pay System*

#### *3.1. Performance-Related Pay for Higher-Level Officials*

The Korean government established the Senior Civil Service (SCS) in 2006 and SCS includes the Director-General (DG) level (generally, its starting level is equivalent to Grade 3) and above in the career service. Minister- and Deputy Minister-levels are political appointees and they are not part of the SCS. The Senior Civil Service performance-related pay system applies to the civil service in grades 1 to 3 and contracted civil service and there are two levels in SCS: level A and level B. The pay is composed of four types of payments: the base pay, job pay, the performance-related

pay, and other allowances. SCS member's maximum base pay is currently 82,464,000 won (approx. 74 158 USD), while its minimum base pay was 55,397,000 won (approx. 49 817 USD) in 2013. Job pay depends on the nature of each job in terms of its responsibilities and difficulties of job fulfilment. PRP depends on the appraisal grade which has four categories (S, A, B and C).

**Table 2: Appraisal Grade and Pay Rate**

Performance Agreement-based Appraisal Result	Grade S (Outstanding)	Grade A (Good)	Grade B (Satisfactory or Normal)	Grade C (Weak and/or Very Weak)
Pay rate	15%	10%	5%	0

As shown in Table 2, if someone obtains Grade S, he/she will get an increase of 15 percent of the standard base pay. Likewise, if someone has Grade A or B, he/she will receive 10 or 5 percent of the standard base pay, respectively. However, if someone receives Grade C, no PRP will be awarded. As of 2013, the standard base pay for the Level-A of SCS was 80,518,000 won (approx. 72 408 USD), while the standard base pay for the Level-B of SCS was 67,100,000 won (approx. 60 341 USD). Based on the performance appraisal results from the previous year, the individual PRP pay amount is determined by multiplying the standard base pay by the pay rate assigned to the relevant appraisal grade of an individual.

### **3.2. Performance-Related Pay for Middle- and Lower-Level Officials**

Performance bonuses are paid to government employees annually and designed for mid- and lower-level employees (Grade 4 and below). The performance bonus is paid once a year after appraisal. However, if the minister in charge takes the matter of increased organization performance and official motivation into account, it can be paid twice or more in a year if necessary. Performance bonuses can be provided in various ways on an individual basis, on a departmental basis, and combinations of both. The performance bonus is paid as a lump sum allowance. However, the minister in charge may decide to divide the allowance in months based on the acceptance of opinion from an affiliated employee.

The performance bonus must be given within the range of budget, however, if paid only once a year after appraisal for the year of 2013, the amount paid will be 110% of the average monthly base pay amount (130% is applied for armed servicemen). However, if the performance bonus is paid twice or more in a year, the minister in charge may change the average amount paid based on the number of appraisals made. The minister in charge should determine the performance bonus payment based on the period of each appraisal and reasonably allocate the payment within the budget. For example, where the performance appraisal is made twice as of the second half of 2012 and the first half of 2013, the first performance bonus payment will be allocated in half of the budget (6 months, given the total appraisal period is 12 months), and the second payment will be based on the other half of the budget.

### *3.3. Performance Bonus Payment Methods: Differentiation and Delegation*

Based on the characteristics of the institution and employees, the minister in charge may consult with officials in the organization to rationally choose the most optimal payment method for performance bonuses that are listed below. Basically, there are four different ways of PRP payment: (1) individually differentiated payment; (2) equal individual payment after a departmentally differentiated payment- if an agency chooses this method, it must consult with the central personnel authority; (3) utilizing a combination of both individually and departmentally differentiated payments; and (4) individually differentiated payment after a departmentally differentiated payment. In addition, the minister in charge may adjust the payment methods if necessary, based on the occupation and tasks of each department.

For the purpose of performance increases of the entire organization and the settlement of this performance-based payment system, the minister in charge may adjust the method of payment based on the characteristics of policy-formation-oriented department, policy-implementation-oriented department, street-level office, and cross-shift working office. If necessary, the minister in charge may pay the performance bonus based on methods that are not listed above, if having first consulted with the central personnel authority. The

performance bonus is paid through each affiliated organization or department. The minister in charge may consolidate an organization or department if necessary. Each agency should have a PRP review committee comprised of a minimum number of 3 to a maximum number of 7 members who are senior to those subject to payment (the head of department in the case of department payment). The PRP review committee decides the priority of the payment of the performance bonus and picks out the rank of those with an equal score. Also, it reviews the payment for officials who raise an appeal. The minister in charge is responsible for the general adjustment of the overall performance bonus system, separate from the PRP review committee, and maintains a PRP management committee in order to review the performance bonus payment plans. The following contents are based on payment after appraisal once a year. For cases where the performance bonus is paid twice or more a year, the payment plan must be adjusted based on the appraisal frequency and period.

*A. Individually Differentiated Payment: the most common method in the Korean Government*

The performance bonus is paid based on the appraisal of individual performance based on their occupation and rank. The head of organization may consolidate or separate occupations or ranks for payment if necessary. The payment classification and rating of the performance bonus are shown in Table 3. The performance bonus amount varies: (1) an excellent performer (top 20%) with Grade S gets over 172.5% of his/her standard salary; (2) an outstanding performer (21-60%) with Grade A receives 125% of his/her standard salary; (3) a normal performer (61-90%) with Grade B gets 85 percent of his/her standard salary or below; and (4) a low performer (bottom 10%) with Grade C receives no performance bonus. However, the pay scope can be adjustable upon the characteristics of each government agency. Before 2009, the Korean government "recommended" to each agency to have a fair distribution of the pay scope: (1) an excellent performer (top 20%) with Grade S; (2) an outstanding performer (21-60%) with Grade A; (3) a normal performer (61-90%) with Grade B; and (4) a low performer (bottom 10%) with Grade C. In 2009, however, the Korean government set a new policy for enforcing a "forced distribution." The Grade S should be granted

to “top 20 percent or less” and the Grade C should be given the “bottom 10 percent or more.” In other words, it is impossible to rate almost everyone as highly satisfactory. As of 2012, 30 government agencies are using this method including the Office of the Prime Minister and many others. The minister in charge may decide to apply ratings that differ from the pay scope and a rating list above through collection of opinion among the officials in charge. Criteria for applying alternative pay scope and payment rating based on classification include: (1) there should be 3 or more pay grades; (2) the highest grading pay rate should be more than 172.5%, which is more than 3 times the rate of the lowest rank (except in the case where the lowest grade of pay rate is 0%); (3) the pay scope should normally be distributed between pay grades, and the pay scope of a single pay grade should not exceed 60%; (4) the pay rate gap between pay grades should, if possible, be even; and (5) any standards that differ from the criteria listed above should be consulted with the central personnel authority.

*B. Equal individual payment after departmentally differentiated payment*

The departments in which it is difficult to evaluate individual performance based on the characteristics of occupation or organizations with systemized shift work may consult with the central personnel authority in order to have a differentiated performance bonus by department while receiving equal amount of performance in a given department. In other words, a performance bonus will be paid evenly based on rank within the department, while each department might have a different amount of performance bonuses. If an agency chooses this method, it must consult with the central personnel authority. The criteria for performance appraisal for each department are set by the minister in charge based on the characteristics of occupation. In the situation where evaluations such as performance contracts are applied, unless there are special circumstances, the evaluation results by the head of department should be applied. The PRP review committee is placed in each performance bonus payment department or organization, and is comprised of up to 7 members (possibly 3 or more), who are senior to those subject to payment, and selected by the head of department in the case of department payment. However, in the situation where there is a shortage of superiors, personnel with the equal

rank may be chosen. Based on the PRP criteria, the PRP Committee adjusts the performance appraisal results of each department in order to determine their relevant appraisal grades. As of 2012, no government agency uses this method.

*C. Utilizing a combination of both individually and departmentally differentiated payments*

This method combines two methods based on both the individual and the department allocation of the performance bonus budget to each method by nearly half and half. The performance bonus can be differentiated by each department's performance level (the amount of bonus cannot exceed 50 percent of the total performance bonus budget) and its proceeds will be equally shared by officials in the department. In the process of the departmental evaluation, overall department distribution should have a normal distribution and one appraisal grade should not exceed 60 percent of all departments. A line ministry should make at least three appraisal grades. For example, a department that gets the Grade S could receive 95 percent of the performance bonus, while a department that gets the Grades A, B, or C, could receive 80, 50, or 45 percent, respectively (the highest bonus pay rate should be double that of the lowest pay rate). Within a department, the bonus granted for a departmental-level performance will be distributed equally to each official. The minister in charge may provide additional information in regards to departmentally differentiated pay methods. In addition, each official will be evaluated by his/her performance and the result will be differentiated. In order to do so, the performance appraisal grade and pay rate should be set by the minister in charge along with the consultation with the central personnel authority. In most cases, the pay scope and pay rate for the individual performance bonus is similar to the Type A as discussed above (Individually Differentiated Payment). As of 2012, 10 government agencies are using this method including the Ministry of Environment.

*D. Individually differentiated payment after departmentally differentiated payment*

Performance bonus payments are made per department after the performance appraisal of each department. After that, an



individual performance bonus is distributed based on each individual's performance appraisal result. The minister in charge may provide additional information in regards to departmental pay methods. In the process of the departmental evaluation process, the department's overall distribution should be normal and one appraisal grade should not exceed 60 percent of all departments. A line ministry should make at least three appraisal grades. The highest bonus pay rate should be double that of the lowest pay rate. The minister in charge may refer additional information in regards to departmentally differentiated pay methods. As of 2012, 4 government agencies are using this method including the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Korean National Policy Agency, the National Human Right Commission and the Rural Development Administration.

*E. Alternative Payment Method set after consulting the Minister of Public Administration and Security*

A government agency can use its own performance bonus payment methods. For example, an agency can distribute the performance bonus equally to each department. After that, a division head can evaluate his/her staff's performance and then distribute the bonus based on an individual's appraisal results. The head of department should interview each official individually and notify him or her of the relevant pay grade arrived at, and the reasoning. As of 2012, no government agency uses this method.

***IV. Discussion on the Impact of Pay Flexibility***

Although the overall impact of PRP on motivation could be ambivalent, PRP could act as a motivator, by providing extrinsic rewards in the form of pay and intrinsic rewards through the recognition of effort and achievement (OECD, 2005). There are not many studies on the Korean PRP issues in Korea. At the individual level, each person is keen to be aware of his or her performance level and civil servants are accustomed to being able to realize his or her performance goals and record his or her performance. In doing so, it also improved the quality of the performance dialogue between staff and managers. In other words, each official is responsible to recognize his/her performance goals and requirements so that

the performance management system helps the dialogue between staff and managers in a given organizational setting. Performance appraisals rely on the assessment of pre-identified objectives and on dialogue with line management. Introducing PRP can be the catalyst that allows possible changes to occur and, at the same time, facilitates a renegotiation of the “effort bargain” thus assisting in recasting the culture of public organizations (OECD, 2005). During the performance appraisal process, a mid-term check is required for both sides. A manager needs to see his/her staff in the middle of each year and discuss overall or expected performance, while a member of staff can discuss his/her tasks and roles in the organization to achieve performance goals with a manager. Managers should openly communicate the organization’s new expectations, and clearly delineate the new criteria in the context of PRP. To do that, it is essential for both managers and employees to be trained in order to reduce resistance to the new system and to establish a performance-oriented culture. Moreover, PRP could complement the results-based management, performance-based budgeting, or other public sector reforms because PRP stimulates a lever for the introduction of wider management and organizational change. In the early stages of implementing a performance management system, public managers might have to act as change agents to encourage employees to bring innovative ideas in order to build more efficient government work processes and provide a vision for further organizational reforms.

In performance management and measurement, agencies should set SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-based) goals because such goals could support the business success of public organizations. Therefore, setting the rules of the game is very important for the success of PRP. Performance goals should reflect major activities and responsibilities of a government official. Government officials pay attention to key activities that are measured. However, if some activities are not measured by a performance appraisal framework, he/she may not focus on those activities. Therefore, the Korean government requires senior civil servants to identify several key performance targets rather than one or two performance goals. Moreover, the general performance appraisal system for middle- and lower-level officials reviews performance goals in three aspects: task completeness, achievement

timeliness, and job difficulties. Some people may pursue relatively easy tasks, while some people may have relatively difficult tasks. In order to minimize a gaming or such evaluation error, job difficulties are commonly evaluated in addition to the quantity of tasks, job completeness, and timeliness. In other words, both quantity and quality should be considered comprehensively in the process of performance measurement.

Sungjoo Han (2010) reviewed the Korean PRP in-depth with a selective number of government officials and found that PRP was effective in making government officials realize the importance of their performance. According to Han's study (2010), many Korean central government officials admitted the political symbolism of PRP system, although they do have some reservations about the appropriateness of its appraisal methods and evaluation results. According to Han's study (2010), Korean central government employees perceive that performance management along with PRP is a global trend so that they do not resist it, but many government officials indicated that the fairness of the performance appraisal is critical to the successful implementation of PRP system in the public sector. PRP for higher performers is a motivational factor, but the motivational impact of PRP for low performers was not significant. Government officials also perceived PRP as a complementary tool to supplement one's salary and it is also viewed as managers' tool for organizational management. Han also (2010: 36) asserts that the Korean central government implemented a relatively well based PRP on its official standards differentiating PRP, while Korean local governments carried out appraisals and awarding bonuses with a lack of differentiation among government officials. Han's claim is also partially supported by Lee's study (Lee, 2010). In the central government, PRP seems to have become relatively well established but the implementation of PRP in the Korean local governments, particularly in rural municipalities, needs to be improved in terms of improving overall transparency and fairness of the appraisal and its process. Han (2010: 44) also reports that relatively young and high-performers are more supportive for PRP than old and low-performers.

According to Heetae Lee (2010: 149), 47.2 percent of local government employees in the Pusan Province felt positively toward

the necessity of the performance bonus system, while 26.8 percent of respondents were neutral and 26.0 percent of respondents were negative. However, 40.4 percent of respondents were not satisfied with the current performance bonus system, while 30 percent of respondents were neutral and 29.6 percent were positive. Overall, many local government employees recognized the necessity of the performance bonus system, but they were not satisfied with the current system due to its lack of fairness. Many respondents indicated that it lacks the rationality of performance standards and performance measurement as well as the objectivity of a good performance appraisal process (Lee, 2010: 152). The performance appraisal process is at the heart of the PRP system. Therefore, the performance appraisal scheme should be continuously improved and practiced in a way that places its legitimacy and fairness beyond any doubt. Among respondents, 38.5 percent of respondents were positive about the contribution of the performance bonus to the willingness to work, while 39.7 percent of respondents were neutral and 21.8 percent of respondents were negative. In addition, 36.7 percent of respondents were positive about the contribution of the performance bonus to the improvement of performance, while 45.5 percent of respondents were neutral and 17.8 percent of respondents were negative (Lee, 2010: 150).

The nature and characteristics of each department in the agency seems to affect the performance appraisal results of government officials. Based on the in-depth interviews, Han (2010: 40) asserts that many interview respondents indicated that those who are working in core departments such as policy-making or coordinating departments get better performance appraisals than ones in peripheral departments such as operational departments because core departments deal with more strategic issues and often meet top leadership in the agency and the government. In any organization, jobs are not equally distributed: some departments have more work and some departments have less work. In such cases, Han asserts that those who work in the departments with more work are likely to get better performance appraisal results than ones in the departments with less work. Han (2010) also indicates that those who work in the office of human resource management or inspection or monitoring are more supportive for PRP system than those working in other departments. Moreover, PRP seems to be

more effective in agencies with relatively easily measurable outputs, such as the service-delivery agencies (employment, welfare, health, collection, other social service agencies, etc.)

The Korean government PRP system has significantly affected many public bodies including state-owned enterprises and public corporations. According to Ilyong Kwon (2010: 129), more public bodies had introduced PRP than private companies: 71 percent of public bodies have PRP, while only 49 percent of private companies. However, the average amount of PRP in private companies was higher than that in public bodies (Kwon, 2010). Overall, PRP is now well institutionalized in Korea, both in private and public sectors. Although methodological debates on the performance appraisal system and PRP payment continue, the necessity of PRP has been widely accepted and approved in Korean society including the public sector. Over the years, the role of human resources management, in general, and performance management in particular, has become very important in public management. In particular, the role of each line ministry has been expanded in order to meet new tasks including implanting PRP with an increasing degree of flexibility. In the past, a function of HRM in many line ministries belonged to the Department of General Affairs, but the function of HRM has been expanded significantly over the years due to the increasing trend of delegation transferring authority over HRM from a central personnel agency to line ministries and agencies. Consequently, most central line agencies and local governments have their own department of HRM because the HRM department has now more delegated power on HRM. The Korean government has initiated continuous civil service reform in the past several years in order to promote professionalism and the global competitiveness of the Korean government.

Moreover, the role of trade unions is usually significant in the process of reform in many countries. For example, the role of trade unions has been very active and critical in the Korean private sector. However, the role of the government employees' union was not critical until the late 1990s with the exception of the teachers' union. Authoritarian governments did not allow government employees to have a union until the late 1990s. In fact, the Law on the Establishment and Operation of the Teachers' Union was

promulgated in 1999. However, the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTU) was originally established as an illegal entity in 1989 and active before 1999. For general government employees, the related law had been made several years later. The Law on the Establishment and Operation of the Government Employees' Union was promulgated in 2005. Originally, the Korean Association of Government Employees' Work Councils in 1999, which became the Korean Government Employees' Union (KGEU) as an illegal entity in 2002. Currently, the Korean Government Employees' Union (KGEU) is actively trying to achieve the common goals of government employees such as having better working conditions. Regarding PRP, the KGEU actively opposed it because PRP was introduced in the Korean government well before the KGEU was established. In other words, the KGEU's voice was not integral in the process of PRP implementation because the KGEU had its own struggle for institutionalizing itself in that decade. However, the KTU was strongly against it when the government introduced PRP in the public schools. The KTU attempted to differentiate teachers from general government employees and delayed the expansion of a PRP system for teachers for several years. PRP for teachers was officially introduced in 2001, but the KTU tried to distribute PRP among teachers equally. Consequently, unlike general government employees, teachers have PRP, but a large proportion of it has been distributed among teachers equally. Nevertheless, many teachers are now seeing PRP as an unavoidable trend of HRM and the overall societal influence of KTU has declined in recent years.

### *V. Policy Implications and Conclusions*

PRP fits within the wider performance management issues. The political community such as the National Assembly is supportive of performance management in government and the National Assembly has promoted performance budgeting and its related systems over the years. Consequently, when the Korean government introduced PRP in the 1990s, the National Assembly supported the idea enthusiastically because it was a politically appealing idea. PRP may be a politically feasible and fiscally less costly way of increasing public sector salaries (World Bank, 2014).

However, the implementation of PRP is not simple and easy. When the National Assembly reviewed the overall implementation of a

PRP system in the Korean government, it found a certain degree of leniency of performance appraisal particularly for SCS members. In the past, overall performance evaluation for SCS was generally positive so that the National Assembly demanded that the Korean central government improve the performance appraisal of SCS members. Consequently, the performance appraisal system has been changed making sure of a relative and more objective evaluation, instead of an absolute evaluation, in order to minimize the moral hazard of performance appraisal in giving all good grades. In the process of performance appraisal, at least three categories (Grade S, Grade A, and Grade B) should be maintained now. In other words, it is not acceptable to have only one (Grade S only) or two categories of grade (Grades S and A only) in the performance appraisal in a given agency or department. In other words, more monitoring and oversight must be done by the National Assembly and/or civil society in the process of performance appraisal and PRP payments.

Furthermore, individual-level performance management is useful, but it is not sufficient. In order to enhance overall performance of governments in addition to individual-level performance appraisal, the Korean government established an “organizational-level” performance management system in the public sector including government agencies and public bodies in the form of the organizational performance evaluation for government agencies and the management assessment for public organizations. Accordingly, the Korean government promulgated the Basic Law on Government Performance Evaluation in 2001 in order to improve performance of government tasks, the quality of public policy and satisfaction of citizens. The term ‘organizational performance evaluation,’ targeting central and local governments as well as public bodies, has officially been in use since the Basic Law on Government Performance Evaluation in 2001, when the Cabinet Office conducted a general evaluation on government organizations. Overall government evaluation is handled by the Government Performance Evaluation Committee (GPEC) in the Office of the Prime Minister. Meanwhile, non-departmental public bodies have been evaluated through the public body management evaluation system. Policies implemented by central ministries and local governments are evaluated in order to secure the responsibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the national administration. Agencies subject to evaluation are central ministries, local governments, and public bodies.

Overall, pay flexibility with performance-related pay is an appealing idea, but experience indicates that its implementation is complex and it may bring some negative side effects (Kim and Hong, 2013). For example, individual rewards may breed harmful competition among peers and group-based rewards could encourage free-riding; small rewards may have limited effects, while large rewards could further encourage number gaming (managing by numbers) and perverse incentives (Hood, 2007; World Bank, 2014). Thus many questions remain and much more research is needed in the future.

Nonetheless, performance is a topic that is now a popular catch-cry around the world and performance management has become a new organizational management doctrine. Under the global economic crisis, almost every public and private organization is struggling with a performance challenge, one way or another. Various aspects of performance management have been extensively discussed in the literature and the field of management in both private and public management. The term “performance management” was not utilized in Korea until the 1980s, but now, the language of performance has become an almost every-day feature of work in many public and private sector organizations. Therefore, it is fair to say that performance management with pay flexibility has become irreversible and it appears to be a new social norm in South Korea.

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## ОЦЕНКА ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ ПОВЫШЕНИЯ КАЧЕСТВА ПРЕДОСТАВЛЕНИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ УСЛУГ

Бакчиев Д.Б.<sup>1</sup>

### **Аннотация**

*Кыргызская Республика в 2010 году провозглашена социально ориентированной страной, а качественное предоставление государственных услуг стало краеугольным камнем для достойной жизни и свободного развития гражданина.*

*Практически пришло понимание, что неэффективная система предоставления государственных услуг тормозит экономическое и социальное развитие страны, к тому же является благодатной почвой для коррупции. Тем более что именно от доступности и качества предоставления государственных услуг общество оценивает всю систему государственного управления.*

*В соответствии с целями Национальной Стратегии устойчивого развития Кыргызской Республики на период 2013–2017 годы, утвержденной Указом Президента Кыргызской Республики от 21 января 2013 года № 11, одной из ключевых задач является переход к построению «сервисного государства» с переориентацией на оказание услуг населению. Стратегическая цель заключается в восстановлении доверия граждан к системе государственного управления посредством повышения качества предоставления государственных услуг.*

*За последние несколько лет принят ряд важных мер в сфере предоставления государственных услуг. Сформирован принципиально новый Реестр государственных услуг и принят Типовой стандарт государственных услуг, а также подписан Закон Кыргызской Республики «О государственных и муниципальных услугах». Достижение столь значимых результатов, несомненно, является важным критерием повышения качества предоставления государственных услуг.*

<sup>1</sup> Заведующий отделом информационно-аналитической работы и развития Государственной кадровой службы Кыргызской Республики, магистр государственного управления по специализации Управление человеческими ресурсами (Международный университет Японии), советник государственной службы 2 класса.

*Однако в данной статье будет рассмотрен другой немаловажный фактор в качественном предоставлении государственных услуг, а именно государственные служащие, которые непосредственно предоставляют государственные услуги населению. О том, как оценка деятельности государственных служащих влияет на качество предоставляемых услуг.*

**Ключевые слова:** государственная услуга, горизонтальное продвижение, оплата труда, оценка деятельности, коэффициент кратности.

### **Несколько слов о реформе в сфере государственных услуг**

С развитием сферы частных услуг, граждане все чаще задаются вопросом об эффективности системы государственного управления, которое отражается через предоставление государственных услуг.

Эти вопросы всё чаще обсуждаются в обществе. Задаются этими вопросами и государственные служащие, ведь в структуре внутреннего валового продукта Кыргызской Республики доля услуг составляет более пятидесяти процентов.

Учитывая качество услуг предоставляемых частным сектором, то почему бы оказание услуг не передать частному сектору, почему этим занимается государство?

Такой вопрос кажется логичным, но не все услуги можно передать в частные руки, так как многие услуги не приносят прибыли, но необходимыми для общества.

С переходом Кыргызской Республики к рыночной экономике и демократической системе управления государство поменяло приоритеты. Произошло переосмысление сути государственного аппарата. Защита и удовлетворение потребностей граждан стало задачей номер один для государственной власти.

Граждане платят налоги, из которых выделяются средства на содержание и функционирование государственного аппарата.

Вполне оправданно, что граждане требуют качественного предоставления государственных услуг.

Стоит отметить, что услуги всегда оказывались государством, но общество не имело возможности оказывать влияние на качество предоставляемых услуг.

В последнее время поменялось отношение к предоставлению государственных услуг. Предприняты меры по совершенствованию системы предоставления государственных услуг гражданам Кыргызской Республики.

Реформа системы государственных услуг была начата в конце 2009 года, но активная фаза работ отмечается в последние два года.

В результате реформирования данной системы разработана методика формирования перечня государственных услуг. Данная методика отражена в Положении о порядке формирования единого систематизированного реестра (перечня) государственных услуг, предоставляемых физическим и юридическим лицам государственными органами исполнительной власти и бюджетными учреждениями Кыргызской Республики от 31 марта 2011 года №129.

По мнению О.С. Тарбинского (2014) созданная методика является уникальной, она не имеет аналогов в других странах, так как создавалась исходя из местных условий и нашей практики. Коренное отличие заключается в том, что в перечень услуг вошли именно те услуги, которые оказываются на основе обращения и потребностей граждан, а не навязанные населению государством: лицензии, разрешения, контрольные проверки и т.д. Такой подход, кстати, был применён в соседних государствах – Российской Федерации и Республике Казахстан, где в перечень услуг были включены лицензии и разрешения. Впервые в Реестре были обозначены не только платные, но и бесплатные государственные услуги, чтобы граждане точно знали, за какие услуги следует платить, а какие они вправе получить от государства бесплатно.

До начала реформы Реестр включал в себя около 125 платных услуг, предоставляемых 21 государственным органом. Позже сформирован новый Реестр, утверждённый постановлением Правительства Кыргызской Республики «Об утверждении Единого реестра (перечня) государственных услуг, оказываемых органами исполнительной власти, их структурными подразделениями и подведомственными учреждениями» от 10 февраля 2012 года № 85, включающий на данный момент 400 государственных услуг, из которых 242 – платные услуги и 158 – бесплатные услуги.

Следующим этапом реформирования системы предоставления государственных услуг стала разработка потребительских стандартов государственных услуг. В настоящее время разрабатываются стандарты по каждой из 400 услуг, на что требуется немало времени. В связи с этим разработан Типовой стандарт государственных услуг, утвержденный постановлением Правительства Кыргызской Республики от 3 сентября 2012 года № 603.

Одновременно с этим продолжается работа по автоматизации предоставления государственных услуг. Некоторые государственные услуги уже частично оказываются посредством использования современных информационно-коммуникационных технологий.

Параллельно с этим проделана значительная работа по совершенствованию системы оплаты труда государственных и муниципальных служащих на основе оценки их деятельности, ведь от профессионализма последних в большей степени зависит качество предоставляемых государственных услуг.

### **Совершенствование системы оплаты труда служащих**

В соответствии с Концепцией модернизации государственной службы Кыргызской Республики, в целях создания эффективной системы оплаты труда служащих, основанной на взаимосвязи системы оплаты труда с результатами деятельности служащих, иерархией должностей, определения реальных критериев стимулирования и продвижения по

службе, разработана Программа совершенствования системы оплаты труда государственных и муниципальных служащих Кыргызской Республики на 2013–2020 годы.

Прежде заработная плата государственных и муниципальных служащих Кыргызской Республики традиционно подвергалась лишь механическому увеличению, при отсутствии координированных усилий по реформированию всей системы. Уровень заработной платы большинства служащих отставал от уровня заработной платы других отраслей государственного и негосударственного секторов.

Механизм мотивации служащих ограничивался рамками вертикального продвижения, отсутствовала возможность финансового стимулирования, оценки деятельности служащих не была связана с результатами их деятельности. Фактически, реальная заработная плата большинства служащих не позволяла привлекать и удерживать квалифицированные кадры.

#### *Анализ прежней системы оплаты труда служащих*

Отсутствие скоординированных действий и большое количество нормативных правовых актов Кыргызской Республики, регламентирующих условия оплаты труда служащих, затрудняло их применение и зачастую порождало серьезные препятствия для повышения эффективности и прозрачности ранее действовавшей системы оплаты труда, которая характеризовалась следующими ключевыми проблемами:

1) Несовершенство нормативной правовой базы в сфере оплаты труда служащих. Некоторые нормы по заработной плате регулировались отраслевыми законами и подзаконными актами Кыргызской Республики. В этой связи, большое количество норм и правил, регулирующих условия оплаты труда, являлись взаимоисключающими и зачастую преследовали узковедомственные интересы, в результате чего возникали трудности при их реализации.

2) Несовершенство принципов в установлении условий оплаты труда государственных и муниципальных служащих. Уровень зарплаты служащего зависел от занимаемой должности

без учета объема работы, сложности и ответственности выполняемых им функциональных обязанностей. Вследствие этого, служащие, находящиеся на одном должностном уровне, но выполняющие функциональные обязанности различного объема, уровня сложности и ответственности, получали одинаковую зарплату.

Ранее действовавшие реестры государственных и муниципальных должностей, утвержденные указами Президента Кыргызской Республики от 27 августа 2007 года № 385 и от 28 июня 2006 года № 327, не обеспечивали прямой связи между классификацией должностей и уровнями оплаты труда.

3) Разность подходов в установлении заработной платы служащих. Это было связано с дифференцированным размером минимальной базовой ставки и коэффициентов кратности, используемых для исчисления заработной платы сотрудников государственных органов, их подведомственного и территориального уровней и органов местного самоуправления. Минимальная базовая ставка была различна как между государственными органами (министерство, агентство, комиссия), так и между уровнями управления (центральный аппарат, подведомственный орган, областной и районный (городской) уровни). Такая дифференциация размера минимальной базовой ставки привела к значительным перекосам в системе оплаты труда.

В дополнение к должностному окладу в каждом государственном органе имелись различные виды надбавок к заработной плате, премиальные и выплаты, которые отражали не системность подхода к тому или иному государственному органу. Отдельные государственные учреждения имели возможность выплачивать своим сотрудникам дополнительные суммы за счет специальных средств и фондов, что еще больше подрывало справедливость существующей системы.

Анализ заработной платы показывает, что несистемные увеличения оплаты труда осуществлялись тремя основными способами:

- увеличение уровней минимальной базовой ставки;
- внедрение новых надбавок и премиальных;
- увеличение значений коэффициентов кратности.

Все вышеперечисленные факторы полностью изменили единые подходы по формированию заработной платы служащих, что существенно увеличило соотношение между должностным окладом и общей величиной заработной платы. В некоторых государственных органах соотношение должностного оклада к среднемесячной заработной плате составляло всего тридцать процентов, что является крайне низким по сравнению с международными стандартами.

#### *Принципы совершенствования системы оплаты труда служащих*

Предлагаемая новая система оплаты труда основана на принципах, содержащихся в Конституции Кыргызской Республики и законодательстве Кыргызской Республики, о государственной и муниципальной службе, с использованием международной практики в сфере оплаты труда. Эти принципы включают в себя:

*Прозрачность.* Система оплаты труда должна быть прозрачной и понятной для служащих и представителей общественности.

*Стимулирование развития карьеры.* Коэффициент сжатия (разница между минимальным и максимальным размером оплаты труда работников) должен быть разумным и стимулировать их в стремлении продвигаться на более высокие должности. Согласно международным стандартам, соотношение 1:4–1:5 предполагает хороший стимул для карьеры на государственной и муниципальной службе (включая выпускников высших учебных заведений).

*Эффективность.* Достижение максимального результата деятельности государственных органов и органов местного самоуправления через усовершенствование системы оплаты труда и установление фонда оплаты труда, как органической составляющей программного бюджета.



*Стимулирование профессионального роста.* В предшествовавшей системе оплаты труда механизм мотивации служащих был ограничен рамками карьерного (вертикального) продвижения. Внедрение принципа горизонтального повышения оплаты труда поможет стимулированию результативных служащих без их карьерного продвижения.

*Единообразии.* Система оплаты труда учитывает различные уровни ответственности каждого конкретного типа управления и различия в уровнях ответственности, сложности должности на различных уровнях управления: центральном, территориальном уровне и на уровне органов местного самоуправления.

*Конкурентоспособность на рынке труда.* В долгосрочной перспективе необходимо обеспечить конкурентоспособность заработной платы служащих с оплатой труда в негосударственном секторе.

*Финансовая устойчивость.* Фонд заработной платы должен сохраняться в рамках установленного для бюджетной сферы предела.

*Оплата в зависимости от выполнения обязанностей.* Увеличение должностного оклада по горизонтали должно отражать степень эффективности выполняемой работы на основе оценки эффективности деятельности служащих.

*Обеспечение социальной защищенности служащих.* Право на вознаграждение за труд не ниже установленного законом прожиточного минимума.

*Справедливость.* Обеспечение оплаты труда служащих максимально приблизить к действию принципа «Равная оплата за равную работу».

*Этапы и основные меры реформирования системы оплаты труда*

Совершенствование системы оплаты труда служащих предусматривает 2 этапа реформирования:

I этап – на 2013–2016 годы;  
II этап – на 2017–2020 годы.

Основные меры, предусмотренные на I этапе реформы (2013–2016 годы):

- внесены изменения и дополнения в нормативные правовые акты Кыргызской Республики с целью введения новой системы оплаты труда, обеспечивающей гармонизацию и упорядочение условий оплаты труда служащих;
- внедрены новые реестры государственных и муниципальных должностей;
- установлена единая минимальная базовая ставка для всех уровней государственного управления.

В целях достижения справедливости, прозрачности и унификации системы оплаты труда установлена единая минимальная базовая ставка для всех уровней государственного управления, размер которой не ниже прожиточного минимума. При этом, в долгосрочной перспективе, размер минимальной базовой ставки должен ежегодно исчисляться Национальным статистическим комитетом Кыргызской Республики и предусматриваться в республиканском бюджете на соответствующий год. Также, в долгосрочной перспективе, предлагается установить, что размер минимальной базовой ставки не подлежит налогообложению и удержанию отчислений страховых взносов.

На данном этапе на основе экономического анализа выявлена оптимальная величина минимальной базовой ставки для 2014 года – 5000 сом. Таким образом, минимальный уровень оплаты труда для низового уровня управления (айылокмоту) будет являться первым шагом и составит 5000 сомов;

- интегрировать в должностной оклад тринадцатую заработную плату, а также путем применения поправочных коэффициентов к должностному окладу – надбавку за творчество, проявление инициативы и заинтересованности в результатах труда.

В долгосрочной перспективе также предусматривается долю должностного оклада максимально приблизить к 80 процентам от общей заработной платы;

- внедрить в качестве основы новой системы оплаты труда унифицированную модель системы заработной платы;
- осуществить поэтапное внедрение новой модели системы заработной платы;
- разработать и внедрить Положение о порядке проведения оценки деятельности государственных и муниципальных служащих с использованием ключевых показателей эффективности;

Основные меры, предусмотренные на втором этапе реформы (2017–2020 годы):

- в зависимости от финансовых ресурсов и исключая факторы, могущие привести к ухудшению условий оплаты труда, осуществить постепенный переход государственных органов, имеющих иную систему оплаты труда, на новую модель оплаты труда;
- интегрировать ряд надбавок и выплат в должностной оклад;
- установить единую минимальную базовую ставку для всех категорий и групп должностей служащих не ниже прожиточного минимума, размер которой не подлежит налогообложению и удержанию отчислений страховых взносов;
- осуществить дальнейшее продвижение системы оценки деятельности служащих;
- планируется в 2017–2020 годах внедрить новую модель системы заработной платы государственных служащих центральных аппаратов государственных органов, имеющих иную систему оплаты труда.

#### *Новая унифицированная модель системы заработной платы*

Для того чтобы завершить процесс реформирования системы оплаты труда и обеспечить ее единообразие, внедрена новая модель системы заработной платы. Эта модель основывается на новой структуре градации должностей, установленной в новых реестрах государственных и муниципальных должностей. Модель системы заработной платы включает элементы вертикального и горизонтального продвижения служащих: Вертикальное продвижение основывается на следующих принципах:

- соответствие количества уровней оплаты труда количеству уровней, используемых при классификации государственных и муниципальных должностей;
- в целях мотивации служащих, принимающих на себя более высокий уровень ответственности, разница в оплате между всеми уровнями должна составлять не менее 20 процентов, за исключением разницы между высшими уровнями (15 процентов).

Горизонтальное продвижение предусматривает принцип горизонтального повышения оплаты труда, основанного на результатах оценки деятельности служащих.

Существовавшие проблемы в различии между должностями различных уровней государственного управления и иерархией государственных органов, на одном уровне управления (например: между различными государственными органами на центральном уровне), были решены путем отнесения государственных служащих отдельных органов к различным точкам входа (уровням сетки заработной платы), в зависимости от статуса государственного органа и/или органа местного самоуправления в рамках существующего административно-территориального деления. Разница в оплате труда между обозначенными уровнями органов составляет до 5 процентов. Внедрение новой модели системы заработной платы будет осуществляться в несколько этапов, в зависимости от финансовых возможностей государства. Последовательность перехода на новую модель системы оплаты труда будет происходить по мере увеличения минимальной базовой ставки.

В то же время предлагается сохранить существующие условия оплаты труда в государственных органах, в которых устанавливаемые новые условия оплаты труда могут привести к уменьшению общего размера заработной платы, с одновременным объявлением моратория на точечные, несистемные нормативные изменения в оплате труда.

Должностные оклады политических и специальных должностей государственной и муниципальной службы будут регулироваться отдельными нормативными правовыми актами Кыргызской Республики.

### *Ожидаемые результаты*

В результате реформы системы оплаты труда служащих создается совершенно новая система оплаты, которая приведет к достижению следующих результатов:

- новая система оплаты труда будет стимулировать государственные органы и органы местного самоуправления на достижение максимальных результатов деятельности в условиях ограниченности финансовых ресурсов;
- будет достигнута справедливость в оплате труда, основанная на принципах «равной оплаты за равную работу»;
- система оплаты труда станет прозрачной, так как должностной оклад будет составлять основную часть общей величины заработной платы;
- будет упрощено администрирование системы оплаты труда служащих;
- увеличены возможности горизонтального продвижения для большинства служащих;
- система оценки деятельности будет интегрирована в систему оплаты труда;
- заработная плата станет более конкурентоспособной и приближенной к уровню негосударственного сектора;
- появятся механизмы привлечения, стимулирования и сохранения квалифицированных сотрудников;
- сотрудники станут стремиться к повышению своей квалификации и карьерному росту.

Процесс совершенствования системы оплаты труда будет способствовать развитию принципиально нового понимания оплаты труда и результативности деятельности служащих на всех уровнях.

### **Оценка деятельности государственных и муниципальных служащих**

В процессе совершенствования системы оплаты труда служащих представляется важным внедрение системы оценки деятельности сотрудников и установление четких целей и задач на год, которые должны быть достигнуты каждым служащим. Для успешности внедрения системы оценки деятельности

служащих необходимы некоторые улучшения, связанные с организационным развитием. Каждая организация должна разработать четкую стратегию, цели и индикаторы результативности деятельности. Элементы такой системы управления разрабатываются в настоящее время в рамках ключевых показателей эффективности, которые необходимо внедрять и укреплять в деятельности всех государственных органов и органов местного самоуправления.

В настоящее время разработана и внедрена система оценки деятельности государственных и муниципальных служащих Кыргызской Республики, которая направлена на повышение результативности деятельности государственных и муниципальных служащих Кыргызской Республики путем систематической и объективной оценки их деятельности.

Оценка представляет собой определение степени результативности выполнения служащими должностных обязанностей в соответствии с целями и задачами государственного органа и органа местного самоуправления Кыргызской Республики. Результаты оценки деятельности учитываются в следующих случаях:

- при горизонтальном продвижении посредством установления шагов (коэффициентов) в сетке оплаты труда;
- в качестве рекомендации при проведении аттестации служащих;
- при выработке рекомендаций по повышению квалификации.

В основные задачи оценки деятельности служащих входят:

- определение уровня профессиональности служащего, включая качество, объем и сложность;
- определение степени вклада каждого служащего в достижение целей и задач органа;
- анализ текущих результатов достижения поставленных задач;
- корректировка процесса достижения результатов;
- планирование профессионального развития служащего;
- стимулирование служащего за достижение высоких результатов.

### *Организация проведения оценки деятельности*

Оценка деятельности служащих проводится независимо и непредвзято, основываясь на коллегиальном решении комиссии по оценке деятельности. Члены комиссии по оценке деятельности не должны получать никаких инструкций, рекомендаций или подвергаться другого рода воздействиям со стороны лиц, которые могут повлиять на результаты оценки.

Статс-секретарь или руководитель аппарата государственного органа вице-мэр или заместитель главы органа местного самоуправления должны обеспечить конфиденциальность всех обсуждаемых вопросов в ходе подготовки отчета об оценке.

Отчет об оценке может быть представлен оцениваемому служащему, комиссии по оценке деятельности, апелляционной комиссии, службе управления персоналом, руководителю органа.

Оценка деятельности служащего имеет свои строго определенные временные рамки. Служащие должны проходить оценку в течение года, с 1 января по 31 декабря, на ежеквартальной основе.

Оценка служащего проводится в двух видах: квартальная и годовая.

Квартальная оценка проводится непосредственным руководителем служащего и направлена на оценку текущей результативности. Текущая оценка деятельности служит основанием для выработки мер по улучшению деятельности.

Годовая оценка проводится комиссией по оценке деятельности, с учетом результатов ежеквартальной оценки и направлена на принятие заключительной оценки в соответствии с достигнутыми результатами служащего.

Результаты годовой оценки являются основой для принятия решений по горизонтальному продвижению путем установления шагов (коэффициентов) в сетке оплаты труда и улучшению деятельности служащих.

### *Процедура проведения оценки деятельности*

Квартальная оценка осуществляется непосредственным руководителем служащего 4 раза в год. Перед началом оценки непосредственный руководитель проводит собеседование и совместно со служащим определяет задачи и составляет индивидуальный план работы на квартал.

Индивидуальный план работы служащего оформляется отдельным актом и утверждается статс-секретарем или руководителем аппарата государственного органа, вице-мэром или заместителем главы органа местного самоуправления. Служащий и его непосредственный руководитель, при необходимости, могут изменять и вносить корректировки в индивидуальный план работы служащего, а также фиксировать отдельным актом корректировки задач служащего.

После завершения квартала служащий представляет непосредственному руководителю отчет о проделанной работе, с указанием результатов выполнения намеченных мероприятий. Далее непосредственный руководитель проводит собеседование, выставляет текущую квартальную оценку с собственным обоснованием, дает рекомендации по улучшению деятельности и, по мере необходимости, разрешает возможные проблемы и другие спорные моменты по отчету служащего.

При несогласии служащего с оценкой непосредственного руководителя он должен написать свои комментарии к отчету об оценке деятельности, с указанием обоснованных причин несогласия, а также представить в апелляционную комиссию дополнительные сведения о служебной деятельности за отчетный период. При этом служащий должен указать дату внесения комментариев и заверить собственной подписью.

Апелляционная комиссия рассматривает представленные сведения совместно со служащим и его непосредственным руководителем и принимает окончательное решение о пересмотре результатов оценки.

В случае замены непосредственного руководителя в период оценки, предыдущий руководитель служащего должен



подготовить временный отчет об оценке деятельности служащего на текущее состояние. При подготовке отчета новый руководитель должен принимать во внимание данные временного отчета.

Годовая оценка осуществляется комиссией по оценке деятельности 1 раз в год, на основе полученных квартальных оценок.

При несогласии служащего с оценкой, он может обратиться в апелляционную комиссию. В случае несогласия с решением апелляционной комиссии служащий вправе обратиться в Государственную кадровую службу Кыргызской Республики.

#### *Критерии и система измерения*

Оценка проводится по основным и дополнительным критериям оценки деятельности служащих.

Основные критерии оценки служащего включают: результаты, достигнутые в ходе выполнения поставленных задач, точность, своевременность, дисциплинированность, соблюдение норм этики и межэтнических отношений.

Дополнительные критерии оценки включают: самостоятельность, инициативность, креативность, степень сотрудничества.

При определении результатов оценки используется четырехбалльная шкала оценок от 2 до 5. При этом рассчитывается средний балл по всем критериям.

На основе полученного среднего балла устанавливаются следующие виды оценок для государственных и муниципальных служащих:

- при среднем балле от 4,6 до 5 включительно – предлагается оценка «Отлично»;
- при среднем балле от 3,6 до 4,5 включительно – предлагается оценка «Хорошо»;
- при среднем балле от 2,6 до 3,5 включительно – предлагается оценка «Удовлетворительно»;

- при среднем балле ниже 2,6 включительно – предлагается оценка «Неудовлетворительно».

При получении служащим оценки «Удовлетворительно» и «Неудовлетворительно» комиссия по оценке деятельности может внести предложение о необходимости обучения и повышения квалификации служащего.

При получении служащим по результатам года оценки «Отлично» комиссия по оценке деятельности вносит предложение о присвоении очередного шага в сетке заработной платы.

При получении служащим по результатам года оценки «Хорошо» комиссия по оценке деятельности вносит предложение о поощрении служащего.

#### *Компетенции комиссии по оценке деятельности*

В целях обеспечения объективности и беспристрастности оценки деятельности служащего создается комиссия по оценке деятельности. Заседание комиссии по оценке деятельности считается правомочным, если на нем присутствуют не менее двух третей ее членов. Замена отсутствующего члена комиссии не допускается.

По результатам рассмотрения итогов ежеквартальной оценки принимается коллегиальное решение по годовой оценке. При вынесении решения годовой оценки служащего комиссия сопоставляет ее с оценкой, полученной от непосредственного руководителя служащего. В случае выявления несоответствия между оценкой служащего и непосредственного руководителя, комиссия по оценке деятельности вправе пересмотреть результаты оценки.

#### *Компетенции апелляционной комиссии*

Для рассмотрения спорных вопросов по оценке деятельности служащего создается апелляционная комиссия. Заседание апелляционной комиссии считается правомочным, если на

нем присутствуют не менее двух третей ее членов. Замена отсутствующего члена комиссии не допускается.

По результатам рассмотрения обращений апелляционная комиссия выносит решение, которое оформляется протоколом и доводится до сведения служащего в день принятия решения. В случае принятия решения в пользу служащего издается приказ.

### **Улучшение системы оценки деятельности служащих**

*Сложности, возникшие в ходе внедрения оценки деятельности служащих*

Действующая система оценки деятельности служащих применяется с 1 января 2014 года. Первые результаты эффективности системы оценки деятельности служащих будут известны по итогам деятельности за 2014 год. Однако для выяснения ситуации по применению оценки деятельности служащих в государственных органах, сотрудниками Государственной кадровой службы Кыргызской Республики был проведен мониторинг в министерствах и ведомствах Кыргызской Республики.

Мониторинг был проведен в 29 государственных органах из 41 курируемых Государственной кадровой службой Кыргызской Республики.

Анализ данных, полученных по итогам мониторинга, выявил, что в государственных органах слабо ведется работа по внедрению оценки. Это связано с тем, что действующая система оценки деятельности государственных и муниципальных служащих не учитывает функциональные и структурные особенности всех государственных органов. Так, большое разнообразие этих особенностей не позволяет унифицировать систему оценки. Возникают сложности в понимании правил и процедур оценки, в связи с чем, работникам кадровых служб с некоторыми усилиями приходится вести данный процесс.

Сложности возникают в введении оценки в подведомственных и территориальных подразделениях государственных органов,

в части правильной постановки задач и сроков представления отчетов. Также, некоторые государственные органы имеют только по одному государственному служащему в каждом территориальном подразделении, а непосредственным руководителем у них является статс-секретарь или курирующий заместитель руководителя. В связи с этим поступают предложения о том, чтобы функцию по управлению оценкой в территориях передать в местные государственные администрации или органы местного самоуправления.

Еще одной проблемой является несостоятельность самих работников кадровых служб в правильном доведении до сотрудников правил и функций системы оценки. Государственная кадровая служба Кыргызской Республики на постоянной основе обучает работников кадровых служб процедурам и правилам проведения оценки деятельности служащих.

Возникает непонимание в использовании критериев оценки деятельности, так как необходимо оценивать служащих по всем критериям, но не все из них применимы в отношении определенных должностей и структурных подразделений. Некоторые структурные подразделения не поддаются оценке по критериям: креативность или инициативность. В других структурных подразделениях точность и своевременность являются основными критериями оценки, в то время как креативность или инициативность не желательны (например: бухгалтерия, аудит и т.п.). Однако в соответствии с системой оценки деятельности все критерии имеют одинаковый удельный вес, что негативно отражается на объективности оценки деятельности служащих.

Отсутствует четкая связь между критериями оценки деятельности служащих и качеством предоставления государственных услуг населению. Единственный критерий, влияющий на качество предоставления государственных услуг, это соблюдение нормы этики. К сожалению, даже если служащий допустить грубость в общении или бестактность по отношению к гражданину, то он будет оценен негативно только по одному критерию, а также это не отразится на соответствии им занимаемой должности.

Все вышеназванные трудности чаще всего возникают по причине нежелания самих служащих применять оценку деятельности. Увеличение должностного оклада по итогам года на 5 процентов не является достаточной мотивацией для служащих. Ведь необходимо каждый квартал получать оценку «отлично», чтобы по итогам года заслужить повышения должностного оклада.


### *Предложения по улучшению оценки деятельности служащих*

В основном система оценки деятельности служащих призвана повышать результативность деятельности служащих путем систематической и объективной оценки их деятельности. Повышение результативности деятельности служащих должно отражаться на повышении деятельности государственного органа, в котором служащий работает, что в свою очередь влияет на достижение стратегических целей государства в целом. Однако не способность непосредственных руководителей правильно определяют задачи, а также отсутствие прямой связи между оценкой деятельности государственного органа и оценкой деятельности государственного служащего не позволяет достичь стратегических целей страны.

В настоящее время деятельность государственного органа оценивается по одним критериям, а деятельность служащих по другим. В случае если государственный орган получит отрицательную оценку по достижению цели устойчивого развития страны, то это не означает, что служащие структурного подразделения данного государственного органа, ответственные за достижение данной цели, получают «плохую» оценку или наоборот. Возникает парадокс, все служащие государственного органа получили оценку «отлично», а государственный орган выполнил план только на 60 процентов, не достигнув стратегически важных целей.

Для достижения стратегических целей необходимо определить четкую связь между стратегической целью и задачей каждого служащего, что требует оказания методического содействия по планированию, разработки механизма верификации ежеквартальных отчетов служащих с поставленными задачами

и сверки с достижением стратегических целей, поставленных перед государственным органом.




В Национальной стратегии устойчивого развития Кыргызской Республики определены стратегические направления деятельности государственных органов. Государственные органы должны составить ведомственный план по достижению стратегической цели, и распределить ответственность за исполнение по своим структурным подразделениям. В свою очередь, руководители структурных подразделений при составлении актов постановки задач, своим подчиненным, должны руководствоваться именно ведомственным планом. По окончанию квартала, отчеты служащих должны быть сверены Комиссией по оценке деятельности служащих с планом государственного органа, так как, зачастую, в ходе выполнения ежедневных «рутинных» обязанностей, происходит подмена приоритетов и служащие «забывают» о стратегических целях. В результате, в конце года, выясняется, что все служащие усердно выполняли «текущие» задачи, а стратегические цели не были достигнуты.

Взаимосвязь оценки деятельности служащих с качеством предоставления государственных услуг является важным условием для повышения уровня доверия населения к государственной власти. Достижение стратегических целей,

положительные тенденции в работе государственных органов могут быть перечеркнуты не качественным предоставлением государственных услуг.

Необходимо установить четкую связь между оценкой деятельности служащих, оценкой государственного органа и качеством предоставления государственных услуг.



Важным элементом в повышение результативности деятельности служащих и качества государственных услуг является установление приоритетности ежеквартальных задач и установление критериев оценки деятельности служащих в зависимости от функций структурных подразделений.

Так, условно, структурные подразделения можно поделить по четырем направлениям деятельности: административное обеспечение, разработка политики, реализация политики и предоставление услуг населению (так называемый «фронт офис»). Для каждого направления деятельности необходимо установить трехуровневую пирамиду задач: критически важные задачи, важные задачи, текущие задачи. Выполнение или невыполнение задач, повлекут за собой поощрения или взыскания в соответствии с уровнем задачи. Например, невыполнение критически важной задачи может являться основанием для освобождения от занимаемой должности, а невыполнение текущей задачи только понижением оценки.

В целях повышения качества предоставления государственных услуг населению необходимо установить критерий «своевременное и вежливое обслуживание гражданина» как критически важную задачу. Жалобы граждан на затягивание

времени обслуживания, грубое отношение и т.п. могут повлечь за собой временное отстранение служащего от занимаемой должности. Впоследствии, после подтверждения фактов, в ходе служебного расследования, служащий может быть освобожден от занимаемой должности.

Изложенные в данной статье сложности, возникшие в ходе внедрения оценки деятельности служащих, и предложения по улучшению системы оценки деятельности служащих основываются на результатах мониторинга и предложениях сотрудников кадровых служб государственных органов.



РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ И ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ  
УЧАСТНИКОВ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ:  
«УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПЕРСОНАЛОМ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ  
СЛУЖБЫ: СОСТОЯНИЕ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ»,  
Астана, 22 мая 2014 г.

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2 мая 2014 года в Астане состоялась Глобальная конференция: «Управление персоналом государственной службы: состояние и перспективы». Организаторами конференции выступили Агентство Республики Казахстан по делам государственной службы, Программа Развития ООН в Казахстане, Академия государственного управления при Президенте Республики Казахстан, Секретариат Регионального хаба в сфере государственной службы в Астане, Проект Европейского Союза «Реформа и модернизация государственной службы Правительства Казахстана», Казахстанская национальная академия естественных наук, Ассоциация HR-менеджеров Казахстана.

Основное внимание участников конференции было сосредоточено на изучении вопросов качественного управления персоналом государственной службы, оценке его работы, профессиональных качеств, анализе основных факторов мотивации деятельности госслужащих.

В рамках конференции участниками была отмечена роль Казахстана в развитии системы государственного управления, в частности:

- политическая воля руководства Казахстана;
- наличие международной экспертной поддержки со стороны таких международных организаций, как ПРООН, ЕС;
- функционирует новая модель государственной службы, базирующаяся и стремящаяся к достижению трех главных принципов: подотчетности, меритократии и транспарентности.

На Глобальной конференции в Астане в рамках АЭФ было рассмотрено **три важных блока вопросов, а именно:**

- оценка эффективности деятельности государственных служащих;
- управление персоналом;
- региональное развитие системы государственной службы.

## **Рекомендации в рамках блока вопросов по развитию госслужбы**

### **1. Оценка эффективности деятельности государственных служащих**

- При проведении оценки необходимо учитывать роль компетенций и использование компетентностного подхода.
- Важно избегать субъективного подхода, намеренного усреднения руководителем результата работы своего подчиненного.
- Следует получать обратную связь, отзывы.
- При оценке высших должностных лиц необходимо учитывать их умение анализировать, прогнозировать в разрезе стратегии организации, страны, умение создавать команду, ставить адекватные реализуемые задачи.

### **2. Управление персоналом**

- При управлении персоналом государственной службы существенной является система мотивации.
- Необходимо определиться с терминологией и создать единую предметную область.
- Некорректно говорить «управление человеческими ресурсами», так как невозможно знать все имеющиеся ресурсы человека. Правильнее использовать термин «управление персоналом», т.е. набор определенных известных компетенций.
- Финансовая составляющая вопроса является второстепенной. Задача не в том, чтобы сделать государственную службу в равной степени привлекательной, как частный сектор. Важно находить баланс, чтобы не привести к коррупции и добиваться эффективной деятельности.

### **3. Региональное развитие системы государственной службы**

- При формировании политики в сфере государственного управления необходим учет региональной специфики.

- В целях дальнейшего совершенствования государственной службы важно развитие регионального сотрудничества, например, создание и функционирование Регионального хаба по обмену и распространению знаний и опыта в области государственной службы.
- Следует усилить институциональную базу и обеспечить устойчивое развитие государственной службы.

### Рекомендации и предложения

В целях развития и совершенствования государственной службы предлагаются следующие рекомендации и предложения.

1. Необходимо **совершенствование институциональной базы государственной службы** путем создания специальных органов – Агентства по делам государственной службы, Академии государственного управления и Регионального хаба в сфере государственной службы.

2. **В системе управления персоналом государственной службы** должно быть достигнуто:

- качество управления персоналом на основе личных заслуг;
- развитие человеческого капитала на постоянной основе;
- подотчетность со стороны государства своим гражданам;
- наличие доверия между сотрудниками и руководителями;
- объективная оценка работы сотрудников;
- своевременное указание на недочеты в работе сотрудника;
- обучение, повышение квалификации сотрудников и руководителей;
- ведение отчетной документации по работе сотрудника;
- важность оценки эффективности деятельности госслужащих.

3. **Учет зарубежного опыта** при проведении реформ в сфере государственного управления. Например:

- инвестиции в человеческий капитал (Нидерланды);
- снижение уровня бюрократии на центральном и региональном уровне для установления более тесной взаимосвязи с гражданами (Германия);
- реформы путем обучения и постоянных тренингов для высших должностных лиц (ENA, Франция);

- беспристрастное и прозрачное государственное управление (представитель ООН).

#### **4. Система оценки эффективности деятельности государственного органа:**

- 1) может включать два элемента:
  - базовую оплату в пределах заработной платы;
  - надбавку в качестве поощрения за работу (Великобритания);
- 2) может основываться на:
  - критериях;
  - методах работы;
  - профессиональных, социальных, управленческих компетенциях (Германия).

При оценке высших должностных лиц должны учитываться следующие показатели:

- умение анализировать, прогнозировать в разрезе стратегии всей организации и страны;
- умение управлять, создавать команду;
- умение вдохновлять сотрудников;
- умение быть лидером;
- умение раскрытия потенциала работника.

Оценка должна проводиться на постоянной основе.

#### **5. Управление персоналом государственной службы должно быть направлено на:**

- создание единой предметной области;
- формирование системы обучения;
- подготовку государственных служащих-кадровиков.

#### **6. Наличие моральных и материальных мотиваций, стимулов:**

- разумный размер заработной платы;
- выдача премий;
- повышение квалификации;
- стабильность в предоставлении работы;
- карьерный рост.

**PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY**

**ОКАЗАНИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ  
УСЛУГ**





## СОВЕРШЕНСТВОВАНИЕ РАБОТЫ С РУКОВОДЯЩИМИ КАДРАМИ КАК ФАКТОР ПОВЫШЕНИЯ КАЧЕСТВА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ УСЛУГ

А. Н. Морозевич<sup>1</sup>

### **Аннотация**

*В статье подробно рассматриваются вопросы развития информационной и коммуникационной инфраструктуры, электронного правительства, спектра электронных услуг Республики Беларусь.*

*Освещены основные приоритеты кадровой политики в системе государственного управления, обозначены характерные проблемные вопросы в данной сфере. Определены критерии доступности государственных должностей, даны рекомендации по организации работы с руководящими кадрами. Помимо этого, указывается необходимость учета индивидуальных заслуг и вклада государственного служащего в общую результативность организации, развития бонусно-премиальной системы оплаты труда государственных служащих. Подчеркивается, что участие в региональной интеграции на постсоветском пространстве, развитие международных и межрегиональных связей являются неотъемлемой и жизненно важной составляющей модели социально-экономического и общественно-политического развития Республики Беларусь.*

**Ключевые слова:** *кадровая политика, электронное правительство, Республика Беларусь, системы оплаты труда, общественно-политическое развитие, интеграция.*

Процессы глобализации, транснациональные вызовы, политические конфликты выдвигают новые требования к государственному строительству и государственному управлению. Одним из приоритетных направлений совершенствования системы государственного управления

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является принесение пользы людям, повышение качества и доступности государственных услуг. С этим в определенном смысле связывается устойчивое развитие белорусской экономики и повышение благосостояния населения.

К сожалению, в обществе все еще встречается искаженное представление о государственной службе, предоставляемых государственных услугах и о государственном служащем. О последнем иногда говорят как о человеке, находящемся «в услужении» у своего народа. Поэтому в отношениях с чиновниками граждане зачастую допускают пренебрежительное отношение, а порой и откровенное хамство. Хотя обратное тоже имеет место, возможно в большей степени, что не способствует формированию положительного имиджа государственного служащего.

Объективно служение своему народу и государству, как подтверждает жизнь, возвычивает статус государственного служащего, если суть его служения – преданность делу, патриотизм, высокие нравственные качества и профессионализм. Если, добиваясь успеха, он всегда соизмеряет потребности индивида с возможностями государства, миссию государства с ее ресурсным обеспечением. Удержание баланса реализуемых прав и обязанностей «жителей и гостей» страны – это рационально. И отражает сущностную роль государственного служащего.

Глава нашего государства Александр Григорьевич Лукашенко неоднократно, обращаясь к чиновникам, акцентировал внимание на том, что нельзя быть равнодушными к людям. Надо знать их проблемы, решать их постоянно, уметь убеждать людей, вести с ними честный и открытый диалог. Надо помнить, что государственные служащие получают зарплату из бюджета, содержатся за счет налогов, которые платят наши граждане, все субъекты нашего общества. Поэтому именно народу и призваны служить все те, кто находится в госаппарате. Александр Григорьевич Лукашенко неоднократно отмечал: «...я Ваш слуга...», «...я – слуга своего народа, простите за патетику, и для меня это не громкие слова, и я знаю настроения людей» [1, 2].



Пока у нас все совсем не так плохо. Однако нужны эффективные «технологии служения», «вооруженность» госслужащих соответствующим инструментарием. Повышение качества услуг, предоставляемых органами государственной власти, органами местного управления и самоуправления на современном этапе неразрывно связано с совершенствованием и активным применением средств информационно-коммуникационных технологий (далее – ИКТ) в модернизации системы государственного управления, созданием электронного правительства. Их использование позволяет сэкономить бюджетные средства, повысить эффективность и управляемость, увеличить скорость и транспарентность принятия решений, способствует борьбе с коррупцией.

Существенно важно отметить, что в национальном законодательстве, регулирующем вопросы взаимоотношений органов государственного управления, граждан и юридических лиц, отсутствуют нормативно закреплённые определения терминов «электронное правительство» и «государственная услуга».

Тем не менее, Республика Беларусь значительно продвинулась в развитии информационной и коммуникационной инфраструктуры, электронного правительства и расширении спектра электронных услуг. Высокие темпы развития информационных технологий в области государственного управления в Беларуси отмечают международные эксперты. Данные статистического сборника ООН «Электронное правительство. Обзор 2014» свидетельствуют, что Беларусь улучшила свои позиции по сравнению с 2012 годом и занимает 55 место из 193 стран мира [3].

Мероприятия по выполнению программы социально-экономического развития Республики Беларусь на 2011–2015 годы предусматривают значительное расширение использования и доступности информационно-коммуникационных технологий в различных сферах жизни общества (создание электронного правительства, торговли, здравоохранения, обучения). Реализация мер по ускоренному развитию сферы услуг позволит повысить производительность

труда и комфортность жизни людей, решить проблему занятости, расширить перспективные для страны внешние рынки услуг и увеличить объемы их экспорта [4].

Важные шаги по внедрению информационных технологий в различные сферы государственной и общественной жизни предпринимаются в соответствии с постановлением Правительства Республики Беларусь от 9 августа 2010 г. № 1174, которым утверждена Стратегия развития информационного общества в Беларуси до 2015 года. Приоритетными путями развития информационного общества в Стратегии определены: национальная информационно-коммуникационная инфраструктура, электронное правительство, электронное здравоохранение, электронное обучение, электронная занятость и социальная защита населения, электронная экономика, система массовых коммуникаций и электронный контент. В рамках этого документа предусмотрена разработка и выполнение государственной программы «Информационное общество» на период 2011–2015 годы [5].

В Республике Беларусь сдан в промышленную эксплуатацию и действует единый государственный портал электронных услуг, функционируют электронная почта государственных органов, ведомственная электронная почта, система межведомственного документооборота, единая информационная система контроля выполнения поручений Президента Республики Беларусь, внедрена система электронных аукционов государственных закупок, электронных торгов, электронного документооборота, электронной цифровой подписи и т.п.

Кроме того, разработаны информационные системы и государственные информационные ресурсы по учету природопользователей и государственный картографический интернет-сервис, а также электронная система оплаты дорожных сборов BelToll; модернизирована автоматизированная информационная система электронного учета руководящих кадров, их резерва (АИС «Резерв»); ведутся работы по созданию национальной системы электронных образовательных ресурсов, совершенствованию инфраструктуры и сервисов доступа к национальным и мировым образовательным ресурсам, а также системы подготовки кадров в области ИКТ.

В соответствии с Директивой Президента Республики Беларусь от 31 декабря 2010 г. № 4 «О развитии предпринимательской инициативы и стимулировании деловой активности в Республике Беларусь» организована возможность электронной государственной регистрации юридических лиц и индивидуальных предпринимателей и создание веб-портала Единого государственного регистра юридических лиц и индивидуальных предпринимателей [6].

Совет Министров конкретизировал планы по развитию электронного правительства в Беларуси постановлением от 10 февраля 2012 г. № 138 «О базовых электронных услугах» и определил 24 государственные услуги, которые будут доступны в электронном виде всем жителям республики к 2015 году. Документ вводит новое понятие «базовой электронной услуги», критериями для таких государственных услуг являются массовая востребованность, социальная значимость и направленность на устранение административных барьеров [7].

Постановлением Правительства Республики Беларусь № 509 от 31 мая 2012 г. государственным органам и организациям поручено до 1 января 2016 года перейти на оказание электронных услуг через Единый портал электронных услуг (<http://portal.gov.by>) в соответствии с ежегодными планами, утверждаемыми Советом Министров Республики Беларусь [8].

Министерство юстиции и Министерство связи и информатизации вместе с Оперативно-аналитическим центром должны до 1 января 2015 года обеспечить работу программного комплекса «Одно окно» в интеграции с **общегосударственной автоматизированной информационной системой** при осуществлении административных процедур.

Электронные услуги будет оказывать созданное РУП «Национальный центр электронных услуг». Перечень услуг, оказываемых государственным органам, иным организациям и гражданам на безвозмездной основе, включает, например, получение сведений из *автоматизированной системы «Паспорт», Единого государственного регистра юридических лиц и индивидуальных предпринимателей, Государственного реестра плательщиков, а также Единого государственного регистра недвижимого имущества, прав на него и сделок с ним.*

В новом Законе Республики Беларусь «Об обращениях граждан и юридических лиц» содержится норма, обязывающая чиновников отвечать не только на традиционные письменные обращения граждан, но и на электронную почту [9]. Это обусловлено тем, что все республиканские органы государственного управления, облисполкомы и райисполкомы, государственные организации представлены в сети Интернет, имеют собственные официальные интернет-сайты, электронные адреса, а электронная форма обращений получает все большее применение на практике. Кроме того, любой гражданин должен знать, что он может напрямую обратиться в госорганы или организации и в оперативном порядке получить соответствующий ответ.

Управление экономикой и другими сферами деятельности требует интеллектуальных усилий, повышения эффективности работы государственных органов. Но главное – наличие подготовленных кадров и высококвалифицированных специалистов, обладающих необходимыми компетенциями. На формирование новых подходов в этой сфере неоднократно обращает внимание Глава государства. Им подчеркивается при этом, что органам государственного управления необходимо улучшать динамику и качество своей деятельности, в полной мере учитывать изменения в жизни страны и современные требования хозяйствования.

Именно поэтому чрезвычайно актуально для выстраивания взаимоотношений граждан и государства по-новому привлечение представителей молодого поколения государственных служащих.

В целом же повышение качества предоставляемых государственных услуг невозможно без разработки комплексной научно обоснованной стратегии работы с руководящими кадрами: составной части общегосударственной Концепции кадровой политики в стране.

Приоритетами государственной кадровой политики в такой сфере жизнедеятельности общества, как система государственного управления, обозначены следующие:

- обеспечение стабильности деятельности государственного аппарата, определение механизма прохождения и прекращения государственной службы, предполагающее принятие нового Закона Республики Беларусь «О государственной службе в Республике Беларусь»;
- оптимизация структуры и функций государственных органов;
- приведение номенклатуры должностей государственных служащих в соответствие с задачами социально-экономического развития республики и актуальными вопросами государственного управления, что требует введения в практику «Табеля о рангах» государственных служащих;
- оптимизация численности, профессионально-квалификационной структуры кадров государственных органов на основе децентрализации функций управления и развития местного самоуправления;
- разработка Этического кодекса государственного служащего Республики Беларусь, определяющего систему ценностных и нравственных ориентиров, этических требований к характеру взаимоотношений государственных служащих с обществом, отдельными гражданами;
- совершенствование форм и методов подбора руководящих кадров органов государственного управления, формирования резерва для занятия руководящих должностей и профессиональной подготовки лиц, состоящих в резерве;
- создание механизма служебного продвижения кадров управления в государственном аппарате, обеспечения их карьерного роста на основе учета нравственно-психологических и профессиональных качеств, оценки результатов деятельности;
- введение в практику квалификационного экзамена для лиц, впервые принимаемых на работу в государственные органы, и для государственных служащих, назначаемых на новые должности в государственном аппарате;
- совершенствование форм и методов оценки личностных качеств, результатов деятельности руководящих кадров и лиц, зачисляемых в резерв и выдвигаемых на руководящие должности;

- формирование системы профессиональной и социальной защищенности государственных служащих на основе совершенствования оплаты их труда, независимости оценки деятельности, обеспечения правовых гарантий занятости;
- регламентация механизма административного и общественного контроля за деятельностью должностных лиц государственного аппарата;
- создание системы прогнозирования и планирования потребности в кадрах органов государственного управления;
- создание и развитие системы психологического сопровождения кадровой работы в органах государственного управления, обеспечивающей мониторинг и корректировку личностных качеств руководящих кадров;
- разработка и реализация республиканских программ переподготовки и повышения квалификации руководящих кадров и специалистов органов [10].

Вместе с тем анализ справочно-аналитических материалов, подготовленных Академией управления к аттестации отдельных руководителей, состоящих в кадровом реестре Главы государства Республики Беларусь, по вопросу реализации ими государственной кадровой политики, и сведений, полученных сотрудниками Академии управления при изучении состояния работы с руководящими кадрами в составе различных межведомственных комиссий, свидетельствуют о том, что наиболее характерными проблемными вопросами в реализации государственной кадровой политики государственными органами для страны в целом и каждого региона в отдельности являются:

- иногда формальное отношение к формированию кадрового резерва и обеспечению его эффективного использования;
- игнорирование установленных принципов отбора и продвижения кадров сужает возможность реализации конституционного права равного доступа на государственную службу и карьерного продвижения;
- в ряде случаев невысокая стабильность кадров управления, основная причина которой, – переход руководящих работников на более высокооплачиваемую работу или с меньшим объемом нагрузки;
- неразработанность механизма ответственности руководителей за управление профессионально-квалификационным развитием государственных служащих.

Основные критерии доступности государственных должностей – государственное сознание, порядочность и профессионализм. Необходимо, чтобы назначение на государственную должность проходило, как правило, из состава подготовленных кадровых резервов, широко применялась практика открытых конкурсов на замещение вакантных должностей с участием кандидатов из различных регионов, была налажена гибкая система перемещения управленческих кадров по стране, использование такой кадровой технологии, как ротация кадров.

Государственные органы и организации обязаны поддерживать постоянную связь со стратегически важной для государственной службы целевой аудиторией. Речь идет о лицах, включенных в банк данных одаренной и талантливой молодежи, перспективном кадровом резерве, банке данных «Перспектива». Эти государственные ресурсы пока используются не на полную мощность.

Посещая 29 июля 2014 года сельхозпредприятия Минского района, Александр Лукашенко обратил внимание чиновников и напомнил о своем требовании по проведению серьезной ротации кадров и выявлению перспективных руководителей. Назрела необходимость разработки и внедрения инструментария для оценки профессионального потенциала лиц, включенных в кадровые резервы. С этой целью возможно формирование в рамках АИС «Резерв» отдельной базы данных по всем государственным служащим, включенным в нее и получающим образование в сфере управления. Такой подход позволит создать информационное поле для отбора на государственную службу лучших из лучших. И, что особенно важно, обеспечит условия для ротации кадров в сфере управления.

Принимая во внимание, что кадровая политика в Республике Беларусь реализуется в условиях негативных демографических тенденций, таких как сокращение численности населения и его старение, было бы также целесообразным: предусмотреть возможность продолжения государственной службы (с разрешения руководителя государственного органа) для лиц, чей возраст превышает предельный возраст нахождения

на государственной службе, при условии прежней продолжительной безупречной службы в государственных органах и отсутствии медицинских противопоказаний; сформировать общереспубликанский и региональные банки данных высококвалифицированных работников, уволенных по сокращению штата, вышедших на пенсию (в отставку, запас), с учетом востребованности государством их профессиональных знаний, умений и навыков, опыта практической работы.

Повышению эффективности работы с резервом будет способствовать создание Карьерного портала Правительства Республики Беларусь. Речь идет о республиканском портале управленческих кадров. Этот информационный ресурс может стать реальным источником полезной для каждого гражданина информации по вопросам кадровой политики.

Труд современных государственных служащих – это труд интеллектуальный, творческий, инновационный, публичный, коллективный. Поэтому государственные служащие должны соответствовать запросам современной макро- и микроэкономической ситуации. Сюда можно отнести и определенный уровень образования управленца: как минимум, у него должна быть степень магистра управления или магистра государственного управления. Также большое значение имеет непрерывное профессиональное развитие: переподготовка, повышение квалификации, стажировка. Нельзя недооценивать роль самообразования. Государственные служащие, и это касается в первую очередь руководящих кадров, должны владеть иностранными языками. Они должны проявлять компетентность в вопросах как межгосударственной интеграции в рамках Таможенного союза и ЕЭП, так и европейской интеграции.

Поступающий на государственную службу должен знать основы своей будущей работы, что называется, от и до. Даже если где-то и существует проблема с кандидатами на занятие должности, формальный подход в оценке способностей государственных служащих недопустим.

Труд государственного служащего должен оцениваться по достоинству, но вместе с тем должен быть и соответствующий



спрос. Сегодня необходимы новые объективные критерии оценки компетентности и результатов работы государственного служащего. Думается, что серьезные знания о тенденциях в сфере внешнеполитической и внешнеэкономической деятельности нашего государства, умение принимать решения опережающего характера могут стать основой таких оценок.

Интернационализация белорусской экономики постепенно затрагивает новые уровни государственного управления. Государственная политика в условиях интеграционных отношений не может замыкаться в национальных границах Беларуси. Участие в региональной интеграции на постсоветском пространстве, развитие международных и межрегиональных связей являются неотъемлемой и жизненно важной составляющей модели социально-экономического и общественно-политического развития Республики Беларусь. Поэтому подтверждение квалификации государственного служащего и оценку соответствия занимаемой должности необходимо проводить в независимых центрах. Наиболее перспективным кандидатам, не прошедшим по конкурсу, но обладающим необходимыми качествами, должно быть предложено зачисление в кадровые резервы.

Существует упомянутая выше проблема высокой текучести руководящих кадров. При этом основными причинами оттока высококвалифицированных управленцев выступают неудовлетворенность условиями оплаты труда, возможностями для самореализации, карьерного роста, профессионального развития.

Отсюда вытекает необходимость изменения подходов к материальному стимулированию труда госслужащих. Что нам дали оптимизация госаппарата и повышение заработной платы, доходившее до 25 %? К сожалению, соответствующей отдачи, роста результативности работы государственного аппарата по-прежнему нет. Кроме того, некоторые эксперты обращают внимание на существующую опасность, при которой увеличение заработных плат государственных служащих может привести к ещё большей «текучести кадров», так как повысится привлекательность государственной службы для лиц, желающих получить место благодаря «патронажу» или личным связям.

Качество и результат, ответственность и дисциплинированность – вот основные показатели, значимые для оплаты труда государственных служащих. Оплата труда должна быть взаимосвязана с развитием конкретных отраслей народнохозяйственного комплекса и определяться эффективностью выполняемых государственным служащим (и в целом госорганом) функций с одновременным повышением качества предоставляемых услуг и укреплением доверия к власти со стороны граждан и частного бизнеса. Высокий уровень заработной платы должен стимулировать привлечение на государственную службу творческих, образованных, умеющих нестандартно мыслить специалистов, любящих и радеющих за свое государство. Нам нужны те, кто может реально внести вклад в развитие республики, помочь людям, обеспечить процветание Беларуси.

Однако одними деньгами «государство для народа» не построишь. Следует искать новые источники, новые резервы. Необходимо раскрыть и привлечь к государственной работе еще не задействованный кадровый потенциал. Для решения государственных задач нам нужны талантливые управленцы, которые готовы работать на благо белорусского народа.

Представляется, что действующая в республике система может быть усовершенствована. Формирование системы денежного содержания этой категории служащих необходимо осуществлять в соответствии с рядом принципов. Уровень финансового обеспечения государственных служащих должен гарантировать им необходимую конкурентоспособность на рынке труда. Их заработная плата должна соответствовать среднемесячной заработной плате в промышленности, а также находиться в зависимости от уровня государственного управления.

Денежное содержание государственных служащих должно способствовать установлению взаимосвязи между результатами профессиональной деятельности служащих и величиной их заработной платы. В целях закрепления на местах молодых квалифицированных управленческих кадров необходима корректировка системы оплаты труда чиновников. Она должна предусматривать зависимость размера основного дохода государственного служащего от результатов и общественного

значения его профессиональной деятельности. Немаловажное значение имеют уровень подготовки и квалификации госслужащего, его результаты, его способность приносить пользу стране и людям.

Необходимо учитывать индивидуальные заслуги и вклад государственного служащего в общую результативность организации. Надо внедрять гибкие системы оплаты, развивать бонусно-премиальную систему оплаты труда государственных служащих. Она должна зависеть от конечных показателей развития страны и регионов и определяться на основе экспертных оценок. Использование передового опыта, современных методов принятия управленческих решений, инновационных подходов, а главное, результат и его качество – вот основные критерии этих оценок.

Анализ мирового опыта показывает, что в большинстве стран идеологический и морально-психологические аспекты, перспективы карьерного роста являются для госслужащих более сильными стимулами, чем оплата труда. Необходимо шире использовать подобные методы стимулирования профессиональной деятельности.

Для повышения интереса к государственной службе необходимо улучшение материально-технических и морально-психологических условий трудовой деятельности государственных служащих.

Построение карьерной линии государственного служащего должно предусматривать его последовательный рост без резких необоснованных изменений служебного статуса. Систему продвижения по служебной лестнице необходимо сделать более гибкой.

Восстановление на государственной службе институтов наставничества для передачи позитивного опыта и профессиональных знаний будет способствовать более быстрой адаптации новых сотрудников. Это обеспечит экспертную и консультационную поддержку деятельности молодых специалистов.

В качестве рекомендаций по организации работы с руководящими кадрами и основных направлениях ее совершенствования полагаю обоснованным предложить следующее:

**1. Рассматривать работу с кадрами и их резервами как приоритетную задачу любого руководителя.**

**2. Руководителям государственных органов и иных государственных организаций сосредоточить усилия на следующих основных направлениях в работе с кадрами:**

**2.1. в сфере организационно-кадровой работы:**

- разработать перспективный план работы по развитию кадрового потенциала, определив в качестве приоритетных направлений индивидуальный подход в работе с кадрами, а также меры противодействия коррупционным проявлениям;
- создать систему мониторинга и оценки кадрового потенциала. Принятие кадровых решений проводить по итогам анализа полученных в ходе мониторинга результатов;
- внедрять методы открытых конкурсных отборов на государственную службу, распространив практику предварительного испытания перед назначением на руководящие должности;
- обеспечивать индивидуальный подход в работе с резервистами, в том числе проводить их индивидуализированную плановую подготовку. Перед зачислением в резерв учитывать согласие кандидатов, результативность их управленческой деятельности, наличие высоких деловых и личностных качеств, лидерских и организаторских способностей, а также личное стремление к дальнейшему служебному продвижению;
- усилить контроль за работой аттестационных комиссий в части анализа уровня компетентности аттестуемых лиц;
- совершенствовать механизм контроля за выполнением рекомендаций аттестационных комиссий;
- организовать систему контроля за работой с молодыми специалистами – выпускниками профильных учебных заведений;

- принять дополнительные меры по внедрению и использованию информационных систем и технологий в кадровой работе;
- создать систему сертификации кадров в сфере управления, в том числе их тестирования по определению профессионально-деловых и личностных качеств, уровней компетенций;
- создать карьерный портал Республики Беларусь (республиканский портал управленческих кадров), выполняющий функции единого автоматизированного банка данных кадров в сфере управления;
- трансформировать кадровые службы в организационные и аналитические центры управления развитием кадрового потенциала;

## **2.2. в сфере дальнейшего профессионального развития:**

- обеспечить повышение профессионального уровня кадрового потенциала государственной службы, базирующееся на комплексном методе обучения на основе единства подготовки, переподготовки, повышения квалификации, стажировки и самообразования;
- внедрить систему построения карьерной линии государственного служащего;
- создать систему корпоративного обучения, ориентированного на формирование актуальных знаний в области политики, экономики, права;
- использовать компетентностный подход в оценке уровня профессионального развития кадрового потенциала;
- создать систему стажировок в правительстве, республиканских органах государственного управления, в профильных организациях на штатных должностях;
- совместно с Министерством образования Республики Беларусь с использованием потенциала учреждений высшего образования в регионах, на постоянной основе организовать обучение новым и современным кадровым технологиям, информационно-коммуникационным технологиям, обучение на курсах иностранных языков;

### **2.3. в сфере совершенствования нормативных правовых актов, регулирующих работу с кадрами:**

- разработать Положение об отраслевом знаке отличия «Отличник государственной службы»;
- разработать проект Декларации служебного поведения государственного служащего;
- разработать проект Модельного кодекса поведения государственных служащих Республики Беларусь;

### **2.4. в сфере идеологической работы с кадрами:**

- организовать в рамках регионов и республики на системной основе подведение итогов работы с вручением лучшим знака «Отличник государственной службы»;
- сформировать блок правил поведения, обеспечивающих повышение имиджа государственного служащего, в том числе обязанности принесения присяги всеми лицами, поступающими на государственную службу;
- обеспечить на плановой основе проведение круглых столов, семинаров, иных мероприятий республиканского уровня, направленных на повышение эффективности кадровой работы, развитие имиджа государственных служащих;
- внедрить в практику работы кадровых служб постоянно действующие семинары по обмену опытом в сфере кадровой работы в рамках проведения соответствующих «круглых столов» с периодичностью раз в 6 месяцев;

### **2.5. в сфере материального и социального обеспечения кадров:**

- совершенствовать систему мотивации, соответствующую уровню квалификации управленческих кадров;
- внедрять систему бонусной (премиальной) системы поощрения государственных служащих в зависимости от конечных показателей развития страны и регионов.

Изложенное, при зрелом размышлении, имеет теоретическое и практическое значение для развития и совершенствования руководящих кадров в национальном масштабе. Правда, не следует преуменьшать трудности на этом пути.

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# РЕЕСТР ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ УСЛУГ КАК КОМПОНЕНТ СИСТЕМЫ ЭЛЕКТРОННОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА В РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

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## **Аннотация**

*В статье рассматривается структура, особенности функционирования, а также потенциальные возможности использования Реестра государственных услуг (РГУ) в Российской Федерации как элемента системы электронного правительства. При формировании Реестра как государственной информационной системы в статье рассматриваются некоторые нормативно-правовые, организационные и технологические особенности, которые определяют как ограничения, так и возможности по развитию Реестра.*

**Ключевые слова:** государственные услуги, реестр государственных услуг, межведомственное взаимодействие, портал государственных услуг.

## **Abstract**

*The article examines the structure, specific features and potential opportunities of Public Services Registry (PSR) in Russian Federation. PSR as information system serves as a component of electronic government system in Russia. We describe PSR formation and further development from legal, organizational and technological limitations and perspectives.*

**Key words:** public services, public services registry, interagency information sharing, public services portal

## **Введение**

Построение системы электронного правительства в Российской Федерации было заявлено в Федеральной целевой программе

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«Электронная Россия 2002–2010» [3]. В федеральной программе «Информационное общество (2011–2020)» произошло уточнение понятия электронного правительства прежде всего с точки зрения масштабов задачи [6]. Если в «Электронной России» система электронного правительства определялась в широком смысле: включала инфраструктуру доступа, компьютерную грамотность, культуру информационного общества, то в «Информационном обществе» можно четко выделить подпрограмму электронного правительства, в которой важнейшей задачей становится реализация сорока наиболее приоритетных государственных услуг федерального значения в электронном виде таким образом, чтобы доля граждан, которая воспользуется ими в электронном виде, была крайне высокой (не менее 70% граждан к 2018 году) [8].

В статье рассматривается процесс создания Реестра государственных услуг как информационной системы, приводятся цели и задачи его создания, рассматриваются особенности и ограничения работы Реестра при организации межведомственного взаимодействия, выявленные на основе социологического опроса государственных служащих – пользователей РГУ. В заключении описываются перспективы развития Реестра государственных услуг.

## **1. Ключевые компоненты системы электронного правительства в России**

Для реализации задачи перевода в электронный вид приоритетных государственных услуг требовалось реализовать портал государственных услуг как единую точку доступа к ресурсам государства, реестр государственных услуг как единую информационно-справочную систему хранения описания государственных услуг и организации межведомственного взаимодействия по согласованию административных регламентов государственных услуг, межведомственную систему электронного взаимодействия и инфраструктуру доступа граждан к электронным услугам. Схематично инфраструктура электронного правительства на федеральном уровне в России представлена на рис. 1.

В основе системы заложены следующие компоненты.

- Портал государственных услуг – [www.gosuslugi.ru](http://www.gosuslugi.ru) – единое окно для доступа ко всей системе российских государственных услуг, в том числе в электронном виде.
- Система межведомственного электронного взаимодействия (СМЭВ) – транспортная среда для обеспечения работы межведомственных сервисов.
- Каналы доступа к услугам – телефонные центры, многофункциональные центры, сеть терминалов, удостоверяющий центр для аутентификации и авторизации граждан.
- Реестр государственных услуг – справочно-контрольная подсистема хранения описания и логики государственных услуг, которая формируется органами власти и транслируется гражданам через портал государственных услуг<sup>1</sup>.




Рис. 1 – Система электронного правительства в России

<sup>1</sup> Для простоты изложения мы далее рассматриваем Реестр как систему на федеральном уровне управления в Российской Федерации. Однако заметим, что Реестр содержит сведения и о региональных, и муниципальных услугах. Рассмотренные особенности работы Реестра на федеральном уровне в полной мере могут быть применимы и к региональному, и к муниципальному уровню управления в России.

## 2. Предпосылки создания Реестра государственных услуг

Реализовывавшаяся в России федеральная целевая программа «Административная реформа (2006–2010)» имела в качестве одной из главных целей формирование системы высококачественных государственных услуг [7].

В этой связи стали разрабатываться стандарты государственных услуг, а также административные регламенты – нормативно-правовые акты, определяющие сроки и последовательность административных процедур, административных действий и принятия решений федерального органа исполнительной власти, а также порядок взаимодействия между его структурными подразделениями, государственными служащими, а также его взаимодействия с физическими или юридическими лицами (заявителями) при исполнении государственной функции (предоставлении государственной услуги).

Определяющую роль в продвижении системы государственных услуг сыграло принятие Федерального Закона ФЗ № 210 «О предоставлении государственных и муниципальных услуг», в котором давалось наиболее четкое определение государственной услуги и ее электронному аналогу, а также способам и возможностям предоставления услуг гражданам и организациям [2].

Для того чтобы обеспечить контроль качества формирования административных регламентов как со стороны органов власти, так и со стороны граждан, было необходимо создать единый репозиторий для хранения государственных услуг, с возможностью анализа их описания, совместной работы над совершенствованием правил их предоставления (по сути административных регламентов) и обеспечением доступа к нему всех желающих сравнить фактическое качество оказания государственных услуг с заявленным [1, 4, 5].

Таким образом, начиная с 2007 года, стала реализовываться идея создания Реестра государственных услуг, который устанавливал единообразные правила формирования описания услуг, их публикации, давал возможности анализа

и сопоставления процессов перевода государственных услуг в формализованный вид по разным органам власти и, что самое главное, Реестр должен был служить бэк-офис системой для портала государственных услуг, с помощью которого можно было публичить согласованные внутри ведомств услуги для граждан.

Оператором и ответственным госорганом за работу РГУ выступило Минэкономики России, главным методологом – НИУ «Высшая Школа Экономики».

### 3. Структура Реестра государственных услуг

На самом высоком уровне РГУ – это совокупность федеральных органов исполнительной власти, по каждому из которых приводится список оказываемых ими услуг согласно полномочиям. Структура РГУ внутри описания государственных услуг отражает структуру их административных регламентов государственных услуг и предполагает наличие следующих разделов (приводятся в укрупненном виде):

- 1) наименование государственной услуги;
- 2) сведения об услугополучателе (физическое и (или) юридическое лицо);
- 3) наименование центрального государственного органа, разрабатывающего стандарт государственной услуги;
- 4) наименование услугодателя;
- 5) наименование организаций, осуществляющих прием заявлений и выдачу результатов оказания государственной услуги, и (или) указание на веб-портале «электронного правительства» в случае оказания государственной услуги в электронной форме;
- 6) форма оказания государственной услуги (бумажная/электронная);
- 7) платность либо бесплатность оказания государственной услуги;
- 8) порядок оказания услуги;
- 9) примечания/изменения.

Отметим особенно раздел «порядок оказания услуги». В него «защита» процедура оказания услуги по шагам: от момента подачи заявления до вариантов принятия решения об оказании

услуги ответственным органом и до формирования и описания итогового результата услуги.

Документы, необходимые для инициации услуги, и шаблоны результирующих документов также хранятся внутри данного раздела. Чем более пошагово формализован административный регламент в РГУ, тем легче создавать его электронный аналог и формировать по нему электронное предоставление услуги.

Заметим, что для каждой услуги в Реестре хранятся нормативно-правовые документы, регулирующие и определяющие порядок ее оказания и получения. Документы хранятся в электронном виде.

Доступ к РГУ получают все органы власти: но каждый к своему разделу. Доступ организуется через идентификацию ответственного лица от органа власти через электронно-цифровую почту. Такой сотрудник вправе изменять содержимое услуг, после чего изменения должны фиксироваться в базе данных Реестра.

В Реестре ведется журналирование всех действий. Известно, кто и какие изменения в какой момент времени производил в Реестре. Это позволяет повысить персональную ответственность за правильность наполнения Реестра.

Пример содержимого РГУ представлен на рис. 2.

Рис. 2 – Пример структуры раздела РГУ

#### 4. Основные проблемы использования Реестра как информационной системы

Работу по наполнению Реестра осуществляли одновременно все государственные органы. Автор данного исследования на основе анкетирования ответственных за наполнение Реестра сотрудников десяти ведомств смог выявить следующие основные проблемы, которые возникли у них при взаимодействии с РГУ как информационной системой.

*Сложный интерфейс для заполнения.* Многие поля и разделы в РГУ требовали дополнительного пояснения. Названия разделов и подразделов были не всегда удачны, что мешало сотрудникам разобраться с правильным вводом данных.

*Пиковые нагрузки на РГУ при заполнении:* при одновременном обращении к РГУ система могла очень долго реагировать и отвечать на запросы по заполнению полей.

*Рассинхронизация содержимого между рабочими станциями и основным сервером РГУ.* РГУ имеет распределенную систему, где клиентские приложения устанавливались на рабочие станции сотрудников госорганов. При этом при «зависании» системы могла происходить рассинхронизация данных. В таком случае на основе единой службы поддержки, организованной оператором РГУ приходилось добиваться синхронизации по данным.

*Отсутствие единого нормативно-правового справочника.* Реестр не был подключен к уже существующим или специально разработанным нормативно-правовым справочникам. В этой связи нормативно-правовое обеспечение процесса предоставления государственной услуги становилось иногда отдельным исследованием, поскольку требовалось обеспечить полноту сопровождающей нормативно-правовой документации.

*Отсутствие в системе команд «копировать»-«вставить».* Заполнение услуги в Реестре – это трудоемкий процесс. Пользователи не могли копировать уже заполненные разделы и были вынуждены заново заполнять похожие данные.

*Статус заполнения услуги.* До тех пор пока статус административного регламента услуги не сменится с «разрабатываемого» на «утвержденный» ответственное лицо в госоргане не может полностью описать госуслугу, как того требует структура РГУ [10].

Таким образом, работа с РГУ как информационной системой обнаружила проблемы технического, организационного и нормативно-правового характера, что делает РГУ типичным проектом электронного правительства.

Рассмотрим далее, как вышеперечисленные проблемы, а также более амбициозные цели по интеграции информационных обменов между госорганами можно реализовать на основе расширения функционала РГУ.

## **5. Направления совершенствования работы Реестра**

Совершенствование работы РГУ может идти по нескольким направлениям. Прежде всего, это технологическое. Есть потенциал для изменения интерфейса работы: появление внутренней справочной документации, полей автозаполнения и выпадающих списков для выбора возможных значений полей. Это позволит снизить нагрузку на центр поддержки работы с РГУ и уменьшит количество ошибок заполнения. Другим технологическим элементом является удаление дублирующих полей и разделов, либо конкретизация их названий. В частности, применимо для поля «комментарии по услуге», заполнение которого зависит от раздела, в котором оно заполняется. Следует также добавить в РГУ нормативно-правовой справочник.

Другое направление работы по совершенствованию РГУ можно назвать организационным. Такое название подразумевает формирование интеграционных процессов межведомственного информационного обмена. Так, описание услуги в Реестре можно расширить полем «жизненная ситуация», что позволило бы объединить ряд различных услуг в единую жизненную ситуацию, к которой можно отнести, например, «поиск работы» или «получение образования».



Также в данное направление входит межведомственная работа по согласованию административных регламентов услуг. Межведомственность является свойством любой системы государственного управления [9].

В России проблема организации межведомственного взаимодействия осложняется масштабом российского государства и распределенности госорганов, например, территориальной. Для терорганов следует вводить механизмы синхронизации информации с головным органом.

Так, предлагается разделить административные регламенты на статическую и динамическую части по информации. Например, «динамической» частью регламента являются адреса территориальных органов, менять которые рекомендуется без прохождения сложной процедуры согласования, а также места предоставления государственных услуг. В то же время изменение логики оказания услуги в регламенте относится к «статической» части, а значит, требует согласования.

Еще одной потенциально удобной функциональной возможностью РГУ должен стать конструктор административных регламентов. Этот модуль должен позволить формировать новые административные регламенты из блоков или элементов, уже существующих и описанных в РГУ. Это позволит существенно сократить временные издержки и упростить работу по созданию новых регламентов.

Переход от «бумажного» согласования изменений в административных регламентах к электронному требует тесной интеграции РГУ со СМЭВ, когда для согласования изменений каждым ведомством будут разработаны собственные сервисы, через которые данные об изменениях будут поступать от одного ведомства к другому или от одного территориального органа в головной орган власти. Для этого предлагается интеграция РГУ и СМЭВ через модуль государственной информационной системы технологического межведомственного взаимодействия, в структуре которой описание для всех информационных сервисов всех ведомств станет универсальным и единообразным.

## Заключение

В статье приведены основные этапы развития Реестра государственных услуг в Российской Федерации: от формирования до планируемого расширения функционала работы. Основные проблемы развития РГУ упираются в несовершенство обеспечивающей нормативно-правовой базы, которая влияет на расширение использования РГУ как системы межведомственного взаимодействия.

Структура РГУ будет усложняться и детализироваться в силу объективных уточнений в описании соответствующих административных регламентов государственных услуг. Разделение сведений РГУ на динамические и статические позволит производить своевременное обновление данных в РГУ, минимизируя организационные и нормативно-правовые издержки.

РГУ продолжает служить справочно-контрольной информационной системой для поддержки полноценной работы единого российского федерального портала государственных услуг. Развитие практики межведомственного взаимодействия для федеральных органов исполнительных власти может сделать РГУ частью транспортной инфраструктуры межведомственного обмена электронными документами и иными данными путем оптимизации и унификации межведомственных информационных сервисов.

### *Список используемых источников*

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**EFFECTIVE  
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**ЭФФЕКТИВНОЕ  
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ**





# COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS REFORMS IN FORMER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE<sup>1</sup>

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## **Introduction**

Public administration reforms in Western Europe after 1980 were based on relatively common problems (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004), two of which were evaluated by most authors as crucial. The first problem was macro-economic: too big a proportion of government in GDP, significant deficits, and a perceived lack of public sector performance contributing to GDP. The global crisis, which became visible in 2009 in the form of the financial crisis in the USA, created new challenges. States need to react effectively to existing global and local problems with short-term anti-crisis measures and especially with long-term strategies, including a further revitalization of their public administration systems. The second problem was a drop in trust and legitimacy in public institutions, including politicians; both issues are still a challenge for all CEE governments.

In CEE countries, the position from which reforms were initiated was quite different; the main objective was the creation/re-creation of democratic public administration systems. The strategies of the CEE countries were also different: either they were heavily influenced by the prospect of becoming an EU member or they were not. Building democracies, organizing transitions, and in some cases preparing pre-accession were shared objectives to be achieved, but methods, tools, timing, and concrete targets were only a relatively shared problem. CEE governments all changed drastically. Political systems changed from centralised or dictatorial systems to democracies. Democratic checks and balances were established. State structures were reshuffled, often toward more decentralisation. Economic systems changed, e.g. from state monopolies to market systems with private firms. Societal and social systems with NGOs, not-for-profit organizations, and citizen action groups were established that

<sup>1</sup> *This paper is based on the background paper prepared for the capacity-development workshop "DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE CAPACITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT", Yerevan, Armenia, 8. - 9. 10. 2014*

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are designed to participate actively in public debate and to become stakeholders in their society and their communities (Peters, 1996).

The goal of this paper, heavily based on NISPACEE research projects<sup>1</sup>, is to identify shared and varied public administration reform trajectories and briefly assess the outcomes of public administration reforms in the CEE region. It discusses whether New Public Management is the best solution for the CEE region today and its final part provides indications of the general requirements and conditions that will allow national public administrations to overcome the challenges of the post-2015 period and meaningfully contribute to the process of achieving objectives of sustainable development.

## **1. CEE public administration reform trajectories: commonalities and differences**

Public administration reforms in CEE are not carried out as one uniform process, neither in their contents nor their time frames. In this part of the paper, we discuss patterns of reform trajectories.

### ***1.1. Reform beginnings and phases***

Available information about reforming public administration in CEE indicates that the national patterns differ somewhat in terms of the beginning and the contents of their reforms, depending on local, political, social, and other environments. Two subgroups are fully visible:

- 1) Countries in Central Europe, including the Baltic States
- 2) Countries of the former Soviet Union (NIS region)

In Central Europe, the first democratisation phase, which was focused on building new public administration systems and started in early 1990, was relatively similar in phasing and reform contents. It focused on replacing old 'socialist' structures with new democratic ones, establishing real local self-government system, democratic elections, etc.

The second common aspect for this region was the EU pre-accession phase at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century (Romania was slightly later). Although the public administration

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system was not an explicit part of the *Acquis Communautaire*, several targets were set by the EU regarding administrative/management reforms in the public sector. Typical common tasks were: establishing a civil service; further decentralisation, especially creating regional self-governments; introducing e-government services; and improving the system of financial controls in order to be able to utilise EU funds.

The situation in other CEE countries does not fit any uniform pattern. The content and timing of their reforms were individual and depended on the country's specific internal and external environments.

The limited local stability in the Kyrgyz Republic meant that basic administrative reforms in the country were initiated only in 2001. For the first time, Public Management Reforms were articulated as a government priority in the Comprehensive Development Framework up to 2010 (2001) and reflected in the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) (2003). Apart from those two strategic documents, a Public Management Strategy was developed in 2003 that focused on the basic mechanisms needed to create a system of public administration.

In Ukraine, some changes began in the 1991–1997 period, characterised by the chaotic reform of both the socio-economic sphere and the state machinery. Several decrees and regulations were prepared later, but increasing political instability limited their success and even their chances of being implemented.

In Kazakhstan, the main aims of the public sector reform agenda were set within a long-term vision for Kazakhstan, announced by the President in 1997, and called 'Kazakhstan 2030'. Reform strategies comprised several main goals, such as increasing the effectiveness of the government, implementing modern information technology, eliminating bureaucracy in government bodies, and restricting state interventions in the economy. The early civil service reform efforts of Kazakhstan by 1999 were first among former soviet countries to introduce important innovations, like the division of civil servants into political and career officers; open and mandatory competitive selection into civil service and the protection of career civil servants when a political leadership changes. Specialized Civil Service Agency has been created during this period. The second wave of significant reforms and professionalization was in 2013 when Kazakhstan again

was first among the CIS countries to introduce the following. In 2013 President decided to decrease the number of political appointees by 8 times, which has been considered by international experts as an unprecedented manifestation of the political will and as a clear sign of a move towards professionalization of the civil service. With the President's order the senior executive core «A» was established. The special competitive selection procedure into the personnel reserve serves as the only source of appointment, retention and termination of civil service, based on special qualification requirements. So, out of total 97,000 civil servants in Kazakhstan 550 positions currently belong to senior executive core «A». Thanks to the country's relative political stability and wealth, all planned reform targets were successfully achieved.

In Armenia, the reform efforts might be characterised by their long interruptions and sporadic nature. The first attempts at a legal framework for the civil service were articulated in 1994 – the concept of civil service was re-developed by the government in 1997 – but its implementation was again delayed after the 1998 change in power. The final version of the Civil Service Law was enacted only in December 2001. Under such conditions during the first reform stage (1999–2003), only basic systems for managing the core government apparatus were established. The second reform stage (2003–2008) focused on improving broader public services.

Russia is an unusual case. According to Obolonskij (2009), there were several attempts to reform Russia's public administration and civil service system. The first attempt was made in 1991, when the Civil Service Office (Glavnoe upravlenije po podgotovke kadrov) was established by presidential decree; it was supported by French experts. This Office was abolished in late 1994 because of its limited success, due to a combination of the influence of 'old' cadres and unhelpful French advice. The second attempts are connected with the 1997–1999 period, when President Yeltsin established the Committee for Administrative Reforms, which formulated a reform strategy. However, this document was never implemented because of major political changes. In the 1999–2002 period, especially at the beginning, public administration reform was discussed and analysed many times, but concrete steps were not taken until 2002. President Putin first presented the need for radical reform in the Parliament, and in November 2002 he approved the document 'Federal Programme of the Civil Service Reform 2003-2005'. In spite of some implementation delays, the Civil Service Law was accepted

by the Parliament in 2004, the Civil Service Office was established in 2007, and most of planned Presidential decrees were adopted. However, the real impact of these changes will only be visible later.

A simplified picture of what happened and when — based on the cluster analysis method — is provided in Table 1, below.

*Table 1: Country clusters; reform contents and timing*

Cluster	Main Features	Countries
1	First PA reforms began in the early 1990s; early reforms were supported by many international donors to supplement limited local experience. From the mid-1990s, the dominant goal was EU accession and the necessary administrative adjustments. After 2004, the speed of reform more or less slowed down.	Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
2	Similar to 1, but with a few years' time delay.	Romania, Bulgaria
3	A stable and strong presidential system allows for relatively successful changes, especially after 2000.	Kazakhstan
4	The reform systematically blocked or at least slowed by 'old cadres'. Necessary legislation adopted only recently; its impact cannot yet be assessed.	Russia
5	Too much local instability continues to prevent needed reforms.	Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine

Source: Bouckaert et al, 2009

## *1.2. Reforms' reasons and driving forces*

As with the phasing and main contents, the purpose of the reforms and their driving forces are relatively similar in Central Europe, but there are also some important similarities in the Eastern European states.

The first reform phase in Central Europe, at the beginning of the 1990s, represented a clear attempt for democratisation, including the democratisation of public administration, fulfilling the need to establish standard administrative structures which function in

developed countries. This phase was dominantly supported and also supervised by SIGMA, OECD structured, and financed by the PHARE programme. Other international donors were also very active during this period, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and country-specific donors. For example, the Estonian public management reform practices were influenced by relevant solutions in Germany (the legal framework, in particular), the UK, and the Nordic countries (individual management tools). Such help was necessary because of the shortage of human and financial resources, the lack of experience, and the urgency for solutions.

However, compared to Eastern Europe (see later), the major decisions about the design and operation of public administration systems in Central Europe have remained very much 'home-grown', thanks in part to the effective reform coordination activities of SIGMA and OECD. Policy transfer was an important policy tool in the 1990s, but it has been gradually replaced by a more knowledgeable process of policy-learning in recent years.

As already described above, the second phase of reforming public administration systems in Central Europe was very closely linked to the EU accession process. The role of other international organisations diminished, and only a few dominantly sectoral or very specialised activities (e.g. the establishment of a cost centre system in the Slovak public administration supported by German funds) remained supported by bodies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and country-specific partners.

After accession, the EU pressure for changes almost disappeared, and reforming public administration became a more 'voluntary' and nationally motivated process (sometimes funded from EU structural funds). The reaction to such new conditions varied among the new EU member states. Some continued to try to implement more complex reform plans (Latvia and Lithuania) and others significantly slowed down, making only a few small changes instead of the required complex reforms (Slovakia and the Czech Republic).

A simplified picture of the principal reform reasons and driving forces in Central Europe, based on the cluster analysis method, is provided in Table 2.

**Table 2:** Central Europe country clusters: reforms, reasons and driving forces

Cluster	Main features	Countries
1	First PA/PM reforms represented the need for democratisation, a switch from the old system and a demonstration of the will to change. From the mid-1990s, the most important reason and driving force for reform was EU accession. After accession, there were few initiatives.	Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
2	First PA/PM reforms represented the need for democratisation, a switch from the old system and a demonstration of the will to change. From the mid-1990s, the most important reason and driving force for reform was EU accession. After accession, reforms continued.	Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary
3	First PA/PM reforms represented the need for democratisation, a switch from the old system and a demonstration of the will to change. From the mid-1990s, the important reason and driving force for reform was EU accession, but many or most changes would happen without EU pressure. After accession, reforms continued, but on a limited scale.	Estonia
4	Reforms began mainly in relation to EU accession and are still connected to it.	Romania

Source: Bouckaert et al, 2009

The situation in most areas of Eastern Europe (Russia may be an important exemption) shows that the majority of reform changes in this region were driven by international donor agencies. Compared to Central Europe, where local reform capacities were created incrementally and most funds were provided by the EU in a relatively coordinated form, in this region, little progress would be possible without external help. Many positive changes would not be possible without the use of international expertise and funds, as local capacities and financial resources were, and still are, very limited.

However, several evaluations of foreign assistance highlight several negative features. For example, there are frequently too many donor agencies sitting at the neck of an individual ministry. In such a situation, the application of 'best global practice' is almost

meaningless. Moreover, most projects are built upon the 'client's needs' as identified for the government by external experts, rather than responding to the actual needs and demands of the present day.

Shakarashvili (2005) adds to this: 'Especially at the early phases of the post-Soviet reforms, these countries were strongly attracted by the idea of 'westernisation' and were open to close collaboration with international (predominantly Western funded and Western influenced) organisations. Often, this collaboration resembled a teacher-pupil type of relationship, when governments would not object to following the recommendations of external partners without questioning their validity or appropriateness for the local context, whilst the Western agencies were not shy to reveal the 'consultant knows it all' attitude. The policy design recommendations were often based on the specific experience and knowledge of international experts in their own countries.'

## **2. Selected reform outcomes**

Public administration and management reforms in the CEE region can be evaluated from many different angles, but it is necessary to accept that they delivered many important and necessary positive changes and improvements compared to the pre-reform situation of 1990s. Effective practices were established in many cases and areas, and the gap between the quality of administration in developed countries and in the region is becoming smaller and smaller. However, as Mayer-Sahling (see below) and other authors indicate, regressive trends are clearly visible today in some countries (for example, there is recentralisation in Hungary and the abolishment of the civil service offices in Poland and Slovakia). We will highlight selected important developments in crucial public management sectors.

### ***2.1. Public financial management***

From a macroeconomic point of view, it is necessary to admit that all EU member countries significantly improved their financial discipline, in part thanks to the implementation of modern budgeting methods. Until the financial crisis at the end of 2008, very few countries had to cope with excessive deficits and large debt

levels, beyond the Maastricht criteria (Hungary, Poland). Slovenia and Slovakia managed to join the Euro zone.

However, since the start of the financial crisis, the financial health of most CEE and former Soviet Union states has deteriorated markedly, reflecting the ongoing crisis as well as the packages of economic stimulus adopted in several countries. Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Belarus, and Ukraine found it necessary to approach the International Monetary Fund for financial assistance.

Typical public financial management reforms in the region are a full accrual medium-term programme and performance budgeting, contracting, outsourcing, public procurement, and even public-private partnerships projects. The results of such attempts differ significantly and depend on concrete local conditions and the environment. High levels of corruption are one important barrier to success. Cost-benefit analysis and impact analysis are more and more commonly practised, partially because of the requirements of the EU structural funds.

A relatively weak point is the efficiency of financial controls and auditing in CEE. Probity – compliance – legalistic approaches dominate, and auditing value for money is still a limited practice.

## *2.2. Decentralization and fiscal decentralisation*

Decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation is a particularly common feature in the language of public management reforms in the CEE region (this may also be due to pressure from the Council of Europe – Congress of Local and Regional Authorities). However, its scale and reality differ significantly. The most radical changes of decentralisation can be found in Estonia and Slovakia. After 2000, decentralisation was the main motto of reforms in Slovakia. The opposite can be found in the eastern countries. In many eastern cases, the initiatives of decentralisation (especially fiscal decentralisation) have not been implemented. For instance, Ukraine has not yet created ‘real’ self-governments.

The most important changes of formal decentralisation are connected with the creation of regional and local self-governments and the transfer of competencies and resources to these levels.

The impact of these changes is mixed, reflecting the opportunities and limitations of decentralisation as a reform tool as well as the need to tailor decentralisation to a particular reform environment. An improper allocation of responsibilities limits the chance for economies of scale and increases transaction costs. Too small government units suffer from a lack of competence and financial resources. Therefore, during the process of fiscal decentralisation, 'the administrative capacity of sub-national governments and the administrative and compliance costs of decentralisation' should be taken into account (Allen and Tommasi, 2001).

### 2.3. Civil service and human resources management

A recent comparative study of the civil service systems in selected CEE states found significant variations in the progress of civil service reforms and their sustainability after EU membership (Meyer-Sahling, 2009). It was possible to distinguish three groups of countries, varying in terms of their current fit with European standards of administration and in terms of the professionalization trajectory (see Table 3 below).

*Table 3: Fit with European Principles: Comparison Across Countries*

<b>Current Fit &amp; Post-accession pathways</b>	<b>High fit</b>	<b>Medium to high fit</b>	<b>Medium fit</b>	<b>Medium to low fit</b>	<b>Low fit</b>
<b>Constructive continuation of reform</b>	Lithuania	Latvia, Estonia			
<b>Constructive reform reversal</b>			Hungary, Slovenia		
<b>Destructive reform reversal</b>				Slovakia, Poland	Czech Republic

Source: Meyer-Sahling, 2009

The fit with European principles was found to be the highest in the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), which constructively continued their civil service reforms. Slovakia, Poland, and the Czech Republic share a relatively low fit with European principles of administration; they are the destructive reform reversal cases (Meyer-Sahling, 2009).



Outside the new EU member states, progress in the civil service area has been even more limited. In the absence of an effective conditionality of EU membership, the civil service reforms of the former Soviet republics (except the Baltic States) have been driven by international donors and domestic political forces. Despite some efforts to modernise the civil service systems, public administration professionalism remains rather low and there were frequent incidences of administrative corruption, with these countries at the bottom of the 2008 corruption perception index. A weak democratic state, stemming from the ability of the post-communist political-administrative regime to retain its power, was found to be one of the main reasons for failed public management reforms in this region.

### **3. New Public Management and CEE region**

During the times of transition, and also now in times of austerity, many CEE countries decided that a smaller state is a better state. However, this NPM-based issue is not simple, as discussed in this part. There exist two concepts connected with NPM, NPM as the way of internal and NPM as the way of external workings of government. These concepts have a rather different focus, despite their common denominator in market ideology. Whereas Osborne and Gaebler (1992) wanted primarily to improve the way government works vis-à-vis society, which would in their view only be possible if the public sector would withdraw and leave service delivery to the private sector; Hood (1995) emphasized the meaning of NPM as a set of recommendations in order to make the public sector better organized and managed internally. Reading both of these frequently-cited publications with the benefit of hindsight, one can see that NPM became the heading for two related but simultaneously rather different streams of reform: on the one hand aimed at improving the quality of the public service delivery on behalf of its customers, and on the other hand emphasizing the need to downsize public service, because in neo-liberal terms there is no way out for the public sector except to leave everything to the private sector.

The internal and external workings of the public sector present an important, albeit somewhat neglected, distinction between two

dimensions of NPM. Looking at the external workings, we feel that NPM is really a dead philosophy. However, recent research provides evidence that many NPM tools, if properly implemented, may still support important efficiency improvements. In our opinion, better efficiency is still an adequate tool to help balance the currently seriously imbalanced governmental finances. Spending less and taxing more is very risky, from the economic, political, and social points of view. Spending better may help. All this implies that NPM is not dead in terms of the recommendations it gives for improving the internal workings of government.

The recent literature on this subject indicates that many NPM-generated tools and instruments are alive all over the world. The results of their implementation depend on the quality of preparing and implementing respective reforms. The most common and frequently used NPM tools and instruments, with their positives and bottlenecks, are the use of performance measures, the emphasis on output and controls that objectives are met (performance audits and controls), contracting and outsourcing, the disaggregation of and competition within the public sector, the emphasis on the quality of service delivery, and e-government tools. In many cases, private sector management styles are copied by public organizations: hands-on management, input discipline, more product-oriented instead of function-oriented management, careers organized on a professional instead of formal-legal basis, mobility increases, and flexible work contracts.

Many authors have evaluated the appropriateness and suitability of NPM principles and tools for the transitional countries. Most authors have not been very optimistic, for example: 'In Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition countries...public administration has had to face special challenges because both the creation of a political democracy and the implementation of the principles of efficiency and effectiveness have become crucial tasks of modernisation at the same time' (Jenei and Szalai, 2002). 'NPM is particularly bad if pushed upon transition and developing countries because if it can make any sense, then it is only in an environment of a well-functioning democratic administrative tradition' (Drechsler, 2005). 'The greater the shortcomings in a country's established management practices, the less suitable the [NPM] reforms' (Schick, 1998). 'Once a so-called Weberian administrative system is institutionalised, then it may

make sense to consider how best to move from that system towards a more modern system of PA' (Peters, 2001).

These quotations indicate that NPM as a reform ideology may not be the proper approach for reforms in transition countries, but this does not mean that many NPM-based policies and instruments cannot be implemented as soon as possible. For example, performance evaluation methods, especially benchmarking, may really help to improve transparency and accountability. Following statements summarise existing knowledge:

- *When reforming administrative systems in transitional countries, overestimating the role of NPM and implementing NPM as a reform ideology and main goal is an evident mistake.*
- *Results from the use of concrete NPM-type tools and mechanisms vary significantly by instruments used and by countries and depend on concrete local conditions and the environment.*
- *The implementation of any NPM mechanism should be deeply investigated for pervasive effects and other 'ex-ante' dysfunctions. Ex-post corrections are costly, if they are possible at all.*

### **3.1. What was missing; what was and is different in CEE?**

In order to be successful – to deliver positive outcomes and impacts – the use of NPM in transitional countries has to reflect specific transitional circumstances, which may limit the possible positive impacts of NPM on reforming public sectors and may exaggerate its negative features. Both 'external' and 'internal' capacities of CEE governments differ significantly from the situation in developed countries. Tables 4 and 5 show the differences for main macro-indicators.

The subsequent text discusses some of these differences in more detail. From the point of competitiveness, the early phases of transformation from a command economy to a market system are clearly characterized by the fact that even potentially competitive markets in transitive countries were not well developed and were dominated by monopolistic or oligopolistic structures and behaviours. Given this, it is rather optimistic to expect that competition could help to improve the performance of the public sector: one of the main arguments for NPM's competitive arrangements is cost-savings as a result of competition.

From the point of democracy, the expectations at the beginning of the transformation were optimistic, but today we know that democratic institutions and norms were not fully developed in CEE during the twenty-year transformation period. The structures exist, but the behaviour is still semi-socialist. A lack of a sense of individual responsibility along with paternalism and fiscal illusion remain important features of citizen behaviour. For example, in Slovakia, 67% of respondents believe that their problems need to be solved by the state (Bunčák et al, 2009).

In these conditions, the rent-seeking behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats is fully effective (from an economic point of view), as it is the simplest way to maximize individual benefits, at least from a short-term perspective.

The possible success of NPM is connected also with the 'quality of the state of law'. The state is switching from the role of the provider to a regulatory function: such a change is technically possible, but cannot deliver results in conditions where regulations and guidelines do not exist and where the law is not respected. There is currently excessive evidence that respecting the law is not the rule for governmental officials and is not required by citizens.

Another core problem is corruption. It is difficult to measure corruption. The most frequently used Transparency International CPI indexes describe opinions about corruption, but do not measure it directly. Many methodologies are sensitive to the level of awareness – when respondents become more aware of the problem, results worsen. In any case, the risk of corruption in CEE is relatively high.

Several CEE countries also suffer from extreme territorial administrative fragmentation. Two classic examples of this are Slovakia, which has only 5.5 million inhabitants, but almost 2,900 municipalities, 68% of which have less than a thousand inhabitants, and the Czech Republic, which has almost 10 million inhabitants, but close to 6,000 municipalities, 80% of which have under a thousand inhabitants. According to Davey (2002), such municipalities struggle with large implementation deficits: 'Reform programs are challenged by the inability of such communities to provide administrative and financial capacity and the scale economics and catchment areas necessary for essential services'. For this reason, we feel that territorial fragmentation, in the absence of effective inter-municipal co-operation, may also be an explanatory factor in the limited success of NPM.

**Table 4: Selected macro-indicators I**  
(higher score = better position)

Country	Functioning of government	Impartial public administration	Government effectiveness	Regulatory quality	Control of corruption	Professional public administration
<b>Selected developed countries</b>						
Austria	12	0.87	1.72	1.52	1.79	4.45
Denmark	12	1.21	2.29	1.91	2.48	5.67
France	11	0.69	1.48	1.22	1.40	4.83
Germany	12	0.54	1.57	1.53	1.70	4.52
Norway	12	1.33	1.75	1.42	1.98	3.75
Sweden	12	1.07	2.04	1.71	2.27	5.65
UK	12	1.06	1.50	1.60	1.54	5.40
USA	11	0.73	1.40	1.40	1.26	4.41
<b>Selected large developing countries</b>						
Brazil	7	-0.02	0.2	0.14	-0.11	3.92
China	1	-0.84	0.13	-0.19	-0.54	4.13
Kazakhstan	2	-0.79	-0.21	-0.32	-0.91	3.75
Russia	3	-0.92	-0.35	-0.35	-1.12	3.29
South Africa	9	-0.76	0.46	0.44	0.11	2.95
<b>Selected small CEE countries</b>						
Czech Republic	11	-0.18	0.98	1.29	0.38	3.74
Hungary	10	-0.21	0.70	1.09	0.36	3.67
Poland	10	0.23	0.59	0.95	0.43	3.80
Slovakia	10	-0.12	0.89	1.08	0.27	3.79

Source: own compilation from different resources

**Table 5: Selected macro-indicators II**  
(higher score = better position)

Country	Corruption perception index	Rule of law	Independent judiciary	Economic freedom index	Ease of doing business (world ranking)
<b>Selected developed countries</b>					
Austria	7.90	1.78	1	71.60	28
Denmark	9.30	1.91	1	77.90	5
France	6.90	1.46	1	64.20	32
Germany	8.00	1.65	1	71.10	18
Norway	8.60	1.90	1	69.40	7
Sweden	9.20	1.95	1	72.40	8
UK	7.70	1.74	1	76.50	6
US	7.50	1.55	1	78.00	4
<b>Selected large developing countries</b>					
Brazil	3.70	-0.20	0	55.60	128
China	3.60	-0.34	0	51.00	91
Kazakhstan	2.70	-0.64	0	61.00	56
Russia	2.20	-0.78	1	50.30	118
South Africa	4.70	0.09	0	62.80	41
<b>Selected small CEE countries</b>					
Czech Republic	4.90	0.96	1	69.80	67
Hungary	5.10	0.79	1	66.10	49
Poland	5.00	0.63	1	63.20	74
Slovakia	4.50	0.55	1	69.70	46

Source: own compilation from different resources

### 3.2. *Conclusions: Where to go?*

Public administration reforms in CEE countries have achieved a mix of successes and failures. However, the reform process proved to be more difficult and slower than expected at the outset of political and economic transition as well as EU accession. The purpose for such limited progress might be that the reform process in many CEE countries was dominated by short-term political interests of ruling political parties, negatively affecting the reform process as well as producing ups and downs in the government policy. This is in contrast to Western Europe, where the zigzag or action-reaction trajectories of public management reforms were based on competing administrative doctrines (NPM reforms based on the principles of 'letting and forcing the managers to manage' followed by post-NPM reforms focusing on renewed hierarchy-type, market-type, and network-type mechanisms) (Bouckaert, 2009).

#### **Economic crisis: the call for the new role of the state**

The world economy, and particularly the advanced economies, slowed substantially in 2008 and went into deep recession in 2009. The forecast was for a return to positive growth in 2010, but this is not true for most countries even today. Many authors speak about a 'global systemic crisis' rather than a short term temporary economic and fiscal imbalances.

Many transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been significantly affected by the current crisis. It could be argued that the impact of the crisis was greater in countries lacking necessary the institutional and human resource capacities of national public administrations. Two standard types of measures – increasing taxes and decreasing public expenditures – have been and are used to cope with fiscal problems by almost all governments involved. However, it is very clear today that such solutions have only a short term perspective: we need sustainable long term solutions; we need to rebuild governments and subsequently improve the public trust in governmental structures; we need to switch from traditional government to modern governance.

Governments should act according to the criteria of good governance. The UNDP sees five good governance principles: legitimacy and voice, including participation and consensus orientation; direction, including strategic vision; performance, including responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency; accountability, including transparency; and fairness, including equity and rule of law. The World Bank

has given six dimensions to the concept: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The EU sees the characteristics of good governance as: a government's reliability, predictability, coherence; its openness and transparency; its accountability and responsibility; its professionalism; the extent of participation; and its effectiveness. If government would proceed to thus improve itself as much as possible in these dimensions, it would be sufficient for eradicating societal problems.

The criteria of a Neo-Weberian state also follow the same line; see Table 6.

**Table 6:** *The Neo-Weberian State (summary)*

Neo-	Weberian
Shift from an internal orientation towards bureaucratic rules to an external orientation towards meeting citizens' needs and wishes. The primary route to achieving this is not the employment of market mechanisms (although they may occasionally come in handy) but the creation of a professional culture of quality and service;	[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of globalization, technological change, shifting demographics, and environmental threat;
Supplementation (not replacement) of the role of representative democracy by a range of devices for consultation with, and direct representation of, citizens' views	[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of representative democracy (central, regional, and local) as the legitimating element within the state apparatus;
In the management of resources within government, a modernization of the relevant laws to encourage a greater orientation towards the achievements of results rather than merely the correct following of procedure. This is expressed partly in a shift from <i>ex ante</i> to <i>ex post</i> controls, but not a complete abandonment of the former;	[but:] Reaffirmation of administrative law – suitably modernized – in preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen-state relationship, including equality before the law, legal security, and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state actions;
A professionalization of the public service, so that the 'bureaucrat' becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere of activity, but also a professional manager, oriented to meeting the needs of his or her citizens/users;	[but:] Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and terms and conditions.

(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p 99-100)



Building the necessary institutional and human resource capacities for modern governance involves many elements, especially:

*An 'appropriate' (the size of the state shall respect local conditions) and 'strong' state, delivering evidence-based public policies, consulted with citizens and focused on citizens:* there are many areas where the role of the state and its bodies is inevitable, and in non-competitive industries and social policy, focusing on inequality, the core problem of the current society. Switching from politics to policy is conditional upon the political and administrative elites of the post-communist countries becoming more willing and able to reform the very foundations of their political systems and overcome their short-term political interests.

*An effective state:* the principles of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness should rule all 'macro' and 'micro' governmental actions, properly implemented on a case-by-case basis. Public finance sustainability is a core part of total sustainability and depends on many factors connected with the allocative and technical efficiency of public expenditures (answering questions like: What do we spend resources for? How do we spend resources? And, what do we achieve from resources used?). One of the core issues here is combating the corruption that is a core problem of contemporary societies, especially in our region. *A 'social state':* inequalities need to be properly addressed and basic social rights guaranteed to all citizens.

*A state of the 'rule of law':* social and economic problems of modern societies cannot be solved in conditions where the legal system is weak and enforcement impossible.

*A state that is responsible for continuously improving service delivery systems, with a focus on access, efficiency, quality, co-production, and results:* public service delivery modes should change in many aspects. Basic services (such as health care, as described in this paper) should be available for everybody, optimum modes of financing and production should be sought example for communal services, quality and results checked internally and externally, and all of this should be done with much more involvement of citizens and the third sector.

*A state that systematically improves its administrative and regulatory services:* European principles clearly define main standards.

Possibly the issue most lacking are compliance costs (Russia is a good example, with its attempt to estimate the most important compliance costs for state services, at least waiting times, fees, etc.). There are many tools for achieving these targets. The most important include informatisation in public administration: e-governance; optimization of administrative structures; citizen and third sector participation and co-production; proper management of human resources in the public sector, including sustainable and effective training and retraining; and economization, focusing on improved allocative (“for what do we pay?”) and technical efficiency of public expenditures (“how much do we pay?”).

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## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS IN POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES<sup>1</sup>

*Yernar Zharkeshov*<sup>2</sup>

### Introduction

In order to understand the sustainability of the development of a country one needs to define what sustainable development is. The term 'sustainable development' has been controversial in the global development dialogue between developed and developing countries. The World Bank cites the definition of it as "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." from the World Commission on Environment and Development's (the Brundtland Commission) report *Our Common Future* dated 1987 (World Bank official website, 2014)<sup>3</sup> It is a rather vague definition that gives rise to questions of whose and what needs, short term as opposed to long term issues.

The recent Report of the UN Secretary-General<sup>4</sup> highlights the importance of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. The Rio Summit and subsequent Sustainable Development Goals stand for marrying these seemingly incompatible dimensions of development.

Arguably, too often the debate over sustainable development boils down to environmental issues linked to economic issues. The institutional and human resources capacities of public administration systems are often given limited attention although these appear to

<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on the background paper prepared for the capacity-development workshop of UNDESA "Developing Government And Governance Capacities For Sustainable Development", Yerevan, Armenia, 8. – 9. 10. 2014. The views and analysis presented in this article are of author's only and do not represent the views of the Regional Hub of Civil Service in Astana by any means. Full text can be obtained online at, <http://www.unpan.org/Events/Conferences/tabid/94/mctl/EventDetails/ModuleID/1532/ItemID/2639/Default.aspx>

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<sup>3</sup> World Bank official website online at <http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/sd.html>

<sup>4</sup> [A/68/79-E/2013/69](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2015/A/150613.doc.htm)

be decisive in setting the development agenda and implementing development objectives. There needs to be political acceptance by politicians and civil servants of sustainable development which depends on its capacity to find effective solutions to pressing societal issues.

It is therefore the quality of governance and institutions that needs a closer look when one attempts to understand the trajectory of a country's efforts towards sustainability. Thus, this paper takes the personnel management in civil service and its underpinning institutional (public administration) reforms as subjects of investigation when taking certain post-Soviet countries as case studies. The transition to market economy, social reforms, public administration and civil service reform and the fight against corruption will be the points of comparison for each country studied below with the time period starting from the early nineties to present.

### *The Washington Consensus<sup>1</sup> and the state role*

Interestingly, Fukuyama (2004: 19) argues that the alluring life in industrialised nations based on liberal democracy with individual political liberty and on market economy with meritocracy and material prosperity is the very desire of many people in the world. Therefore, as he argues, there is one-way migration from less industrialised to more industrialised nations. However, it can be argued that such a sophisticated recipe of institutional and societal structures is neither affordable nor appropriate for developing countries to follow, at least in the early stages of their development. A good example of this asymmetry would be the notorious Washington consensus which argued that state intervention into markets resulted in deadweight losses and market distortions, and government's role had to be minimised to avoid these inefficiencies (Stiglitz, 2004; Einhorn, 2001). The state was increasingly depicted as the rival of the free market, and therefore had to be significantly downsized, if developing countries were to enjoy economic

<sup>1</sup> It was a Western economies' prescribed set of policies with heavy reliance on market mechanisms as an efficient means of fostering economic development. The term refers to such restructurings as privatization, liberalisation of capital markets, and minimising the size and role of government (Rodrik, 2006: 973; Stiglitz, 2004; Einhorn, 2001: 26).

development (Bofinger et al 2009). Thus, the belief in the magic of markets dominated the wave of reform in many developing countries worldwide. Developing nations of Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union nations wholeheartedly embraced aggressive privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation (Rodrik, 2006: 974). These resulted in rapid increase in inequality as public assets were privatised through widespread corruption; moreover, as new private owners were likely to be incompetent in developing the assets they had privatised, they failed to advance their businesses and participate meaningfully in new markets (Stiglitz, 2004). Subsequently, instead of growing, national economies were slowed down. Thus, particularly in developing countries with weak market economic records, the reliance on market mechanisms did not result in efficiency and equity (Stiglitz, 2004). This paradigmatic change resulted in the reduction of not only the scope of the state but also its strength and capacity (Fukuyama, 2004). Market forces with *'the invisible hand'* were expected to bring about social equity and progress. However, the global financial turmoil has undermined this belief. Some now therefore argue for a highly interventionist and controlling state. Bofinger argues for *'a shaping state'* which is to be seen as a partner of the markets, and not a rival. Its functions would be to supervise the markets so that the latter would result in long-term economic development (ibid). Indeed, markets by nature are necessarily short-term oriented, and it is therefore the state's role to keep the markets at arm's-length and ensure long-lasting equal opportunities within society. From this viewpoint, *'the visible hand'* of government has a principal importance. In this sense, the state should be sufficiently autonomous from market and societal pressures. It can be argued that the truth is somewhere in the middle: that the centralisation and high autonomy of the state will likely lead to economic and political development in a developing country *if*: the ruling elite is developmentally-oriented and the economic bureaucracy is efficient and insulated. All these developments impacted the former Soviet Union countries differently with some doing relatively better than others. Below certain countries are given a closer look.

## Kazakhstan

### 1.1. Transition to market economy

Kazakhstan, an upper middle income economy, with a land area of 2.7 million sq kilometres, GDP per capita just over 13 000 USD, and a population of over 17 million, is the 9<sup>th</sup> largest country by territory in the world and one of the least dense populated countries (World Bank, 2014). Over the years of its independence, Kazakhstan underwent a great path of political, socio-economic and administrative transformations.

#### *Negative Initial Conditions*

Before independence, the economic output and trade of Kazakhstan used to be decided in Moscow. Remote economic planning led to little concern for efficiency and strategic focus on competitive advantages of Kazakhstan. As one of the 15 constituent republics, Kazakhstan was closely tied to the rest of the republics and was a major provider of some goods (eg. military components, crude oil, metals) and a major receiver of other goods and considerable subsidies. Such a high interdependence led the economy into severe financial and socio-economic depression upon breakup of the union. No access to sea and climate and ecological disadvantages exacerbated the initial challenges the country faced. Systemic corruption was a major barrier to meaningful transition.

#### *Positive Initial Conditions*

*Abundant natural resources.* Even though this factor is sometimes classified as neutral conditions, in the case of Kazakhstan it must be considered as a positive factor for the following reasons, among others:


- there is plenty of evidence that revenues from oil, gas, coal, and other minerals allowed the government to reach adequate macroeconomic climate, to increase government spending on social safety, education, agriculture, and to escape total collapse of the economy;
- transition to market-based economy requires spectacular restructuring of the economy that was often financially prohibitive to developing countries. Revenues from mineral resources facilitated faster transition process compared to the neighbouring countries in Central Asia. One should bear in mind, though, that heavy reliance on mineral resources' revenues retarded progress in non-commodity sectors that the government of Kazakhstan is now attempting to tackle by forced

economic diversification schemes like cotton, wine and fish clusters (Abdygaliyeva et al 2007). *Human capital* in Kazakhstan was relatively high as a result of comprehensive Soviet system of education and healthcare that ensured traditionally very high literacy; average years of schooling and female labour participation rates (see WDI, 2010).

#### *Economic Development since Independence*

During the early years of independence (first half of the 1990s), the economy contracted significantly as a result of the sharp increase in unemployment and inflation. The output decline in CIS countries was so severe due to a number of factors including the regional political conflicts and the absence of necessary institutions to propel the shift to market economy. The chaotic privatisation of SOEs meant to generate growth and investment was accompanied with rampant corruption and contributed to decline (Stiglitz, 2006). Thus, it took until second half of 2004 for Kazakhstan (as it did for Azerbaijan) to regain the previous 1990 real GDP level, whereas 2006 enjoyed almost 130 percent of the 1990 level as a result of favourable global economic environment and commodity prices in contrast with Russia that did not reach its 1990 output level (see Figure 1). Unemployment during the first half of the 1990s was due to the closure of unproductive firms and privatisation of state enterprises as the shift from a centrally planned to market economy started (See Figure 2).

**Figure 1** Output Profile, 1991–2006  
(Real GDP index 1990 = 100)



Source: Iradian 2007

**Figure 2** Employment, 1991–2006  
(1990=100)



Source: Iradian 2007

Importantly, the main source of economic growth of Kazakhstan has been revenues from crude oil export. As can be seen from Table 1 below, oil revenue to GDP ratio increased from above 7 percent



in 1998 to above 30 percent in 2004 (Agrawal, 2008). Given the fast rising GDP in the 2000s, oil industry was indeed a crucial part of the propelled economic activity and job creation in the country.

*Table 1* Oil export revenue of Kazakhstan

Year	Oil Exports (million barrels)	Oil Price (\$/barrel)	Oil Export Revenue (billion \$)	GDP current (billion \$)	Oil Export Revenue as Percent of GDP
1998	125.95	13.1	1.65	22.14	7.45
1999	120.00	18	2.16	16.87	12.80
2000	156.03	28.2	4.4	18.29	24.05
2001	183.54	24.3	4.46	22.15	20.13
2002	246.41	20.9	5.15	24.64	20.90
2003	254.35	27.6	7.02	30.83	22.77
2004	331.56	37.7	12.5	40.74	30.68

GDP = gross domestic product.

Sources: World Development Indicators (World Bank, various years); IMF Country Reports (IMF, various years)

Source: Agrawal (2008: 104)

### *Quality of Economic Growth*

Since 1991, Kazakhstan has had both negative and positive annual growth rates of between -12.6% and 13.5% (See Figure 3). The 1991 – 95 negative growth rates can be attributed to a series of events, mainly the end of centrally planned economy and closure of inefficient state owned enterprises, chaotic macroeconomic situation in the country, and heightened unemployment. The devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis did not leave Kazakhstan untouched leading the country to experience a negative growth rate of 1.9 in 1998. Yet, the economy recovered quickly by bouncing back to a positive 2.7% in 1999.

**Figure 3**



Source: WDI, 2009

Kazakhstan struggled with the annual average inflation rate which topped 168 percent in the period of 1993 - 2006. This was due to hyperinflation during 1994 – 1996 when the annual rate averaged almost 700 percent. In subsequent years from 1997 to 2006 the inflation rate averaged 9 percent which was still high for enhanced economic growth (WDI, 2009).

As mentioned above, the closure of unproductive firms and the production becoming more resource-efficient resulted in considerable job losses. Most CIS nations saw a significant shift in labour from public to private sector. However, the reduction in employment in the public sector was not proportionate to the increase in employment in the private sector. Such asymmetry resulted in the unemployment rate during 1994 – 2006 averaging at 10.7 percent per annum (WDI, 2009). Here it is important to note that the engagement in the informal economy has always been a norm in the Commonwealth of Independence States, including Kazakhstan. The ILO estimates that the employment in shadow economy in CIS could account for as big as 50% of total employment. Therefore, these estimates might contain a degree of exaggeration.

During the period of 1993 – 2007, Kazakhstan had an average Gini coefficient of 0.339. While this figure is higher than that in Kyrgyzstan (0.329), it is lower than Russia's Gini coefficient of 0.375 (WDI, 2009). UNDP's Human Development Index of CIS captures the extent of difficulty of the transition and its associated social costs. HDI of Kazakhstan in 1993 was valued as 0.614 which was well below the pre-independence level of 0.848 in 1990. The number reached 0.702 in 2006 ranking the country the 71<sup>st</sup> out of 179 countries (whereas in 2010 it reached 0.714 placing the country into the high human development category). Despite this improvement, the life expectancy was stagnant not reaching the Soviet level, and standing at 67.1 years in 2008. The government expenditure on healthcare in 2003-2006 stood at 2.27% of GDP (WDI, 2009), half the minimum recommended level of state healthcare expenditure for middle income economies. As a result, some 10% of the population suffers from healthcare deprivation (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2011).

### 1.3 Public administration and civil service reforms

#### *Pro-growth economic policies*

During the early years of independence, the Kazakh government had to tackle a number of issues at once: creating a new constitution, creating a private banking system, developing a national currency, restructuring many industries and agriculture to fit the market economy, tackling inflation, reducing poverty, maintaining political stability, and so on.

Fast *privatisation* was advised by the World Bank and IMF to all transition economies, including Kazakhstan, within the framework of the 'shock therapy' of the Washington Consensus. Over a short period of time there was thus created a new class of oligarchs, rich businessmen who managed to privatise hundreds of billions of dollars worth public assets (Stiglitz, 2006). This transfer was expected to allow private hands to run the enterprises more cost-efficiently; however, under the fear of unprotected property rights, investors invested minimum amounts and channelled as much profits as possible out of the country. Subsequently, lack of sound regulations and strong tax laws allowed the outflow of those assets to be irreversible. Fortunately, Kazakhstan managed to survive this policy mistake largely as a result of skyrocketing oil revenues (*ibid*).


Reforms of *financial sector* in accordance with prudential and capital requirements stemming from Basel Agreement of 1995 led to the spread of private, foreign and public banks in the economy. Public financial assets to GDP increased as did the credit to GDP ratio from 10 percent in 1994-95 to high 30 percent in 2005 (Agrawal, 2008). Adequate credit combined with influx of foreign direct investment revived the industrial sector substantially, generating much needed employment not only in oil sector, but also in transportation and construction. Foreign direct investment, which increased from annual US\$100 million in 1992 to more than US\$6 billion in 2006 (Azam, 2009), were primarily attracted to the oil sector and totalled US\$35 billion during 1993-2006 (UNCTAD, 2007: 102).

1992-1993 saw government spending controlled and taxes being raised. This was achieved by curbing salaries to civil servants, subsidies to industries, public investment outlays, and reducing government consumption by 20 percent.

As a commodity trading economy Kazakhstan enjoyed a considerable boom in trade terms during the 2000s as a result of

rising commodity prices. As can be seen from the Figure 4 below, Kazakhstan saw an almost 40 percent increase in its terms of trade during 2003 – 2006, which explains the double digit growth rates of GDP discussed earlier and increased government revenues (IMF, 2010), whereas countries like Chile, Russia, and Nigeria enjoyed even higher trade surpluses.


**Figure 4**



Source: IMF, 2010

to use parts of oil revenue to decrease its public debt (see Figure 6) and save some 60 percent of the revenues in the National Oil Fund (which topped \$27.5 billion in 2008). This displayed the government's ability to keep government expenditure under discipline (ibid).

**Figure 5    Figure 6**



Source: IMF, 2010

Source: IMF, 2010

*The National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan* is an important instrument established in 2000 to buffer the effects of unstable world commodity prices on the national economy and save oil revenues for next generations (ibid). The fund's reserves are not included in the budget and are used for overseas investment. The institution keeps more than half of its reserves in US dollars, whereas the rest are kept in euros, UK pounds, Japanese yen, and Australian dollar (ibid). Notably, part of the reserves was also used to fund social security net and reduce poverty during the 1990s (Agrawal, 2008).

Economic output is inextricably linked with *inflation*. Price level increase was an inescapable result of ceased subsidies from other former Soviet Union republics to Kazakhstan and of prices catching up with the world prices. The hyperinflation skyrocketing to almost 3,000 percent in 1992-94 was gradually overcome by launching the national currency, the tenge, and by subsequent use of instruments of monetary regulation by the central bank (e.g. high interest rates & low available credit) and of fiscal austerity. By 1996 the central bank managed to decrease inflation to 26-28 percent (ADB, 1996) and the exchange rate of the tenge against US dollar was stabilised.

Another long-term growth strategy of the government is President's international scholarship "*Bolashak*" (from Kazakh means 'future'), which was established in 1993 despite economic stagnation and social problems. Many talented young Kazakhstanis are annually selected on merit basis: through rigorous academic examinations, interviews and psychometric tests. The selected scholars are then sent to study at world renowned universities such as Harvard, Oxford, Columbia, Sorbonne, LSE, and others. The main purpose was to groom a new generation of leaders who upon return would help sustain the achieved results and further propel smooth transition to market economy and fully functioning democracy (Center for International Programs, 2010). Since inception, more than 10,000 students became Bolashak scholars. Thus, the scholarship furthers government's equal opportunities policy and levels the playing field across different income groups of population.

### *The Evolution of Civil Service*

An integral part of the political, socio-economic and administrative transformations was the civil service reform. It is worth noting that Kazakhstan inherited a patronage-based system from the soviet

past, where officers were all political appointees, and a society with distorted values. Intensive study of international experience and analysis of own problems allowed the country to determine the main directions of the first stage of reforms of late-nineties (ACSA, 2014).

As a result in 1999 Kazakhstan passed the Civil Service Law and 11 Presidential Decrees which led Kazakhstan to be the first among the post-soviet countries to introduce the following innovations in legislation:

- Division of civil servants into political and career officers;
- Open and mandatory competitive selection into civil service;
- Protection of career civil servants when a political leadership changes;
- Creation of a specialized Civil Service Agency (Baimenov, 2000).

Taking into account the features of the transition period a position based civil service model was chosen in Kazakhstan. The adopted law ensured the stability of personnel. Whereas in the mid-1990-s the staff turnover in government agencies amounted for 60%, in 2013 it has decreased to about 11-13% (ibid, ACSA, 2014).

Since the adoption of the law over 550 thousands citizens have participated in the competition procedures to enter civil service, among them 130 thousands were appointed for the posts. Here it is important to note that the legislation test as part of selection procedure was a very important step in a country, where the traditions of the rule of law was downsized. So, in short, the first stage of reform was directed towards elimination of patronage-based system (ACSA, 2014).

As the country implemented the adopted legal framework the government faced certain issues to tackle. Among them are:

- lack of an unbiased approach of competition commissions (sometimes the results of a competition were predetermined);
- using loopholes in the legislation for so-called "team movements" by newly appointed minister/governor;
- low efficiency of using personnel reserve;
- high corruption;
- low role of personnel management services.

Taking these and the best international practices as well as the increasing expectations of society into account, President Nazarbayev approved in 2011 the *Concept of a new model of civil service* by defining its basic principles as meritocracy, efficiency, transparency and accountability to the society (ibid). Following this, principal changes in the legislation and 18 Decrees of the President were adopted in Kazakhstan in March 2013. Thus, in short, the new stage of reform was focused on introducing new instruments and mechanisms in human resources management. The main ones of them are as follows.

*1. Measures have been taken to improve the transparency and objectivity of competitions*

For the first time, the government introduced the practice of observers and experts. Observers can attend the interviews with the candidates, review the work of competition commissions and provide their opinion on their work to public body's management. The media and non-governmental organizations can perform as observers as well.

*2. Restriction of out-of-competition movements.*

Changes in the legislation that limit out-of-competition movements allowed solving this issue fundamentally. As a result, the number of rotations between government agencies has decreased by 30 times. At the same time transfers within departments have been enabled.

*3. Professionalization of HR units.*

In order to professionalize the state apparatus there is a need to professionalize HR units in state agencies and implement and properly enforce the new staffing technologies in civil service. An automatization of HR units' activities is expected to become possible with the introduction of "e-Kyzmet" information system in 2015. Importantly, specialized training courses for the staff members of those HR units have been developed at the Academy of public administration under the President of Kazakhstan.

*4. Professionalization of the civil service*

In 2013 President decided to decrease the number of political appointees by 8 times which has been considered by international

experts as an unprecedented manifestation of the political will and as a clear sign of a move towards professionalization of the civil service (G-global, 2014).

With the President's order the senior executive core "A" (similar to Senior Executive Service of the USA) was established. There are a special competitive selection procedure into the personnel reserve that serves as the only source of appointment, retention and termination of civil service as well as special qualification requirements. So, out of total 97,000 civil servants in Kazakhstan **550 positions** currently belong to senior executive core "A" (ACSA, 2014).

There is a significant attention devoted to civil service competency tests. Given the lack of experience in this field and the lack of scientific developments in Kazakhstan and companies specializing in these tests, one of the leading global companies *HILL International* has been involved in development and improvement of competency tests.

Now on the results of testing the National Selection Commission tasked to select candidates into core "A" reserve will have information about the eligibility of each candidate to 4 distinct groups - *strategic, organizational, economic, expert-analytical, financial and auditing*, as well as its relative ranking among all applicants.

Such open and competitive selection into core "A" helped the decision-makers explore ways of maintain the adequate human resources capacity of the national public administration and find new potential managers who previously under the patronage system went unnoticed. Other innovations included training, job rotation, and performance appraisal of the core "A" civil servants.

Kazakhstan also pays considerable attention to training of civil servants as a factor of professionalization of the civil service. In the soviet past there were very few HR experts; research on human resources management was not encouraged as it was the 'business of the Communist party' (Baimenov, 2000). The country is now putting considerable efforts into modernizing the training of civil servants and fostering Kazakhstani research on public



administration and civil service. Training programs of the Academy of public administration are being developed taking into account the real practical needs of civil servants (APA, 2014).

*5. Strengthening the system of ethical and disciplinary control.*

The law “On civil service” has been added with a new chapter on: Code of ethics and anti-corruption behavior of civil servants. An increased role of disciplinary committees of state agencies Coordination of their activities with the Civil Service Agency. Importantly, political civil servants, who are heads of state bodies, governors **are now to resign** in case of corruption offenses made by their subordinates. Along with this, the new edition of the Law on civil service provides personal responsibility of the top officials for illegal HR management decisions.

*6. Improving the quality of public services delivery*

Law on public services delivery was adopted in 2013. The Agency has been given an authority to audit and externally monitor quality of public services. Importantly, a Public Council on public services delivery under the Agency was established that now includes representatives of academia, NGOs and the mass media. To assess the public services delivery since 2012 the Agency started satisfaction surveys among the recipients of public services (APA, 2014).

Notably, Kazakhstan has identified priority areas as next steps:

- increasing the protection of meritocracy (for instance, by creating a special Commission);
- increasing the effectiveness of ethics and disciplinary control (for instance, introduction of the Ethics Commissioner for the state authorities)
- Implementing talent management system and improve the quality of civil servants education;

Overall, it is important to mention that **the key performance indicators** of the new model of civil service are defined as the following:

- 1) The level of public trust in the system of competitive selection of civil service personnel;
- 2) The level of civil servants’ trust in the principle of meritocracy;
- 3) The level of citizens’ satisfaction with the availability and quality of public services.

Along with international cooperation, Kazakhstan is making significant efforts to promote *regional* cooperation. For this purpose, by the initiative of Kazakhstan and UNDP the Regional Hub of Civil Service in Astana was established, bringing together 33 countries and partners, including 13 countries of the CIS, the advanced economies, and international organizations such as the OECD, the EU, the World Bank, USAID and others. Regional hub is seen as an institutional platform for a continuous exchange of knowledge and experience in the civil service field. The hub is now expanding as other countries are noticing its value and joining as new participants (ACSH, 2014).

President Nazarbayev within the efforts of implementing the Strategy Kazakhstan-2050 and reaching the development of top 30 developed countries guides Kazakhstan to comply with *the OECD international standards*. Recently, a special Council on OECD under the President was established, and this underlines the priority of this field of international cooperation. Within the framework of fostering international cooperation Kazakhstan annually organizes the Astana Economic Forum attracting global thinkers for discussion of solutions to the problems of the world economy, civil service etc (G-global, 2014).

## **Armenia**

### **1.1. Transition to market economy**

The transformation to a market economy was started in the early 1990s, with Armenia rapidly developing as one of the strongest reformers of the former Soviet states. The change from a centrally planned welfare state to a market economy was very costly in terms of providing insurance and security for citizens. Russia could not supply these countries with budgets. The republics of Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus were measured as middle-to-low-income states (Grais, Wafik 1992). Hyperinflation of the ruble, the absence of the tax collection base, diminish in income from output and the rise in the unemployment all contribute to the lack of financing the administrations needed to actualize these changes in the early 1990s (Grais, Wafik 1992). Structural

changes were presented, starting with a wide privatization program and the establishment of a transparent legitimate system for the improvement of a developing private sector, with an early concentrate on opening the banking and energy sectors. Amid this early period of transition, the generally instructed Armenian workforce, numerous with specific specialized abilities, assumed an important part and gave a paramount stimulus to quickening the reform program. The arrangement of 10 activities spreading a dozen years –backed Armenia’s economic reform program to restore and keep up macroeconomic strength, make conditions for financial development, and enhance living conditions. These expansive ranges would structure the establishment for the change of the economy from an unified model to a business based one. The project incorporated a recovery credit for 1995-1996, five structural change credits somewhere around 1996 and 2004, two structural adjustments technical assistance credits around 1996 and 2002, and two neediness diminishment help credits starting in 2004 and ongoing. The technical assistance tasks backed the usage of the eight modification operations by giving the important expertise to reinforcing organizations (IDA, 2007).

Armenia had different barriers, which confounded its transition to a market economy. Reliance on oil imports and energy resources made Armenia vulnerable. It expends a lot of oil every year and is greatly vulnerable to oil costs. Political circumstances and geographic clashes have aggravated Armenia’s situation. The land argument about the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan resulted in an economic blockade forced by Azerbaijan in 1988 on Armenia. This blockade made Armenia even more vulnerable to its oil needs and foreign imports. In 1988 Armenia also experienced a setback because of devastating earthquake. The blockade kept support from Russia and the West from entering Armenia.. The principal IMF credit to Armenia was made in 1994 and aggregate giving reached at about \$210m. The vast majority of this loan was under Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which used to be known as the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) (Odling-Smee, 2001).

The economic growth in Armenia had peculiarities that can be considered as sources of vulnerability of economic performance

during shocks. The Armenian economy could be described as: (i) narrowly based; (ii) lowly diversified by sectors; (iii) microeconomic biases with low share of small and medium-size enterprises, which would facilitate the entry of new firms and the growth of small enterprises and consequently contribute to faster job creation, employment growth and unemployment reduction; (iv) one in which remittances play an important role in the economy and mitigate the impact of the transition on the welfare of households; and (v) an economy in which the share of informal sector is large (CRRC-Armenia, 2011).

## 1.2. Public administration and civil service reforms

- Armenia's public administration system development, in conjunction with political and socio-economic reforms, necessitated the re-conceptualisation of the role of the state. Gradually, the state shifted from directly influencing the public administration to a partner that regulates, stimulates, assists and sets "the rules of the game." As a result, the following contemporary principles and approaches have been given more attention:
  - the decentralisation of vertical structures of administration and the strengthening of horizontal connections;
  - the delegation of more authority, functions and responsibilities to lower levels of government;
  - the improvement of communication and information flow in all directions;
  - emergency and crisis management;
  - programme-oriented management, prioritised to cope with contemporary problems (e.g., reconstruction of the earthquake zone, strengthening of border areas, protection of Lake Sevan, creation of market infrastructures and the development of small businesses);
  - the streamlining and merging of public administration bodies to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

The reorganisation of the public administration led to the elimination of several tasks that were no longer necessary, while expanding and adding other duties. The following issues formed the basis of public administration reform efforts:

- the identification of the volume and types of activities of the public administration in relation to the current state of political and economic development;
- the election of adequate bodies of public administration;
- the distribution of administrative functions between various public administration bodies in order to avoid both duplication and “vacuums” whereas certain tasks are not covered by any administrative division.

The new role and responsibilities of the public administration required new mechanisms of effective functioning, as well as new legal and organisational approaches. In particular, the public administration was at least partially responsible for the creation of favourable conditions for market competition, the implementation of anti-trust policies and for the management of the civil service.

The extent of the participation of any given body in the complex system of public administration is also very important. Public administration organisations in Armenia, according to the nature of their functions, are divided into the following groups:

- central authorities (the government of Armenia);
- functional administrative bodies;
- sectoral administrative bodies;
- territorial administrative bodies.

The mergers of ministries were designed to improve the ministerial structure, eliminate duplication of functions, downsize the management and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration. In general, these mergers involved decentralising administrative functions, delegating tasks to lower levels of the administration and achieving a new balance between centralisation and decentralisation (Annual reports of the Ministry of Statistics). The results of these mergers and subsequent procedural reforms led to the following results:

1) Administrative reforms in the manufacturing sectors (agriculture, industry, construction) were tightly connected with the privatisation process. More than ninety-five percent of agricultural land and production means, more than half of industry, and a significant part of the construction sector was privatised. As a result, many economic entities emerged – approximately thirty-

eight thousand organisations and forty thousand individuals have registered with the appropriate authorities.

2) In the agricultural sector, three hundred and twenty-one thousand personal farms and two hundred and seventy-three collective farms replaced eight hundred collectives. In addition, economic organisations were granted the right to independent economic activity.

3) The means and methods of exercising power in the sectoral administration also changed – sectoral ministries ceased directly influencing the manufacturing and agricultural sectors and assumed a new role appropriate to contemporary needs, including:

- developing and implementing sectoral development strategies;
- ensuring legal regulation of economic activities;
- implementing foreign economic policy;
- encouraging investment;
- creating a competitive environment in the given sector.

## Tajikistan

### 1.1. Transition to market economy

During the last years of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan decided to follow others and started a move from the traditional Soviet model to a market economy. In 1991, Tajikistan authorized the renting and privatization of governmental enterprises (except the ones that were critical to national security). However, not everyone liked this move; especially individuals who had influential positions or possessed technological secrets in the industry and some politicians who were against any kind of market reforms. These people assured that the old system was still efficient and that everyone just needed to work a little bit harder. This opinion was popular after the rapid increase of inflation rates caused by the initial reform stage. The transition itself was slow because of distrust, fear, and anger people expressed to state government after the economic shock. As a result, during the first year of independence, less than five private farms were created.

In 1992, Tajikistan established the Tajikbankbusiness, its first commercial bank created with the goal to invest in the country's

economy. The bank tried to set up international links with many countries including the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and United Kingdom. The Soviet ruble was used in Tajikistan until it was replaced with the new Russian ruble in 1994. When the country joined the Russian ruble zone, Russia wasn't able to send enough currency to keep Tajikistan's economy in good shape. In 1995, Tajikistan finally quit the ruble zone and introduced the Tajikistani ruble. The initial exchange rate was about 50 Tajikistani rubles to \$1 USD, but by January 1996 the rate was already 280 per \$1 USD (Curtis, 1996).

## 1.2. Public administration and civil service reforms

Considering the Tajik model of civil service, it represents a positional model. It is characterized by such features as selection on civil service on a competitive basis and rapid promotion is not possible as it is necessary to maintain competition to any position despite the length of service and experience. One of the signs of the Tajik model is competitive selection on civil service. For understanding of features of the Tajik civil service, a place and a role in policy of the state it is necessary to track the main stages of its development which can conditionally be divided into four stages (Djamshedov D. N. 2004):

**1 stage (1991 - 1995).** Declaration of independence of Tajikistan set the task for the young state - to improve qualitative structure of cadres of civil service, to adapt it for new realities. However, in the period from 1991 to 1995, there was no legislation on the principles of the civil service in Tajikistan. In practice, only Soviet-era nomenclature principles of gradual advancement and adoption of the civil service to meet professional requirements co-existed (ibid).

With acceptance in 1994 Constitutions of the Republic of Tajikistan the institute of civil service got a strong constitutional and legal basis (p.2, p. 7) the citizen can carry out the right for participation in government directly or through representatives (p.1, p. 27 of the Constitution) (Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2003). The right for civil service is connected with direct participation of citizens in government. The constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, establishing the equal right for access of citizens to civil service, any requirements for arriving on civil service were not

fixed, for example: abilities, suitability to service, an education level, progress in office activity of candidates, etc. Realization of the specified constitutional law is in details regulated in acts.

**2 stage (1995 - 1999).** The further development of constitutional norms about equal access of citizens to civil service in legislative practice of the republic was implemented with adoption of the law of the Republic of Tajikistan on November 13, 1998 No. 677 "On civil service" (The law of the Republic of Tajikistan No. 677, 1998) which played a noticeable role in stabilization of government activity, definition of the status of civil servants, initiated the process of formation of civil service in the Republic of Tajikistan. In this law which worked within nine years, the modern understanding of essence of civil service for the first time was standardly issued. During its existence it was much made for formation of civil service. It is important to note that civil service became object of attention of arising institutes of civil society. Formation of organizational, scientific and methodical, educational and information infrastructure of civil service began. Civil service as social and legal institute became object of scientific researches and among scientists and experts (Karimov K. M., 2007).

**3 stage (1999 – 2007).** During this period the law "About Civil Service" of the Republic of Tajikistan on November 13, 1998 No. 677 became invalid and the new law "About Civil Service" enters in force from March 5, 2007 No. 233 which conforms to new requirements and standards to civil service, and also in 2001 the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on May 12, 2001 No. 28 "About the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan" was adopted in a new edition, which became the basis for structural changes in executive power. According to it for short term were developed and accepted next changes: The decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan on June 4, 2002 No. 853 "About system of central executive authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan"; Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan on October 9, 2002. No. 926 "About creation of Institute of professional development of civil servants of the Republic of Tajikistan"; Register of the state positions of the Republic of Tajikistan and annex to it "Qualification requirements for the state positions of civil service" 2002 and 2008; The Provision on the HR department, approved by the Decree of



the President of the Republic of Tajikistan on March 10, 2003 No. 1031, and a set of other normative legal acts of local character. All above-mentioned regulations made a certain contribution to improvement of office climate of government and improved the legal status of civil servants, order revenues to civil service and its performance, the role of HR department etc.. However, despite all this the regulatory base on civil service there remained some room for improvement. Adoption of regulations in various directions the most important of which were acts of social guarantees, preparation and retraining of civil servants and the concept of civil service was necessary for this purpose.

**4 stage (2007 - to present).** Continuation of reforming of system of civil service in the Republic of Tajikistan is carried out, new changes and additions are entered into the Law "On Civil Service", in particular obligatory competitive selection to administrative positions is established, qualification requirements to civil servants are established, the certain head of ethical control and performance appraisal of civil servants has been recently introduced (Official website of the Department for civil service affairs under the President of Tajikistan, 2014).

## Azerbaijan

### 1.1. Transition to market economy

The years after the independence, economically can be divided into two main periods. The period of 1991-1995 was characterized by economic chaos and regression. The period after 1996 was an increase in macroeconomic stability and dynamic economic development. The first period was strongly aggravated by political (unstable political situation during 1991-1993), military (20% of the territory of Azerbaijan was and still is under the occupation of Armenian military forces as a result of Armenia's military aggression against Azerbaijan. The majority of the one million refugees from Armenia and internally displaced persons from the occupied regions of Azerbaijan are still forced to live in unbearable conditions in refugee camps. Even though most of the refugees and IDPs are capable of working, they do not have permanent jobs and have to make their

living on random incomes and meager governmental allowances) and economic (the break up of mutual cooperation ties and economic relations that were formed over decades between the former Soviet states, have led to a rapid decline in production rates, limitation or suspension of production activities by most of the enterprises, widespread unemployment and reduction of salaries, as well as the rise of inflation. The actual economic capacity of Azerbaijan was disregarded in governmental efforts to increase salaries and improve the social security climate together with the introduction of numerous benefits for various groups of the population, in which this further encouraged inflation which ultimately led to hyperinflation) problems faced by the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The process of liberalization of price policy and foreign economic activities was started in the Republic of Azerbaijan over that period. The liberalization processes led to abrupt raise of prices in Azerbaijan until 1995. The price of consumer goods increased in 1991 by 2.07 times against figures of 1990, and was growing in several times every year (10.12% times in 1992, 12.3 times in 1993, 17.63 times in 1994).

The legalization of economic reforms was also reflected in adoption of the State Programme "On Business Development in Azerbaijan (1993-1995)" in 1993. Considering that only sporadic unmethodical activities were taken in place of serious reforms in business sector until 1993, the adoption and implementation of the programme played an important role in the achievement of positive results in that area (increase in the number of small and medium enterprises, expansion of foreign trade relations, etc.). Within a short historical period after the independence and even in spite of the unfavorable starting conditions, significant results were achieved in the fields of socio-economic development and integration into the world economic system as the result of far-sighted policy and intensive activities of the late President of Azerbaijan, the national leader Heydar Aliyev. The greatest achievement was that the Azerbaijani model of the state system establishment and development was established over the past period.

The second stage of economic reforms in the Republic of Azerbaijan was based on a number of large-size political documents (concepts,

strategies and programmes) which were either adopted and successfully realized (the State Assistance Programme to Small and Medium Businesses in Azerbaijan (1997-2000), the State Programme of Small and Medium Business Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan (2002-2005), the State Programme of Mechanical Engineering Industry Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan (2002-2005), the State Programme of Agricultural Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan (2002-2006), the Concept of Demographic Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan, the State Programme of Tourism Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan during 2002-2005, the State Programme of Poverty Reduction and Economic Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan (2003-2005), the State Programme of Socio-Economic Development of the Regions of Azerbaijan (2004-2008), etc.) or at the stage of adoption (the Employment Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Integrated Strategy of Trade and Investments in Non-oil Sector, etc.). Among the principle directions of consecutive and systematic economic reforms in Azerbaijan was the privatization of state properties and establishment of favorable conditions for free businessmen. Land and agrarian reforms are institutionally completed already. Over 1695.1 thousand hectares of land were passed free of charge to villagers, while kolkhozes and sovkhoses were transformed into farms. 99.8% agricultural products are currently produced by the private sector. This process encouraged significant socio-political changes and increased economic efficiency of various agricultural sectors. This has also led to significant reduction in importation of food products (e.g. meat and dairy products, potatoes and onion, etc.) over the last few years (Portal, 2010).

## **1.2. Public administration and civil service reforms**

Azerbaijan has done a lot in political reforming and institution-building, particularly with respect to establishing a functioning market economy, a healthy financial and banking system as well as ensuring high and sustained levels of GDP growth. These steps forward in the economic realm have allowed the Azerbaijani government to decrease poverty levels fivefold; implement privatization as well as ensure social stability, all being key conditions for successful political change. Beyond the market, however, the need to tackle directly political reform has become increasingly apparent.

Another important part of institutional reform is the rationalisation and improvement of public administration structures. In this regard, some measures have been taken to rationalise through the merging of government agencies. So far nearly 30 central government structures have been either liquidated or merged and new ones established. The government aims to provide key social and economic services for the citizens and help to remove impediments to growth and employment in the non-oil sectors through efficient management of the country's natural resource wealth. In order to achieve this it is important to improve the existing governance, policies and institutions for public expenditure management. The overall aims of public administration reform are:

- To improve governance, financial discipline and transparency
- To improve resource allocation and use
- To improve the efficiency of programmes and services

Although 30 central government structures have been reformed, it is still considered necessary to continue with these reforms in order to rationalise the existing government structures. Public administration reform envisages a close review of the mandates and expertise of separate government agencies since there is still significant duplication of functions in most of the government agencies dealing with economic issues. Therefore, it is intended to continue structural reforms with a view to ensuring the efficient functioning of different government agencies particularly in the agricultural sector. (World Bank, 2003).

## **Ukraine**

### **1.1. Transition to market economy**

After the Soviet Union collapse Ukraine was one of the poorest countries among former Soviet Union states. Statistics for the time are notoriously uncertain, but the best ones available show Ukraine's GDP at just \$1,307 per capita. Only Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan lagged behind Ukraine; even Moldova and Turkmenistan, generally regarded as very poor Soviet republics, were ahead of Ukraine. Ukraine inherited relatively good infrastructure and capital stock, in many respects what was built then was not maintained.

Ukraine's economy contracted annually between 9.7 and 22.7 percent in 1991–1996. The country faced with hyperinflation and an exceptionally huge production cut for a country not ravaged by a major war. Official GDP collapsed by almost half from 1990 to 1994, and slow decline continued throughout the decade. Economic growth would not resume again until 2000. The budget deficit was, at 14.4 percent of GDP, exceptionally large. Barter and the use of surrogate moneys and foreign currencies prevailed. Ukraine had introduced a sovereign currency, the hryvnia, but it was little used. A shadow economy swelled and compensated for an unknown share of the economic collapse. Political instability hindered the building of functional administrative institutions like tax authorities, and escaping into the untaxed shadow economy was easy. Corruption also helped ease that transition. As the tax base grew narrower, attempts to increase tax revenue often meant that what could be taxed was taxed too heavily. It forced many people and enterprises into the shadow economy. In the process, any respect for law tended to evaporate. This was not a good environment for competition, investment, and growth of new industries (Sutela, 2012).

## **1.2. Public administration and civil service reforms**

Independent Ukraine inherited Soviet state machinery with public authorities formed by representatives of Soviet communist party nomenclature as well as model and culture of public administration. Therefore, bad governance and its inalienable concomitant corruption became a kind of system disease which emerged as a result of new democratic and market conditions faced by the state machinery unable to cope with them due to its identity with soviet model closed from the society. In these circumstances, transparent and accountable policy could not be provided without change of the model, the structure of state machine, mechanism of decision making and reform of public sector. Reluctance to reform state bureaucracy fostered absence of legitimate procedures of lobbying interests of different groups of society, of consultations with citizens concerning policy development and realization, not to mention direct participation of society representatives in policy making. This resulted in several sequels, namely, coalescence of power and big business; regulatory policy oriented at interests of separate influential groups; negligence and prejudice of judges. The

privatization scheme was non-transparent and beyond the rule of law; this gave birth to lawless clannish monopolistic formations which by using connections with public authorities ensured own sky-high profits and great damage for the state and the people. Thus, independent Ukraine's elites from one side did not know how to react to new realities, and from another one – there was absence of political will to bring about adequate response to those challenges.

The contemporary Ukrainian politics produces an effect of muddle. During 2005-2008 Ukraine went through four changes of the Cabinet of Ministers, two parliamentary elections – regular in 2006 and pre-term parliamentary elections in 2007; numerous leadership reshuffles in local public authorities. Generally, the political situation in post-revolutionary Ukraine resembles circle: parliamentary elections – creation of coalition with appointment of new government – political crisis and loss of legitimacy by leading political parties – reelections when partly legitimacy somewhat restores – and again the beginning of the circle. At the same time, nobody tries to tear this circle (Popovych, 2012).

## **Russia**

### **1.1. Transition to market economy**

After dissolution of USSR three basic issues emerged fairly quickly: liberalization, stabilization and privatization. Liberalization was seen as the first element of transition, consisting of both internal and external liberalization, meaning eg price liberalization, as well as the liberalization of foreign trade and entrepreneurship in the formerly closed and state-controlled economies. Stabilization was and still is an essential part of any macroeconomic reform package. Bringing down high inflation and balancing government budgets were rightly seen as crucial preconditions for future growth (Gros and Steinherr 1995). The importance of privatization was partly based on the need to harden the Russia, privatization was initially based on voucher give-aways, which generally led to insider ownership and continued political control. In numerous instances, local politicians and managers in fact seized control of privatized former state enterprises, giving rise to 'grabbing hand

privatization'<sup>1</sup>. The second round of Russian privatization, the large auctions in the mid-1990s, on the other hand, contributed to the rise of oligarchs and raised considerable criticism, both inside and outside of the country (Boyko et al, 1995).

These three issues later formed the backbone of the so-called Washington consensus, a broad agreement – especially among the Washington institutions, the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury – on guidelines for successful transition.<sup>2</sup> Somewhat later much emphasis, both in economic theory and in policy analysis, has shifted towards reform implementation and the institutional arrangements. A wide range of institutions has been named as essential in successful transition, including property rights, law enforcement, and social norms and trust.<sup>3</sup> A major challenge of economic transition still today concerns the role of the government and public institutions. In most variants the socialist economies were overly centralised, overly regulated and overly bureaucratic but none of the bureaucracies had any means of efficiently operating in a market environment. Therefore shifting the incentives of politicians and bureaucrats towards goals compatible with functioning market economy has become all more important (Shleifer, 1997). Decentralization of economic decision-making has been proposed as one potentially fruitful means of tackling the issue. Due to the vast geographical area and formally federalist structure, decentralization and evolving fiscal federalism has indeed been a salient feature of Russia's economic transition during the 1990s.

## **1.2. Public administration and civil service reforms**

As other former soviet union countries embarked on administrative reform, Russia started its own reform that could be divided into 5 time periods (Administrative reform portal, 2014).

### *1 stage (1992-1993)*

At the first stage measures for reorganization of government and formation of concrete federal executive authorities were taken which on the typology and competences differed little from the Soviet ministries and departments.

### *2 stage of administrative reform (1996-1998)*

In September 1996 a policy memo "On the problem of weak management of state processes" was presented to the Russian President. In that paper the need for drafting a concept of new system of executive power was stressed as the main problem. Key ideas of this paper found reflection in the State of the Nation address of the Russian President in 1997 titled "Order in power - order in the country".

In May 1997 five working groups of experts were established to draft the Concept of administrative reform. Notably, from September 1996 to May 1997 twelve versions of the Concept of administrative reform were drafted.

In the final version of the Concept the following were noted as the main problems:

- citizen and power;
- executive power: new functions;
- problems of civil service;
- corruption in top management.

Discussion of the draft of the Concept of administrative reform took place on March 13, 1998. Participants of the meeting insisted that there were no grounds to start its implementation until 2000. In May 1998 the Concept was handed to the new Russian Prime Minister S. V. Kiriyenko for the purpose of publication, but it was left unpublished.

### *3 stage of administrative reform (1999-2000)*

Since fall of 1999 the center of development of problems of administrative reform moved from the Administration of the Russian President to the Center of strategic developments - the election campaign headquarters of V. V. Putin as the acting Russian Prime Minister.

In the beginning of 2000 the Center prepared the Concept of state construction which absorbed the main ideas of the Concept of administrative reform of 1998.

In the section "Power and Society" high degree of disharmony of the relations between the government and society was emphasised. It was claimed that the executive power was reproducing the soviet



management system. In the section “Policy of Changes in civil service” it was argued that civil service had to be established based on the principles of meritocracy, openness and free access. These ideas were short-lived, however. Due to the presidential elections and the policy shift towards strengthening of the power vertical, federal relations, change of the upper house of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, etc. Thus, the administrative reform was once again postponed.

#### *4 stage of administrative reform (2003-2005)*

In 2003-2005 administrative reform was practically carried out in the following directions:

- optimization of functions and structure of executive authorities;
- reforming of civil service;
- improvement of administrative procedures;
- creation of administrative justice.

#### *5 stage of reform (Program of administrative reform for the period until 2008)*

In the second half of 2004 the Concept of administrative reform in the Russian Federation for 2006-2008 was approved.

The concept of administrative reform provided among others:

- measures on introduction into the work of executive authorities of the principles of management by results;
- introduction of standards of the state and municipal public services;
- increase of system effectiveness of public procurement;
- creation and implementation of special regulative measures in corruption prone fields;
- completion of revision of excess and duplicating functions of executive authorities and elimination of inefficient state intervention in the economy;
- ensuring transparency and efficiency of interaction of executive authorities with civil society.

The concept was aimed, first of all, *at enhancing the institutional capacity of the national public administration* to achieve concrete results and also increase the quality and availability of public services and minimize the costs of inefficiencies in public procurements.

Immediate results of the Concept implementation were envisioned to be in the form of:

- 1) creation of public administration capable to achieve socially significant measurable objectives;
- 2) decrease in costs of doing business due to reduction of administrative barriers (by three times);
- 3) creation of the new markets for services by private businesses as a result of withdrawal of the state from certain spheres where its presence was not desirable ;
- 4) improvement of quality and availability of public services to citizens;
- 5) increase of trust of citizens and business in public institutions (Migin S., 2008)

## Georgia

### 1.1. Transition to market economy

The evolutionary and the so-called “shock” methods were in the initial stages of Georgia’s social-economic reforms transformation of the economy. Which one would be adopted would depend on the country’s capacity to undertake evolutionary and revolutionary transformations respectively. Both options came with supporting arguments, and researchers into transitional economies had different opinions. Most socio-political forces supported the idea of a gradual transition to a market economy, but at the beginning of 1990<sup>th</sup> the economies of many transition countries suffered a severe shock and more radical changes had to be made. It should be noted that at this period the new economic mindset contradicted the old stereotypical mindset, and this significantly delayed the implementation of reforms. The downfall of the Georgian economy began in 1990 and continued for another five years; this was partly the result of political conflict and ethno-political wars. During 1990-1993 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased by 28% a year on average, and in terms of purchasing capacity fell from USD 4,433 to USD 1,437 per capita. By 1995 production had decreased by 78% compared to 1990, a fall three times greater than that during the “Great Depression” in the US. In addition, although the other post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe suffered the same decline, it lasted for an average of 4 years in these countries, but 7 years in specifically post-Soviet countries. Although Georgia’s decline lasted for a relatively shorter time it was the deepest. Furthermore,

economic activity largely moved into the shadows, the black market overtaking the official economy.

Georgia was the last post-Soviet country to begin to peacefully construct its state and transform its economy. Not until 1995 did the Georgian economy begin to recover from crisis, supported by institutional transformation. The peak of economic growth was seen in 1997, when GDP grew by 10.7%, the highest rate prior to the “Rose Revolution”. But the growth rate then deteriorated dramatically, and the Russian financial crisis of 1998 significantly handicapped economic development, leading to inflation. This first catastrophic inflation caused an increase in the value of foreign currency in Georgia, in particular the US dollar, and in the size of the shadow economy, which as a coefficient of dollarisation reached its height by the end of 2003 – at 86% of the whole economy. In fact a two-currency zone existed in Georgia: local currency was used to cover immediate expenses, small business transactions and consumer costs, and the US dollar was used for large business transactions, larger consumer expenditures and making investments.

The biggest problems in the Georgian economy were the hyperinflation from the beginning of the nineties, low revenues accruing to the state budget and the financial crisis of 1998. And also, Georgia had the fundamental problems characteristic of an underdeveloped economy: a budget deficit, increasing state debt, low monetisation, a weak banking system and insufficient progress on institutional and structural reforms. Transformation progressed slowly; market mechanisms operated in a poor and weak manner. Strong administrative interference in the activities of market institutions prevented the development of a private sector and stimulated corruption and the formation of a new state oligarchy. To this can be added the immovability and stagnation in the attitude of the state; the level of monetisation was very low, and this indicated the limited role banks were playing. Due to the low levels of savings, the preponderance of cash transactions and the high dollarisation coefficient, the development of banks took place within a limited, closed environment. The low level of investment also contributed to the instability of the economy, and the high dollarisation increased Georgia's dependence on external factors, which, in case of the devaluation of the dollar, had a negative impact on the growth of the national economy and the value of goods

produced in Georgia. These and other indicators demonstrated the generally weak financial condition of Georgia, but the dynamics were slowly improving (USAID, 2012).

## **1.2. Public administration and civil service reforms**

In Georgia like in the most post-soviet states, new forces came to power and their ‘new order’ moved in different directions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Due to different conditions in these states, different social structures and state-society relations evolved. After national protests against the Soviet regime in 1989, and breakup of the USSR in 1991 – the first national elections were held, in which the “Round table, free Georgia” party won and Zviad Gamsakhurdia became president. This was followed by two ethnic wars in Osetia and Abkhazia, and a civil war during 1991-95. In 1992 Eduard Shevardnadze became leader of “Citizen’s union of Georgia” party and was president from 1995 until the Rose Revolution. In November 2003 on the wings of this revolution, the “Nationalists” party came to power, and young Mikheil Saakashvili, leader of the party, won the presidential elections in February of 2004 with great support from the population (almost 90%). Later, following political tensions of late 2007, the country has faced out of turn Presidential elections in January and parliamentary elections in spring 2008, where Saakashvili and ‘his party’ won again. Later on, state development was deranged with Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 for Georgia’s break-away region of South Ossetia.

One of the major issues related to corruption and Georgian political society, often mentioned was the problem of family clans and involvement of relatives in power structures (Tsitsishvili, 2010).

## **THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM TRAJECTORIES: COMMONALITIES, DIFFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS**

The development of the post-soviet countries since 1991 can be divided into 3 stages. In the first stage (1991 – 1995) the nations were gaining political independence, international recognition, accessing to international organizations etc. Clearly, during this period the GDP of the countries dropped significantly. The second stage (1996 – 2000) was characterized by strengthening of national sovereignty, creating of the private sector, currency, taxing and customs systems leading to decrease in inflation and some macroeconomic stabilization. The third stage (2001 – present) has been witnessing the

revenue maximization of natural resources, public administration and social reforms.

By 2010 Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and the Baltic States exceeded the GDP level of 1991. Ukraine, the second largest economy after Russia failed to ensure continued sustainable economic development. The recent political crisis exacerbated the situation. In Armenia, predominantly industrial country with significant scientific potential, the problems of transition were exacerbated by the earthquake of 1988 and the armed conflict with Azerbaijan. Since the early 1990s Armenia found itself in a blockade as automobile and railway networks between Azerbaijan and Armenia were terminated, and the railway connection to Russia via Georgia was also stopped due to the Georgian – Abkhaz conflict. Tajikistan is suffering from much more serious challenges. The civil war (1992 – 1996) led to significant human losses of more than 100 thousand (that is more than the country lost during the Second World War). These all point to the significant decrease of human resources capacities that complicated the transition.

What is clear is that the undertaken public administration reforms do not demonstrate a concerted attempt of transition but rather policy choices affected primarily by domestic political discourses and initial socio-economic conditions. The available information about the reform efforts and statistical data that was not collected regularly inevitably limits the depth of inferences to be drawn. Having said that certain development trends among the countries studied appear noteworthy.

**Table 2**

Country	TI CPI rating		GDP per capita USD current prices		WGI government effectiveness	
	1996-99	2013*	1991	2013	1996	2012
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	84 (out of 99)	140	1512	13172	-1.07	-0.44
<b>Armenia</b>	80 (out of 99)	94	589	3505	-0.41	-0.04
<b>Tajikistan</b>	124 (out of 133)	154	468	1037	-1.46	-0.93
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	96 (out of 99)	127	1209	7812	-0.94	-0.78
<b>Ukraine</b>	69 (out of 85)	144	1490	3900	-0.71	-0.58
<b>Russia</b>	47 (out of 54)	127	3427	14612	-0.52	-0.43
<b>Georgia</b>	84 (out of 99)	55	1310	3602	-0.67	0.57

Sources: TI (2014), WGI (2014). \* out of 174 countries

We can see from the *Table 2* that Kazakhstan, Armenia and Tajikistan from the mid 1990s to present progressed on government effectiveness by about 50 percentile points towards improvement, although all of them stagnated on their Corruption Perception Index during the same period. It is worth noting that the GDP per capita of Kazakhstan and Armenia increased 7 times, perhaps due to natural resources revenues. Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Russia remained relatively slow in increasing the government effectiveness, whereas among all the above countries Georgia made a meaningful progress in government effectiveness from -0.67 in 1996 to 0.57 in 2012 which is backed by its significant improvement on CPI from 84<sup>th</sup> place out of 99 countries in the mid 1990s to 55<sup>th</sup> place out of 174 countries in 2013. The general trend though among the studied countries, except for Georgia, is the persistently low government effectiveness and high level of corruption.

The purpose of reforms in these countries was somewhat similar – fast transition to market economy and solving the accumulated socio-economic problems (short and medium term). The prescribed measures of the Washington consensus penetrated the national agendas of these countries leading to waves of privatization of public assets and deregulation unfortunately often accompanied with rampant corruption.

All the countries studied managed to establish some form of civil service system with Kazakhstan being the first to adopt a law on Civil service and establish a specialized civil service agency whereas Russia even until today failed to establish such a specialized state agency. Overall it can be argued that civil service reforms in these countries need further development.

Besides Kazakhstan none of the studied countries established performance appraisal of civil servants in its full form found in the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, for instance. Kazakhstan is currently advancing in appraising the performance of its senior executive core “A” and other mid career professionals. It is also actively using performance management of state agencies based on certain criteria such as the quality and timeliness of public services delivery etc.

Overall, the post-Soviet countries since independence have been witnessing political and socio-economic consequences

of disintegration of the USSR. Politically countries regained sovereignty after 70 years, the national elites started enjoying international recognition. Arguably, the people who were close to former top management of the countries enjoyed preferential access to prestigious positions in civil service and public assets. The new political and business elites of the countries were faced with the challenges of nation building, mental shift in society and new geopolitics. The initial years of independence demonstrated different maturity and human resources levels when it came to political issues. Internal and international conflicts (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan etc) emerged pointing to the lack of leadership, negotiation skills and credibility of certain leaders.

Coming back to the discussion of sustainable development it is worth noting that the above analysis of countries' development trajectories and chosen policies points to the paramount importance of adequate institutional and human resource capacities. Building such capacities requires conscious and continuous investments such as Kazakhstan's Bolashak scholarship to finance most talented youth to study at best universities and come back with a different, progressive, mindset to instill change. Another example of efforts is anti-corruption measures of Georgia.

To sum up, it is useful to note that the civil service reform in the studied countries is ongoing and currently needs further professionalization, depoliticization and capacity building. Political interference is a common deficiency that exacerbates the weak institutional capacity to implement long-term reforms. The lack of a tradition of robust research in the field of HR management as a consequence of the soviet period results in the significant lack of institutional and HR capacities. Furthermore, following the prescriptions of the Washington consensus by the post-Soviet countries led to the loss of public assets, institutional capacity and socio-economic distress.

From a broader perspective, one can argue that the trajectories of the studied countries differ besides other factors partly due to chosen priorities of national development agenda which subsequently determined overall socio-economic performance and human resources capacities of national public administrations.

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## THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE INSTITUTE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: AMID EPOCHAL CHANGES & ON-GOING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CHALLENGES

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Chester A. Newland<sup>1</sup>

### **Abstract**

*Transformation of high levels of Public Service from exclusive elitism to general inclusiveness, reflecting epochal changes in American society generally, has been the most visibly sustained aspect of development of the Federal Executive Institute (FEI) throughout its 46 years of operations. Two other interrelated frameworks of change dynamics that remain on-going from earlier Public Administration thinking and practices have also been vital Institute concerns: (1) shifts from dominant centralized, hierarchical, silo structures of expert, positivist authority to behavioral theory and practices of Facilitative Governance, including cross-sectoral developments (but with growing reversions in recent decades associated with ideological extremism and partisan politicization); and (2) extension of the field from near-dominant preoccupation with Executive Branch affairs of government to governance broadly in digital-era contexts. The FEI has been impacted importantly by these developments, and it has contributed to them. Therefore, this paper attempts to analyze the development of the FEI within the framework of changes towards general inclusiveness in the American society. It concludes that the digital era, several decades in development, is now established globally as Epochal. New opportunities abound for multiplication of splendid values and reconciliation with them of varied means for their accomplishment. Challenges are great but many can be overcome in the years to come.*

**Key words:** *Federal Executive Institute, elitism, inclusiveness, governance, digital era.*

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## Epochal Transformation: From Exclusive Elitism to Open Inclusiveness

Upper reaches of civil and military public services were nearly entirely domains of Anglo males from relatively elite educational institutions and politically connected sources when the FEI was created in 1968. It was among the last of President Johnson's aspirations for a Great Society facilitated by *Inclusiveness*. The Institute was also vitally the handiwork of John Macy, both Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman and White House Personnel Advisor to the President. He was a *topmost exemplar* of merit-based, professionally expert, *exclusively elite, senior public service*, as broadly understood by most leaders in public administration in the 1950s and 1960s.

That exclusivity prevailed during FEI's first years. The CSC Bureau of Executive Manpower (as it was aptly named at the time) reported only 1.6% females at the Federal Supergrades 16, 17, and 18 levels in 1969; 1.5% in 1971; and 1.9% in 1974. Minority groups executives totaled 2.7% in 1971 (and 3.6% in a Feeder Group) and 4.7% in 1974 (and 5.1% Feeders).

The reality of such white-male exclusiveness was most dramatically illustrated in one of my earliest sessions after I became a FEI faculty member in 1971. Only one woman—*Linda*—was among the 60+ executive participants. And Linda was a total dummy! She was always ostentatiously seated most visibly on the front row at major meetings, and she was invariably professionally attired, quaffed, and unwaveringly attentive. Clearly, Linda was among troubled beginnings of a gender revolution. The all-male executives in that session had acquired Linda—a department-store mannequin—to express the Institute's dismay with the absence of women and minorities in their ranks and to encourage inclusiveness of the sorts aspired to in Great Society ideals.

Both gender and minorities inclusiveness moved slowly not only in FEI's initial years but through its early decades. Despite extensive efforts during my years as FEI's second director (ended in 1976 by the five-year maximum time allowed at the Institute pursuant to its "Temporary Society Culture" enforced by the CSC at the time),

only one FEI session in those years had as many as six women out of around 65 total participants. Anita Alpern, a powerful Treasury Department (IRS) GS 18, and others (especially FEI Alumni Association members) networked extensively in professional organizations and throughout government to bring about changes. However, as late as 1981, when I was asked to return to FEI, again to be a limited-term director for several months to deal with destructive problems, executive occupations were mostly in fields into which few women or minorities had entered prior to the late 1960s. Federal Service fields that accounted for 81.35% of executive occupations in 1981 were: *Administration*, 32.25%; *Engineering*, 14.2%; *Physical Sciences*, 12.9%; *Other Sciences*, 11.2%; and *Legal*, 10.8%.

That privileged elite of professionally expert white males in public services reflected America's centuries of legally enforced and/or condoned racial segregation and exclusion of minorities and females from equal opportunities to learn, enter paying jobs/careers, and advance shared standards and practices in search of human dignity. Lyndon Johnson and other advocates of inclusive culture sought epochal change via such efforts as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Hart-Celler Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and extensive programs of the War on Poverty. Most central to long-term alleviation of poverty were not simply the vital welfare programs instituted and extended in the 1960s and beyond but open job/career opportunities, including in public services, and learning via education, training, and other vocational / professional experience to merit workforce inclusion.

Creation of the FEI was a part of that, essential to changing Federal Executive Service from exclusive to achieve professional merit to inclusive with enhanced standards of professionalism and expertise. Doors were to be opened by such methods as *Affirmative Action*, not meritless tokenism, but through disciplines of individual and shared learning, performance, and earned advancement. LBJ relied upon and sought to advance roles of career civilian and military executives more than any other American President. In Vietnam affairs, he became severely criticized at the time and in history for what many considered wrong-headed dependence on policies and tactics of professional military leaders and their political advocates. Meanwhile, however, doors were deliberately opened in those

years for advancement of minorities and women in military service, with such examples as Army Colonel Juanita Roberts as Johnson's personal White House assistant and Colin Powell's preparation for topmost roles. With respect to civilian executive service, LBJ relied similarly heavily on John Macy to sustain and advance merit, even though Macy and the Civil Service Commission adhered generally to merit by exclusion and reliance on traditional elites. Johnson's aspirations were in partial contrast. He was a graduate of San Marcos State Teachers College with initial experience teaching Spanish-speaking Mexican-American students followed by early life-defining administrative service in FDR's National Youth Authority. He embraced as fundamental merit-based public service, as Macy did, including reasonable reliance on traditionally grounded elites. But he strongly opposed traditional Civil Service Commission exclusion of others and failures to advance affirmative means of inclusion of promising and qualified people from among non-elites, including those of diverse backgrounds and cultures. Hopes were that the FEI would become a force for such development, drawing on and valuing highly diverse talents and experience of executives to advance America as racial, gender, and multi-culturally inclusive.

However, as noted above, traditional exclusionary civil service practices remained hard to change. After all, exclusion of corrupt Spoils and Incompetence had been much of the essence of Civil Service reforms since their roots following the Centennial Era. Advancement was built on cherished ideals of elite public service based on a combination of specialized and generalist careerists in leadership positions. Note the depth of this elitist thinking in an example from early history of the Northern Virginia Branch of the University of Virginia, now the highly regarded George Mason University. Two topmost Public Administration leaders, one in Federal service and the other a most distinguished academician, withdrew from the institution's advisory roles when the faculty first sought to undertake graduate level education for high levels of public service. It was generally considered at the time that only a few elite institutions, including the then-all-male University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Syracuse's Maxwell School, Princeton, Harvard, the University of Southern California, and the likes, should provide graduate education in public administration for topmost Federal civilian service. It was considered desirable for "lesser schools"

to train for such public careers as law enforcement, fire services, public works, and even generalist city management, as at Kansas University (where Elmer Staats graduated before completing doctoral study at the University of Minnesota).

Leading books of the 1960s reflected realities, including merits, of traditional elitism while demonstrating needs for changes. David Stanley's 1964 Brookings study, *The Higher Civil Service*, found that, of those at high-levels studied, "Only one of the 363 present employees and three of the 163 former employees are women" (p. 23). John J. Corson and R. Shale Paul's 1966 Committee for Economic Development (CED) book, *Men Near the Top*, sought answers to questions of how to sustain and increase quality among high Federal Service levels. Among executives highlighted was one woman, the Commissioner of Welfare, Ellen Winston, in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—singularly responsible for many LBJ Era changes, including Medicare. This CED book contributed importantly to thinking in support of creation of the FEI. Forces for such action grew with publication in 1967 of a second Brookings study, *Men Who Govern*, by David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and Jameson W. Doig.

For well over a decade now at the FEI, realities have been of *Women and Men At and Near the Top*. Inclusion of minorities and of foreign-born professionals of expert talents remains more limited than in top levels of business and political leadership. But generally, *public service inclusion has reflected epochal changes in racial and gender roles that have accelerated in the past 25 years, grounded in civic, political, and professional efforts of earlier generations.*

The stand-out exception to changes until recently was strict exclusion of known homosexuals from public services—reflecting social values that remained powerful in much of America until recent decades. President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10450, issued 27 April 1953, excluded "security risks" not only in former political terms but rather stressing character: "Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion." While this E.O. did not refer to homosexuality, it was implemented as a suitability test to exclude known gays and lesbians. As Civil



Service Chairman, John Macy wrote to Frank Kameny, an Army Map Service astronomer fired pursuant to the policy: "Homosexuals or sexual perverts are not suitable for Federal employment" (*National Journal*, 25 January 2014, p. 24). As a contrary example to this view, when White House aide Walter Jenkins was forced out due to an alleged homosexual incident, Claudia Taylor (Lady Bird) Johnson had her photograph taken with him and released it publicly. The President followed that with support for Jenkins' private employment in Austin. The Civil Service Commission aggressively continued to pursue exclusion of known homosexuals until the U.S. Supreme Court held the policy unconstitutional in *Norton v. Macy* (1969) and in *Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton* (1973). Comprehensive inclusionary policy finally came with the appointment by President Obama of John Berry, a prominently out homosexual, as Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Director. Exclusionary policies continued in military services, with "Don't Ask; Don't Tell" prescribed during the Clinton Administration. However, in the Obama Administration, following broad changes in social acceptance, openly out gays and lesbians were finally accepted in the military.

America's epochal transformation from a White Supremacist and otherwise exclusionary society into a broadly inclusive one since President Truman's racial integration of military services and vast changes in laws in the 1950s and 1960s has been topmost among FEI's contexts. *The Institute was created to facilitate varied and shared capacities of public executives for behavioral and other leadership to deal with such challenges.* Enduring and changing inclusiveness obstacles remain ever-challenging, along with other contexts that require executives to balance needs for stability and vital changes. In short, confounding problems of Temporary Society that were understood in FEI's founding remain ever-present in dynamic constitutional democracy. Public executives must be among foremost facilitators of diverse and shared governance for society's multiplication of constructive values and varied talents and means to their accomplishment. Beyond the epochal American transformation to inclusiveness, these competencies involve two other defining sets of American changes related to FEI experience, each briefly noted next.

## FEI in Changing Contexts: Hierarchical Positivism and Facilitative Governance

Decades before FEI's creation, at least since realities learned during and soon after World War Two, American Public Administration had transitioned from singular domination by hierarchical positivism to embrace of rapidly expanding knowledge from behavioral sciences. Among leading studies was the topmost 1960 book by John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, *Administrative Organization*. It examined cutting-edge developments in theories and practices during the period of FEI's creation. The authors' Preface could serve as a powerful framework of the Institute as a creative engine of changing contexts of American Federal Government and of public administration globally:

"Studies of administrative organization tend to cluster at one or the other of two poles. At one end is the traditional framework of job content, job structure, and job relationships—the mechanistic, engineering approach to the problem. At the other end is the human behavioral orientation, in which the sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists have been most prominent. As a result there has been a need for introductory materials which seek a middle ground between these two contrasting extremes. To provide such materials is the essential purpose of this book." (p. v)

As FEI's inaugural director, Frank Sherwood creatively facilitated a shared search for informed middle ground, recognizing that diversely experienced, highly placed Federal Executives have widely varied talents and much expertise to bring to endeavors. Borrowing from Malcolm Knowles's advocacy of Andragogy befitting adult learning rather than Pedagogy oriented to children, efforts were to create a diverse community of shared and varied learning.

My initial FEI experience highlighted that vital context. As both an in-and-out government executive, civic activist, and itinerate university faculty member prior to arriving in Charlottesville, I had always identified my role as a *teacher*. Other Institute faculty members immediately informed me that, at FEI, I was not to be identified as a teacher but as a *facilitator*. Since I had grown up in Kansas and completed military service mostly in Texas—places

where a facilitator was a behavioral expert who helped bulls and heifers in their sometimes challenging intricacies of procreation—that instruction initially raised professional doubts and troubling questions about my expected FEI roles. But I quickly caught on and embraced FEI's innovative language and effective practices of shared and diverse learning and varied applications. They were, after all, basically like my earlier roles as a teacher in exceedingly dynamic U.S. Air Force and university contexts, but with vastly deeper and broader embrace at FEI of human behavioral factors. From previous work with topmost officials and career executives, I had long understood that my roles (as teacher or facilitator) consisted of helping individuals, groups, organizations, and society generally to achieve constructive successes via self and shared talents and other diverse resources.

Particularly important subsequently in the 1970s and into the 1990s, understanding of Facilitative Government and Governance more broadly that was strengthened at FEI was vital in my professional responsibilities. Facilitative State theory and practice became central, for example, in challenging international development activities. Especially in Polish Solidarity Movement involvements and other efforts leading to and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, facilitative competencies were crucial. Facilitative Governance became a redefining framework throughout over two decades in United Nations efforts in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and in bits in the Middle East.

These theories and practices were three-fold: (1) Civil Societies, stressing responsible self-governance and diversity/multiculturalism; (2) Global & Local Market Economics and Facilitative Regulation and Support to limit Market Failures, stressing open markets as in European Union and NAFTA and workable regime institutions, such as reserve banks and anti-trust efforts; and (3) Facilitative Governments and Cross-Sectoral Governance (emphasizing constitutional limits and authority; devolution and situational differentiation; and extensive public, private, and personal self-governance).

Importantly, human-behavior dynamics and facilitative-culture disciplines, as advanced earlier by the FEI and vastly expanded upon internationally, also became important in American public administration generally (Newland). However, throughout

the Carter and Reagan Administrations in American National Government, public administration became extensively populated in universities by “free-market” economists and in politics and government by libertarian thought, as at OPM. Market concerns of Facilitative Governance became infused with *laissez faire* doctrine, depicting Government as “the Problem,” as President Reagan said at his inauguration. In international public policies, this was most crucial in International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) insistence on privatization of enterprise throughout former USSR zones in the absence of Rule of Law institutions in support of responsible private enterprise. New Public Management (NPM) became a trendy movement in public administration, advocating a new dichotomy of policy (via partisan political officials) and management (via “Limited Term” responders). The UN Development Programme, with which I was often involved, and the EU’s Technical Assistance (TACIS) program generally resisted such NPM ideology. But in America, such institutions as the University of Chicago, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Southern California and the U.S. OMB and OPM were joined by vastly more leaders in its trendy embrace.

With respect to how all of this relates to FEI, consider the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, chiefly the creation of Alan (Scotty) Campbell, the Economist Dean of the distinguished Maxwell School of Syracuse University who was Carter’s appointee as Civil Service Commission Chairman and subsequent Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Director. Campbell believed in Economic Man, one of two most crucial theories implemented by the CSRA. Performance, it is *believed*, is driven most basically by self interests (and, therefore, financial bonuses / “merit pay”) more than by public service values. Thus, if so, working for government is primarily a job for personal gain. The second most basic CSRA provision is Presidential Executive Branch Domination of Federal Government (and, subsequently, responsiveness to enlarged partisan politicization) that became especially enlarged in the Reagan Administration under OPM Direction of Dr. Donald Devine.

*Laissez faire* regimes justified as Facilitative Government and Dispersed Governance translated into contracting out imperatives. Under guises of civil service personnel reductions as cut-back

government despite vastly expanded budgets in many situations, throw-backs to mechanical, engineering modes of outsourced performance have characterized some important procurements. Realities stretch far beyond such negatives, however. Outsourcing was old, long preceding OMB's A-76 that originated on such practices during the LBJ Administration. With changed government and private-sector roles and conditions from the 1960s forward, however, it vastly expanded and is now a principal way of organizational being in private for-profit enterprises, non-profit activities, universities, governments—almost whatever and wherever.

### **Contemporary Contexts: Outsourced Government; Disaggregation & Conjunction**

Coincident with epochal **Digital Era Sciences and Technologies** and accompanying perpetual-motion rhythms of social, economic, and political complexities, for-profit and non-profit enterprises are now commonly empowered as preferred performers of government-provided functions. Government agencies, such as OPM, that share in provision of legally required or sanctioned functions, increasingly appear as *non-directly-appropriated-fund cost centers* in an “every tub must float financially on its own bottom world.” That is similar to old practices in many universities and other contracts-supported research institutions that contain varied money-earning activities within separated silos while centrally skimming shared overhead (often large, some doubling “service” charges). With growing imperatives for collaborative efforts among formerly distinctively specialized and separated disciplines, this old “divide and conquer” organizational funding style of centralized control from the top is no longer suited to many highly advanced research and development institutions, whether universities, for-profit businesses, or governmental organizations. However, silos and skimmed funding to support centralized domination persist, along with outsourced performance of functions.

Consider the outsourcing example of the FEIAA 2014 Executive Forum, scheduled for 20 May. The opening speaker will be John Kamensky, Associate Partner with IBM's Global Business Services and Senior Fellow of the IBM Center for the Business of Government, following his 24 years of public service. Since 2005, he has been among the most involved and impactful Fellows of the

National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). For many more years, he has been active in the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). The afternoon Keynote Speaker at this year's Forum will be Warren Blank, the Founder and President of *The Leadership Group*, a private training and development firm out of North Carolina and Florida, and a regular Adjunct Professor for many years at FEI. Realities are that such expertise appears difficult (or nearly impossible) to sustain within today's Federal Civil Service, although it can be encouraged and nourished, as by the FEI. Also among realities, such external expertise may displace internal organizational competencies for dynamic creativity and accomplishment.

Outsourcing similarly characterizes vastly more of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Federal Government. Among the most widely known examples today is the extensive contracting out to for-profit private enterprise of national security performance, as by Edward Snowden, employed 2009-2013 by Del, Inc., a privately owned multinational computer technology company based in Round Rock, Texas. While Snowden is now notorious as a secret-documents leaker and the NSA has failed miserably in keeping public trust, the long history of dispersed responsibility for performance of vital governmental functions earlier earned mostly sustained respect. Recall, for example, the *Manhattan Project* in nuclear energy developments during World War Two that relied around 95% on outsourcing. Remember also how the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) similarly earned popular and political support and scientific / technical acclaim while drawing on universities and mostly for-profit business enterprises for well over 90% of performance.

**Conjunction** of public and private responsibility, as in the Manhattan Project and NASA examples, is essential in challenging affairs of advanced civilization. **Authority** to match such shared responsibility—often awesome—is an enduring challenge of constitutionally democratic and responsible private-enterprise culture.

That essential match has been found in important measures historically through exercise of professionally disciplined, highly diverse, and shared expertise functioning in balance with responsible

social, economic, political, and legal-systems institutions. Those were realities behind successes of the Manhattan Project and NASA: Career Executive Service included the likes of Donald Stone, Jim Webb, Elmer Staats, and Dwight Ink, working topmost in **Nexus** with responsible political officials in Congress and the Executive Branch. Early FEI participants in eight-week sessions included Charles Bingman (FEIAA Founder from Session One) and Anita Alpern (IRS GS18) as well as some presidentially appointed officials, including George Hartzog (Park Service Director) and Georgiana Sheldon (DOD and CSC Commissioner). Joe Bartlett (Marine General and GOP Clerk to the House) was among a few Congressional staff executives, and he remained active for years in support of career / political and Congressional / Executive Branch connectedness through FEIAA and the Institute. While some such matches of Public Service careerists and political officials survive, they are no longer the Federal Government standard. Disastrous consequences include far more than the Snowden Affair. Consider the astonishingly defective roll out of the Affordable Care Act, relying for essential digital technologies on private, for-profit business enterprise—a significant part based outside the United States.

Today's divisively partisan politics nationally and globally impacted business enterprise, lacking shared ethical and legal grounding, make workable matches of shared responsibility and commensurate authority—the historic ideal of Public Administration—illusory at best. However, the search for such responsible accomplishment remains essential to American society. And precisely due to troubling changes in conditions since FEI's founding 46 years ago, the Institute needs to remain in the struggle. Especially through the FEIAA, it does. Thankfully, it has participated increasingly effectively in **America's epochal transformation to an inclusionary culture from earlier centuries-long exclusionary practices.**

Ways and means of contributing to solutions of today's other great challenges warrant understanding and informed participation by Federal Executives. And FEI can continue vital contributions in these, even though some promising executive-workforce conditions that were a blessing when the Institute was created are now absent. If skeptical, remember that today's great blessing of *Inclusive*

*Public Service* was absent during FEI's early years—and **We did Overcome!**

Two sets of enduring understandings among effective public officials and career executives remain vital among many workable ways and means of public-service effectiveness. These are well understood by topmost contemporary thinkers, fashionably termed **Disaggregation** and **Conjunction** in today's Digital Era. But they have been situationally practiced together by most highly effective careerists and political officials throughout dynamic advances in Business and Public Administration. Basically, these are twin practices analyzed as Differentiation and Integration by Harvard Business Professors Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch in Contingency Theory that prevailed when FEI began operations. It was not new then. Situational performance was explained by Mary Parker Follett in the 1920s and practiced by Chester Barnard in the 1930s. It was of the essence of the Manhattan Project and NASA's Moon Walk and other accomplishments. Lyndon Johnson was a political genius in understanding and employing these contingency means and ends as Senate Majority Leader and as President. Donna Shalala, HHS Secretary throughout the Clinton Presidency juggled responsibilities in sustained nexus with careerists and politicians, drawing on deep understanding of how to disaggregate challenging complexities for differentiated handling by specialized expertise and energies. She then called upon diverse experts with twin knowledge and skills to integrate findings and forces for accomplishment.

Disaggregation / Differentiation has been most deeply researched and thoughtfully analyzed in recent years by Anne Marie Slaughter, Princeton University Distinguished Professor and former Woodrow Wilson School Dean and also Foreign Policy Deputy in the U.S. Department of State during the first years of the Obama Administration. In her 2004 Book, *A New World Order*, Slaughter explained realities of decades and even centuries of advances in globally shared Rule of Law by disaggregation of sovereignty into such diverse elements as Law of the Sea, International Postal Service, etc. matched with development of workably differentiated institutions. In short, these are ways and means to get needed work done internationally, recognizing that a generally comprehensive Rule of Law is beyond valued differences among varied cultures



globally. Federal career executives and political officials need to understand and employ such understandings domestically as well for shared accomplishment of many vital responsibilities.

Conjunction/Integration has been most succinctly analyzed recently by H. George Frederickson, Kansas University's Distinguished Stene Professor of Public Administration. He focuses on metropolitan local-government realities of jurisdictions distinctly separated by laws and politics but in vital need of shared infrastructures and many conjoined operations. By election and/or appointment, local government officials remain bound within their separate jurisdictions, but successes depend on getting needed work done collaboratively irrespective of borders. This understanding is vital in Federal service as well. Connectedness is increasingly imperative not only among agencies and intergovernmentally but among public and private entities cross-sectorally. Failures among security providers to "get it together" outside their silo walls were revealed in the 911 World Trade Center, Pentagon, and hostage plane terrorism over Pennsylvania. Continued deficiencies in needed integration are due in significant part to vital importance of differentiation. Balancing those requirements—matching disaggregation for multiplication of constructive values and specialized expertise with conjunction for collaborative accomplishment—remains at the heart of responsible political and career public service.

### **Concluding Reflections: Reconciling Ideals and Realities**

Transformation to *generally inclusive Federal Civilian and Military Services* from extensive racial, gender, and other exclusions has been FEI's biggest contextual change in the 46 years since its creation. Epochal changes in American culture and institutions, of which these Public Service developments have been key parts, should dispel or at least moderate skepticism and provide inspiration for other needed advances. Struggles remain between mechanistic and centralized positivism and behaviorally informed facilitative governance and diverse creativity as organizational frameworks. These struggles have intensified following increased extremism in politics, religions, entertainment, and individual and group self-indulgences. Even ossification of extremes appears in packaged prescriptions in education and training conferences and institutional

venues, drawing on glitzy digital technologies to inculcate trendy formulations as “executive learning.”

Reconciling ideals and realities discussed above has almost always been challenging—including in creation, survival, and developments of FEI. During my first period as Director, 1973–1976, forced changes included formal elimination of the Institute’s impressively outstanding Advisory Board, chaired by universally respected Roger W. Jones, 43+ year Federal official with moderate GOP credentials, including service as Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy OMB Director, and CSC Chairman. The GAO’s Elmer Staats was also among advisors who provided splendid insights. Congressional action requiring detailed reporting of virtually all aspects of utilization of such advisory bodies was applied government-wide, making their use impractical.

Also highly disappointing during that period, extensive University of Virginia efforts to provide a permanent FEI facility on its grounds failed, despite thoughtfully expert collaboration in planning by the University’s Chief Architect and FEI Deputy Director Pat Conklin and FEI Administrative Officer Mike Carmichael’s informed liaison with both CSC and UVA. The CSC insisted on having a large parcel of UVA land for development of a much larger, general training operation with the Institute merged within it. Also upsetting, though more understandable given perspectives of Client Agencies to which I personally went to “sell shares” to attend programs, the FEI was compelled to reduce its principal Sessions from 8 to 4 weeks. While CSC Chairman Bob Hampton sought vigorously to protect “academic freedoms” of the Institute, bureaucratic entanglements and dependencies were ever-present, as was typical in my experience elsewhere in government and universities.

My second service as FEI Director was understood topmost at OPM to be probably limited to 15 to 18 months of struggle for the Institute’s survival. The reserve-fund surplus of a bit over \$730,000 when I departed four-years earlier had evaporated, and a deficiency of over \$1 million (Big Money back then) in the revolving fund was due to legally questionable CSC uses for personnel investigations requirements. A public scandal would have done no good; professional correction might. Most urgently, the FEI facility was

about to be placed in escrow to be sold to General Electric. Despite earlier termination of FEI's Advisory Board, Roger W. Jones took the lead and we contacted GE's CEO, Reginald H. Jones, who stopped the purchase. The facility owner was understandably dismayed. He wanted to get rid of FEI and sell the place or, at the least, find profitable alternatives. Serious threats included efforts to relocate the Institute, including a proposal by North Carolina's Senator Robert Morgan to move it to Rocky Mount, NC, then an isolated town with limited access. New York's U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, with whom I had been a bit involved in study of Federal Labor-Management Relations (EO 10988) and in archival development of the LBJ Presidential Library in the 1960s, had become Chair of Senate Public Works. He took the lead with Virginia's Senator John Warner and Congressman Kenneth Robinson, Charlottesville's 5<sup>th</sup> District Representative, to scuttle that. Following my meeting with Congressman Levitas' House Public Works staffer, Nancy Vitali, and other House experts on 24 June 1980, Pat Moynihan briefly convened Senator Childs's Appropriations staffer, Mike Hall, and others, including one other OPM executive and me, on 25 June 1980 to demonstrate support for FEI to continue operations in Charlottesville. In celebration, the FEI soon got two bushels of apples delivered personally by the Congressman from the Robinson Family's orchards. North Carolina Senator Morgan lost reelection.

It was already clear by late Summer 1980 that President Carter could not be reelected and that Ronald Reagan would become President. That facilitated professional networking with Reagan's transition leaders, Ed Meese and others, both before and following the November 1980 election. For strictly limited part time, I scheduled myself to assist Ed Meese at the Presidential Transition Headquarters on M Street and then at the EOP, not in my role as FEI Director but as incoming ASPA National President and as a NAPA Fellow serving officially on the Academy's Presidential Transition Panel. Ralph Bledsoe, a Senior FEI Faculty Member, 1973-1980, joined Dwight Ink, Chuck Bingman, and me in those efforts. Ralph had earlier served as Director of the University of Southern California's Sacramento Center, where was involved with Governor Reagan and Ed Meese. As the Presidential Transition developed, Ralph was selected to become Secretary to the highly important Reagan Cabinet Council on Domestic Affairs.

Appointment of Don Devine as OPM Director could not be prevented, and he was sworn in on 23 March 1981. OPM scheduled his Director's Reception on April Fool's Day, and I participated. Most importantly for FEI, Loretta Cornelius, a prominent professional of a respected Virginia political / GOP family and a USC Public Administration doctoral student, was appointed Deputy OPM Director with specified authority for all FEI oversight. Ed Meese arranged that. Meanwhile, throughout this troubled period, FEI's outstanding administrative staff and full-time professional faculty and expert adjuncts (mostly distinguished UVA resident faculty members) kept the Institute on course. A vital aspect of that blessing was that Bob Matson was splendidly prepared to become the Director, relatively free to devote his high expertise to substantive executive-development programming.

That experience is summarized in conclusion here to emphasize that one should not be naive about challenges of Reconciling Ideals and Realities. Troubles sometimes abound. Contexts change. Situations can commonly be altered. Sometimes not! Today, the American political parties and elections system is seriously fractured if not dangerously broken, as U.S. Senator Bill Bradley concluded as early as the 1980s. The Great Recession from 2008 to whenever continues to be reflected in damaging joblessness and in growing extremes separating *Haves and Have Nots*. Remains of NPM ideology continue to be powerful in some Public Administration venues and politics.

Yet, the **Digital Era**, several decades in development, is now established globally as Epochal. New opportunities abound for multiplication of splendid values and reconciliation with them of varied means for their accomplishment. Challenges are great but many can be overcome, as in the Epochal Transformation to Inclusiveness that has redefined America. **These are promisingly challenging times for FEI. When have they not been?**

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